Woolcock v. Michaels Organization LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 13, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-1375
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) CHANNER WOOLCOCK, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-cv-1375 (TSC) ) ) THE MICHAELS ORGANIZATION ) LLC., ) ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINON

Plaintiff Channer Woolcock filed this employment discrimination action against

Defendant The Michaels Organization LLC., in D.C. Superior Court on April 10, 2023, Original

Case File, ECF No. 8 at 2. On May 15, 2023, Defendant removed the case to this court, Notice

of Removal, ECF No. 1.

In her original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was employed by Defendant as the

community manager of its Wardman Courts apartment complex, in which she also lived. She

claimed that “as a female employee, her pay was significantly less than male employees in

comparable positions,” id. at 3, and when she notified her management of the pay disparity

“defendant began a campaign of retaliation against her,” id. at 4. On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff

resigned from her position but retained her apartment at Wardman Courts. Id. at 5. Defendant

responded by raising her rent and isolating her from other tenants. Id.

Page 1 of 4 Defendant moved to partially dismiss the Complaint on May 31, 2023, arguing that it did

not give “fair notice” of the basis for Plaintiff’s race and color discrimination claims. ECF No. 6

at 3.

On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9, and on June

29, 2023, Defendant partially moved to dismiss it as well, ECF No. 10. Again, Defendant argued

that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint failed to give fair notice of her claims. Id. at 1. On

July 3, 2023, the court denied without prejudice Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss because

Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that “she is a member of a protected class who suffered an

adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Minute Order 1, 07/03/2023 (quoting Massaquoi v. District of Columbia, 81 F. Supp. 3d 44, 49

(D.D.C.2015)). The court did, however, require Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint

with “dates for alleged events, as well as the names of involved individuals.” Minute Order 2,

07/03/2023.

Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint on August 4, 2023, ECF No. 12, and once

again Defendant has moved to partially dismiss it, arguing that Plaintiff cannot proceed with her

District of Columbia-based legal claims because she has failed to “identify any source of District

of Columbia law that gives rise to her claims,” ECF No. 13 at 1.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must comply with Rule 8,

which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement is meant to “give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (alteration in original)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

Page 2 of 4 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiff brings her employment discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e – 2000e-17, as well as “the comparable state laws of the

District of Columbia,” but she does not specify which District of Columbia law provides her a

cause of action. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at 2. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff argues

that claims brought pursuant to the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) are

analyzed “under the same legal standard” as federal employment discrimination claims;

therefore, Defendant should be “on notice” of her DCHRA claims. ECF No. 14 at 2 (citation

omitted). The court disagrees.

Courts in this District have held that pleading a general reference to District of Columbia

law in support of an employment discrimination claim is not sufficient to meet Rule 8(a)’s

pleading standards. See e.g., Pyne v. District of Columbia, 298 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002)

(“Plaintiff has failed to reference a specific law or statute, or even generally describe what law

has been violated. Such pleading does not satisfy notice pleading requirements under Federal

Rule 8(a).”). Furthermore, “plaintiffs may not amend their complaints through briefs in

opposition to motions to dismiss.” Woytowicz v. George Washington Univ., 327 F. Supp. 3d

105, 119 n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 n.4

(D.D.C. 2010)).

Given that Plaintiff is represented by counsel and has twice amended her complaint, her

District of Columbia-based employment discrimination claims will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Page 3 of 4 Date: September 13, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN

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