Wooten v. Abbott

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2452
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROBERT WOOTEN, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2452 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 15 : GREG ABBOTT, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert Wooten filed this lawsuit against Defendant Greg Abbott, the Governor

of Texas, following Defendant’s pardon of Daniel Perry. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleged

that the pardon was unconstitutional, and Defendant moved to dismiss this case. This Court

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, citing a lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.

Plaintiff then timely filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion.

II. BACKGROUND1

This suit was filed following Defendant’s pardon of Daniel Perry, who was convicted of

murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison in April 2023. Second Am. Compl. at 2,

ECF No.7. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s pardon was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth

Amendment, arguing that Defendant infringed on the First Amendment rights to peacefully

1 A more detailed presentation of the facts can be found in this Court’s previous memorandum opinion, but a summary of the procedural history of this case follows. See generally Mem. Op. Grant Mot. Dismiss (“Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 14. assemble and free speech. See id. at 15. Defendant moved to dismiss these claims on multiple

grounds, including improper venue, lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, failure to

state a claim, improper service, and qualified immunity. Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 8. On

April 23, 2025, this Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed

to establish both general and specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Mem. Op. at 6, 9.

Plaintiff then timely filed a motion for reconsideration on May 14, 2025, asking the Court to

reconsider its dismissal. Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 1, ECF No. 15.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“If a person files a motion for reconsideration within twenty-eight days of the judgment

or order of which he complains, courts consider it a Rule 59(e) motion.” SEC v. Bilzerian, 729

F. Supp. 2d. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2010). Because Plaintiff has met this twenty-eight-day deadline,

Plaintiff’s motion will be considered a Rule 59(e) motion. Such motions are “disfavored and

relief from judgment is granted only when the moving party establishes extraordinary

circumstances.” Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001). To

find such circumstances, courts review the motion to determine whether “there is an intervening

change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or

prevent manifest injustice.” Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). However, “[a] Rule 59(e) motion

to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has

already ruled.” Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140 (D.D.C.

2023) (quoting New York v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995)) (alteration in

original).

2 IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has failed to establish any extraordinary circumstances warranting this Court’s

reconsideration. First, in their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff does not discuss any

intervening change of controlling law. See generally Pl’s. Mot. for Recons; see also Messina,

439 F.3d at 759. Second, Plaintiff fails to provide any new, available information that this Court

could consider in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See generally

Pl’s. Mot. for Recons; see also Messina, 439 F.3d at 759; Hindu Am. Found. v. Viswanath, 646

F. Supp. 3d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2022) (“[a] plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and to meet that burden, the plaintiff

must allege specific facts upon which personal jurisdiction may be based”) (citation omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff does not establish a clear error or manifest injustice. In its prior memorandum

opinion, this Court examined both aspects of personal jurisdiction, specific and general. Mem.

Op. at 5–8. While Plaintiff claims that the Court’s reasoning was in error because the Court did

not reach the merits of their claims, Plaintiff fails to provide any legal authority supporting that

assertion. See Pl’s Mot. for Recons. at 6 (“In the courts [sic] discussion of its decision in this

action . . . [i]ts focus is entirely, and improperly, on the Petitioner; when, in fact, its concern

should be entirely on the Constitution vis a vis, the actions of the government.”). Nor could

they. See Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (when “personal jurisdiction is in question, a court must first determine that it possesses

personal jurisdiction over the defendants before it can address the merits of a claim”). Given that

none of the extraordinary circumstances that could provide grounds for reconsideration have

been shown, the motion must be denied.

3 V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 15) is

DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: November 20, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge