Wooten v. Jackson

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Wooten v. Jackson

812 So. 2d 609, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 4603, 2002 WL 529917

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 10, 2002

DocketNo. 1D01-2731

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 812 So. 2d 609 (Wooten v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wooten v. Jackson, 812 So. 2d 609, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 4603, 2002 WL 529917 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence entered in this case pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2001), because the trial court denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. On remand, the trial court shall permit the parties to present evidence on the issue of entitlement to the requested injunction. See, e.g., Chanfrau v. Fernandez, 782 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (both section 741.30 and constitutional principles of due process require that the court hold a full evidentiary hearing before entering a permanent injunction against domestic violence); Utley v. Baez-Camacho, 743 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“The purpose of a due process hearing following the grant of an ex parte temporary injunction is to give the defendant an opportunity to show that the allegations previously relied on are not true”); Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (the constitution, statute and rules contemplate, at a minimum, that the parties will have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence prior to a ruling on a request for a permanent injunction against domestic violence).

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

ALLEN, C.J., MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse the final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence entered in this case pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2001), because the trial court denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. On remand, the trial court shall permit the parties to present evidence on the issue of entitlement to the requested injunction. See, e.g., Chanfrau v. Fernandez, 782 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (both section 741.30 and constitutional principles of due process require that the court hold a full evidentiary hearing before entering a permanent injunction against domestic violence); Utley v. Baez-Camacho, 743 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“The purpose of a due process hearing following the grant of an ex parte temporary injunction is to give the defendant an opportunity to show that the allegations previously relied on are not true”); Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (the constitution, statute and rules contemplate, at a minimum, that the parties will have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence prior to a ruling on a request for a permanent injunction against domestic violence).

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

ALLEN, C.J., MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

812 So. 2d 609, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 4603, 2002 WL 529917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wooten-v-jackson-fladistctapp-2002.

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