Woods v. Woods

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas

Woods v. Woods

12 Pa. D. & C. 740, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County

DecidedJuly 24, 1929

DocketNo. 3866

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 12 Pa. D. & C. 740 (Woods v. Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Woods v. Woods, 12 Pa. D. & C. 740, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1929).

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Opinion

Martin, P. J.,

A libel in divorce was filed Dec. 14, 1927. On March 9, 1928, respondent was ordered to pay a counsel fee and $12 a week alimony. When the order was made, he was employed as a blacksmith. On April 13, 1929, he was forced to give up his employment, and alleges that he has been without means to pay the alimony since that date. It appears from the answer and depositions that libellant has abandoned the prosecution of the divorce proceedings and is treating the order for alimony as a support order. This is irregular. Libellant should make application to the Municipal Court for support.

The testimony is undisputed that respondent is unable at the present time to continue payment and that libellant has refused to prosecute the divorce proceeding. Further payment of alimony should not be required.

And now, to wit, July 24, 1929, the rule to show cause why the order for alimony pendente lite should not be vacated is made absolute, without prejudice to the right of libellant to renew the application for alimony if within a reasonable time she proceeds with her cause and produces proof of the ability of respondent to pay.

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Martin, P. J.,

A libel in divorce was filed Dec. 14, 1927. On March 9, 1928, respondent was ordered to pay a counsel fee and $12 a week alimony. When the order was made, he was employed as a blacksmith. On April 13, 1929, he was forced to give up his employment, and alleges that he has been without means to pay the alimony since that date. It appears from the answer and depositions that libellant has abandoned the prosecution of the divorce proceedings and is treating the order for alimony as a support order. This is irregular. Libellant should make application to the Municipal Court for support.

The testimony is undisputed that respondent is unable at the present time to continue payment and that libellant has refused to prosecute the divorce proceeding. Further payment of alimony should not be required.

And now, to wit, July 24, 1929, the rule to show cause why the order for alimony pendente lite should not be vacated is made absolute, without prejudice to the right of libellant to renew the application for alimony if within a reasonable time she proceeds with her cause and produces proof of the ability of respondent to pay.

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Bluebook (online)

12 Pa. D. & C. 740, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woods-v-woods-pactcomplphilad-1929.

Opinion

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