Workman v. Copeland

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Workman v. Copeland

108 S.E. 922, 117 S.C. 214, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 149

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedOctober 10, 1921

Docket10729

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 108 S.E. 922 (Workman v. Copeland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Workman v. Copeland, 108 S.E. 922, 117 S.C. 214, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 149 (S.C. 1921).

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Opinions

The opinion of the Court w¡as delivered by

Mr.' Justice Fraser.

In the view that this Court takes of this case, very few words are necessary to determine it.- The Copeland Company were conducting a mercantile business at Clinton, S. C. The stores occupied by the company were the individual property of the .defendant J. W. Copeland, who '.was the president and the person who conducted the negotiations between the parties. The plaintiffs claim that by a parol agreement W. H. Workman, on behalf of himself and others, bought the stock of goods and made a lease of the storehouses for a period of five years. Before the end of' the first year Mr. Copeland sold the storehouses to his codefendant. The codefendant denied the lease, and. demanded increased rent after the expiration of a year. This •suit was brought for specific performance.

Appellant’s argument says:

“There is only one question, Was if error to refuse specific performance of this contract; it being one in parol to give a lease of buildings for a longer time than one year?”

*226 Due consideration will show clearly how impossible it is tOi grant the -relief demanded. The plaintiff W. H. Workman in his testimony stated:

“It never occurred to me to'have the lease put in writing till after he talked about selling. I did not know that a verbal lease for fivei years was not good till later oh, when some of them claimed it was no.t good, when he began to talk about wanting the building.”

1,2 There being no agreement for a written lease, the Court -cannot require Mr. Copeland to execute a written lease. The Courts may require a person to perform a contract he has made. There was no agreement for a written lease, and the Court is powerless to require one. It is equally clear that a parol lease for five years is void under the statutes, and the .Court cannot enforce a parol contract that the statutes- say is void.

There are other insuperable obstacles in the plaintiffs’ way, but this is enough. ' . .

Det the report of the special referee and the decree of the trial Judge be repotted.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Ci-iiee Justice Gary and Mr, Justice Watts concur.

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The opinion of the Court w¡as delivered by

Mr.' Justice Fraser.

In the view that this Court takes of this case, very few words are necessary to determine it.- The Copeland Company were conducting a mercantile business at Clinton, S. C. The stores occupied by the company were the individual property of the .defendant J. W. Copeland, who '.was the president and the person who conducted the negotiations between the parties. The plaintiffs claim that by a parol agreement W. H. Workman, on behalf of himself and others, bought the stock of goods and made a lease of the storehouses for a period of five years. Before the end of' the first year Mr. Copeland sold the storehouses to his codefendant. The codefendant denied the lease, and. demanded increased rent after the expiration of a year. This •suit was brought for specific performance.

Appellant’s argument says:

“There is only one question, Was if error to refuse specific performance of this contract; it being one in parol to give a lease of buildings for a longer time than one year?”

*226 Due consideration will show clearly how impossible it is tOi grant the -relief demanded. The plaintiff W. H. Workman in his testimony stated:

“It never occurred to me to'have the lease put in writing till after he talked about selling. I did not know that a verbal lease for fivei years was not good till later oh, when some of them claimed it was no.t good, when he began to talk about wanting the building.”

1,2 There being no agreement for a written lease, the Court -cannot require Mr. Copeland to execute a written lease. The Courts may require a person to perform a contract he has made. There was no agreement for a written lease, and the Court is powerless to require one. It is equally clear that a parol lease for five years is void under the statutes, and the .Court cannot enforce a parol contract that the statutes- say is void.

There are other insuperable obstacles in the plaintiffs’ way, but this is enough. ' . .

Det the report of the special referee and the decree of the trial Judge be repotted.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Ci-iiee Justice Gary and Mr, Justice Watts concur.

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108 S.E. 922, 117 S.C. 214, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/workman-v-copeland-sc-1921.

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