Woolley v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-3745
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS WILLIAM WOOLLEY, No. 24-3745 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 6:23-cv-00645-AN v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Adrienne C. Nelson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 8, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CLIFTON, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Thomas Woolley appeals the district court’s order affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability benefits.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review the district court’s order de novo and may reverse a denial of

benefits only when that decision is “based on legal error or not supported by

substantial evidence in the record.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 653–54 (9th

Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means—and

means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A claimant is precluded from an award of disability benefits if alcohol or

drug use is “a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s determination

that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). This analysis turns on

whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) would find the claimant disabled

even in the absence of drugs or alcohol use. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535.

Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Woolley’s

substance use was material to his mental impairments. Records from Woolley’s

visits to the emergency department in July 2020 show that he experienced several

episodes of substance-induced psychosis and that his conditions improved

markedly during the times when he was not using substances. As the ALJ

observed, mental status findings that post-dated July 2020 demonstrated Woolley’s

normal cognitive capacity and cooperative demeanor.

Woolley argues that the ALJ erred by discounting four medical opinions

2 24-3745 from practitioners who submitted form reports indicating that Woolley suffered

severe limitations even without considering his substance use. Their assessment,

Woolley contends, is reconcilable with evidence that he suffered merely moderate

limitations. Under substantial evidence review, however, we may not reverse a

denial of benefits on the basis that an alternative interpretation of the facts favors

the claimant. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ

reasonably determined that the medical opinions were unpersuasive because they

were neither supported by specific objective findings nor consistent with the

practitioners’ own clinical notes tending to show that Woolley functioned

normally. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2).

Woolley also argues that the ALJ erred by providing no reasons for

discounting the lay witness statement from his mother. The ALJ did, however,

reasonably explain that the statement conflicted with evidence of Woolley’s

average intellectual function and ability to socially interact.1

Substantial evidence thus supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Woolley is

not entitled to disability benefits because substance use was material to his mental

1 Woolley’s argument that the ALJ erred by posing incomplete hypothetical questions to the vocational expert is derivative of his arguments about the medical opinions and lay witness statement, and therefore fails. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert can omit limitations “that the ALJ had specific and legitimate reasons for disbelieving”).

3 24-3745 impairments.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-3745