Woolard v. Axline (In re Woolard)

269 B.R. 760, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1546
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Woolard v. Axline (In re Woolard). Read the opinion of the Court — 269 B.R. 754
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided August 6, 2001·No. Bankruptcy No. 99-59201; Adversary No. 99-0401·Published

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT TO DETERMINE DISCHARGE-ABILITY OF DEBTS (11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15))

BARBARA J. SELLERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs amended complaint to determine the dischargeability of certain obligations he incurred in connection with the parties’ separation agreement. This separation agreement subsequently was incorporated into their decree of dissolution.

The Court has issued a separate opinion and order regarding the discharge of the plaintiffs marital debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). The Court determined in that decision only $1,000 of the monthly spousal payments constituted nondischargeable support. The Court will determine here whether the remainder of those payments, as well as certain other obligations under the separation agreement are nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(15). The following, together with pertinent facts from the § 523(a)(5) opinion and order, constitute this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the General Order of Reference entered in this district. This is a core matter which this bankruptcy judge may hear and determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).

Title 11, United States Code, Section 523(a) provides in relevant part:

A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual from any debt — ■
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debt- or ... in connection with a separation agreement ... unless—
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ...;1 or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the debts are not of the type excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5). Hart v. Molino (In re Molino), 225 B.R. 904, 907 (6th Cir. BAP 1998). If the defendant satisfies her burden, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence either of the exceptions to nondischargeability found in subsections (A) and (B) respectively, Id.

[763] There are three provisions set forth in the parties’ separation agreement to be considered. First and foremost is the plaintiffs obligation to pay the defendant $3,100 per month for a period of 84 months. In the § 523(a)(5) opinion and order the Court determined $1,000 of this monthly payment to be nondischargeable support, leaving the dischargeability of the remaining $2,100 per month to be determined under § 523(a)(15).

The second provision ordered the plaintiff to maintain a life insurance policy with a death benefit of $400,000 until December 31, 1998. This amount would then decrease by $40,000 each year for the next 10 years. The defendant was to be the named beneficiary of the policy.

Lastly, the parties agreed not to incur any indebtedness for which the other might be responsible.2 At some point following their dissolution, the plaintiff made several charges on a credit card which he believed at the time was in his name. When he stopped making payments on the credit card shortly before his bankruptcy, the company sought payment from the defendant. She, in turn, initiated a contempt action against the plaintiff in state court. At this time, the plaintiff discovered that the primary obligor on the credit card was the defendant and that he was merely an additional cardholder. The plaintiff contacted the credit card company to have the account switched over to his name, and he has been making $200 payments each month ever since. At the time of trial, the account balance was approximately $9,000.

The Court in a separate opinion and order has determined that $2,100 of the $3,100 spousal payment was not of the kind described in § 523(a)(5). Therefore, the defendant, despite advocating a position contrary to that holding, has met her burden under § 523(a)(15). See Molino, 225 B.R. at 907.

Although the parties focused their attention at trial as to what constituted nondis-chargeable support on the $3,100 per month obligation, the requirement that the plaintiff maintain life insurance could also be viewed as falling within the scope of § 523(a)(5). See Holder v. Holder (In re Holder), 92 B.R. 294, 297 (M.D.Tenn.1988); Caster v. Caster (In re Caster), 1994 WL 797866 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1994). Nevertheless, the Court will assume for the purposes of this opinion and order that the plaintiffs duty to maintain life insurance was not intended as support for either the defendant or their minor daughter, Kelsey. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that this obligation is dischargeable under § 523(a)(15)(A) or (B).

The fact that both parties are prohibited from incurring debt for which the other might be liable indicates that this provision of the separation agreement was not intended to provide support. Accordingly, the plaintiff must show that he is either unable to pay the credit card debt or that discharging this debt would result in a benefit to him that substantially outweighs the detriment to the defendant.

In determining whether the plaintiff has the ability to meet the three obligations, the Court will apply the disposable income test of 11 U.S.C. [764] § 1325(b)(2). Barnes v. Barnes (In re Barnes), 218 B.R. 409, 411 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1998). This test includes the following factors:

1. The debtor’s “disposable income” as measured at time of trial;
2. The presence of more lucrative employment opportunities which might enable the debtor to fully satisfy his divorce-related obligations;
3. The extent to which the debtor’s burden of debt will be lessened in the near term;
4. The extent to which the debtor previously made a good faith effort to satisfy the debts;
5. The amount of the debts which a creditor is seeking to have held non-dischargeable and the repayment terms and conditions of those debts;
6. The value and nature of any property the debtor retained after his bankruptcy filing;
7. The amount of reasonable and necessary expenses which the debtor must incur for the support of the debtor, the debtor’s dependents, and the continuation, preservation, and operation of the debtor’s business, if any;

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Woolard v. Axline (In re Woolard), 269 B.R. 760, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1546 (Ohio 2001).

269 B.R. 760 (Woolard v. Axline (In re Woolard)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Barnes v. Barnes (In Re Barnes)
218 B.R. 409 (S.D. Ohio, 1998)
Holder v. Holder
92 B.R. 294 (M.D. Tennessee, 1988)
Hart v. Molino (In Re Molino)
1998 FED App. 0019P (Sixth Circuit, 1998)