Woods v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 2, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01530
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JL 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Adam Kristopher Woods, No. CV 20-01530-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 David Shinn, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Adam Kristopher Woods brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Centurion moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 30.) 17 Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. 18 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 31), and he did not file a 19 response. 20 The Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff’s claim arose during his confinement in Arizona Department of 23 Corrections. (Doc. 1.)1 On screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court 24 determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment medical care claim in Count One 25 against Defendant Centurion and directed Centurion to answer the claim. (Doc. 6.) The 26 Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id.) 27 . . . . 28 1 Plaintiff was released from custody in June 2021. (Doc. 21.) 1 II. Summary Judgment Standard 2 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 3 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 5 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 6 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 7 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 8 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 9 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 10 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 11 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 12 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 13 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 14 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 15 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 16 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 17 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 18 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 19 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 20 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 21 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 22 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 23 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 24 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 25 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 III. Facts2 2 At the relevant time, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex 3 (ASPC)-Tucson. Plaintiff suffered a “significant blow to [his] jaw” and was in tremendous 4 pain. (Doc. 1 at 3.)3 He could hardly talk, eat, or drink or move his jaw in any way without 5 severe pain. (Id.) On February 1, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a Health Needs Request (HNR) 6 stating he had been “hit in the jaw playing basketball,” that he could not open his mouth 7 all the way, and that he thought his jaw might be fractured. (Doc. 31-1 at 9.) Plaintiff saw 8 a nurse the same day, who evaluated Plaintiff, took his vital signs, and ordered an x-ray. 9 (Id. at 12.) The nurse observed swelling on the left side of Plaintiff’s jaw near his ear. (Id.) 10 On February 7, 2020, Plaintiff saw Dr. Bake for an x-ray of his jaw. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 11 Dr. Bake told Plaintiff his jaw was broken and that he could suffer long-term or permanent 12 damage if his injury was not addressed. (Id.) However, Dr. Bake “adamantly refus[ed] to 13 take immediate action.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff’s medical records, the February 7, 14 2020 x-ray showed a fracture of the mandibular alveolus. (Doc. 31-1 at 25.) Plaintiff was 15 prescribed ibuprofen 600 mg and Tylenol #3 with codeine for pain. (Id. at 26.) 16 After Plaintiff returned to his unit, Nurse (?) Donna Mendoza informed him that 17 Defendant Centurion’s policy “prevented immediate medically corrective action,” a 18 consultation request must be submitted, and if the request was approved, Plaintiff “might 19 see an oral surgeon” in three weeks to a month. (Doc. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff’s 20 medical records, an urgent consultation for off-site oral surgery was submitted and 21 approved. (Doc. 31-1 at 30.) 22 On March 4, 2020, Plaintiff saw Dr. Ronald Quintia at Southern Arizona Oral & 23 Maxillofacial Surgery, P.C. (Id. at 32.) Dr. Quintia told Plaintiff that “because of the

24 2 Because Plaintiff did not file a response or controverting statement of facts, the 25 Court will consider Defendants’ supported facts undisputed unless they are clearly controverted by Plaintiff’s first-hand allegations in the verified Complaint or other 26 evidence on the record. Where the nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the Court must consider as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all the nonmovant’s contentions set forth 27 in a verified complaint or motion. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). 28 3 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 1 delay[,] there was nothing he could do” and that his broken jaw was healing improperly, 2 resulting in a significant decrease in mobility. (Doc. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff’s 3 medical records, Plaintiff reported getting better each day. (Doc. 31-1 at 32.) Dr. Quintia 4 noted that the jaw fracture was “healing reasonably well” and was stable. (Id.) Dr. Quintia 5 recommended that Plaintiff remain in isolated housing for four weeks and follow up for 6 the removal of a decayed tooth, which was unrelated to the jaw fracture. (Id.) Plaintiff 7 was discharged in “stable and satisfactory condition.” (Id.) Dr. Quintia did not recommend 8 surgery, and no “permanent” injuries due to the timing of the oral surgeon’s initial 9 consultation, or for any other reason, were noted. (Id.) 10 On June 2, 2020, at ASPC-Lewis, Plaintiff saw Dr. Mark Mery. (Id. at 99.) Dr. 11 Mery noted that Plaintiff’s condyle fracture was still healing and that, per the oral surgeon, 12 Plaintiff should have a mechanical soft diet and liquid supplements while healing. (Id.) 13 Dr. Mery observed that one of the roots may be fractured and the beginnings of an abscess. 14 (Id.) Plaintiff stated the tooth was not “bothering him at the moment.” (Id.) 15 On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an HNR reporting left side jaw pain and 16 requesting pain medication. (Id. at 35.) He was seen the same day on the nurse line and 17 scheduled to see the dentist. (Id. at 37.) Plaintiff saw Dr. Russell the next day, who took 18 an x-ray of Plaintiff’s jaw and noted, “The L-subcondylar fracture of the mandible is 19 healing [within normal limits]” and that Plaintiff had “continuous[ly] talk[ed] without any 20 sign of discomfort or pain” in the eight months since the original trauma. (Id. at 53.) No 21 additional follow-up was recommended. (Id.) 22 On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff submitted another HNR reporting “trouble [and] 23 pain” in his jaw and that the ibuprofen was not working. (Id. at 57.) Plaintiff was seen on 24 the nurse line the same day. (Id. at 58.) He was prescribed naproxen and a topical cream 25 for pain. (Id. at 64.) 26 On June 2, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an HNR stating, “med do not work lately” and 27 reporting that his jaw was popping and causing more pain. (Id. at 70.) Plaintiff was seen 28 1 on the nursing line on June 4, 2021 and referred to the dentist. (Id. at 72.) On June 8, 2021, 2 Dr. Russell evaluated Plaintiff for his reported left jaw pain. (Id. at 83.) Dr. Russell noted,

3 A review of the information concerning the incident surrounding the so- 4 called basketball hitting the side of his jaw and fracturing it, is totally 5 different from the story that he is conveying to the staff and the result of the [oral surgeon] visit is completely different than what was communicated to 6 the staff now and earlier. Furthermore, the [oral surgeon’s] evaluation confirms that the details of the trauma and when it was supposed to have 7 occurred is now different than what is being communicated today. 8 9 (Id.) Dr. Russell conducted a TMJ screening evaluation and determined that Plaintiff had 10 lost his right-side molars, which contributed to his reported discomfort. (Id. at 87.) Dr. 11 Russell prescribed ibuprofen 600 mg. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff was released from 12 custody. 13 IV. Discussion 14 A. Legal Standards 15 To support a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a traditional public 16 function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support 17 that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom 18 promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 19 1128, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2012) (extending the “official policy” requirement for municipal 20 liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), to private entities 21 acting under color of law). Under Monell, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 22 constitutional injury; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom 23 amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy 24 or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 25 691–94; Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110– 26 11 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 To support a medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must 28 demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are 2 two prongs to the deliberate-indifference analysis: an objective standard and a subjective 3 standard. First, a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Id. (citations omitted). A 4 “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 5 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin 6 v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 7 Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citation 8 omitted). Examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious medical need include “[t]he 9 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy 10 of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 11 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1059– 12 60. 13 Second, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s response to that need was 14 deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “Prison officials are deliberately 15 indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally 16 interfere with medical treatment.’” Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 17 1990) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988)). Deliberate 18 indifference may also be shown where prison officials fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain 19 or possible medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “In deciding whether there has been 20 deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs, [courts] need not defer to the 21 judgment of prison doctors or administrators.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 22 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989)). 23 Mere differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the 24 basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 25 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). However, a physician 26 need not fail to treat a prisoner altogether in order to violate 27 that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 28 1 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some 2 treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. 3 Even if deliberate indifference is shown, to support an Eighth Amendment claim, 4 the prisoner must demonstrate harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see 5 Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200 (delay in providing medical treatment does not constitute Eighth 6 Amendment violation unless delay was harmful). 7 B. Analysis 8 1. Serious Medical Need 9 Defendant argues “there is no evidence that Plaintiff has been denied appropriate 10 medical care or is suffering from a serious medical need at this time that is not being 11 addressed.” (Doc. 30 at 8.) However, the question is whether Plaintiff suffered from a 12 serious medical need at the time of the conduct alleged in the Complaint. The evidence in 13 the record shows that Plaintiff suffered a fractured jaw that caused him pain and warranted 14 consultation with an oral surgeon. The record is sufficient to support the existence of a 15 serious medical need. See McGuckin, 974 at 1059–60. 16 2. Response to Serious Medical Need 17 With respect to the second prong, a plaintiff must first show that the defendant was 18 “subjectively aware of the serious medical need[.]” Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 19 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). Then, the plaintiff 20 must show: (1) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical 21 need; and (2) harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A plaintiff may 22 meet the harm requirement by demonstrating that the defendant’s actions or policies expose 23 the plaintiff to a “substantial risk for serious harm.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 24 (9th Cir. 2014). 25 The available evidence establishes that Defendant did not fail to respond to 26 Plaintiff’s medical need. Plaintiff saw a nurse the same day he reported the injury to his 27 jaw, and he underwent x-rays six days later. Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he 28 was prescribed two medications—ibuprofen and Tylenol #3 with codeine—for his pain, 1 and an urgent consultation for offsite oral surgery was submitted and approved. 2 Plaintiff saw Dr. Quintia less than one month later, at the earliest available 3 appointment. Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Dr. Quintia did not tell Plaintiff there 4 was “nothing he could do” and that his broken jaw was healing improperly; rather, 5 according to Plaintiff’s records, Dr. Quintia noted that the jaw fracture was “healing 6 reasonably well” and was stable. Dr. Quintia did not document any recommendation for 7 surgery or any permanent injuries due to the one-month delay in the consultation. 8 Several months after Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case, he saw Dr. Russell, 9 who noted that the jaw fracture was healing within normal limits and that in the eight 10 months since the injury, Plaintiff had continuously talked without any sign of discomfort 11 or pain. By failing to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has 12 failed to adduce any evidence to contradict the evidence in his medical records. 13 Based on the available evidence, the Court finds Defendant responded reasonably 14 to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Thus, the Court need not consider whether Plaintiff 15 suffered any harm attributable to Defendant. The Court finds there is no genuine dispute 16 of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff suffered an Eighth Amendment injury. 17 In light of the conclusion that there was no injury attributable to Defendant 18 Centurion, the Court need not consider whether Defendant maintained a policy, custom, or 19 practice that resulted in Plaintiff’s injury. 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary 21 Judgment. 22 IT IS ORDERED: 23 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s 24 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30). 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 (2) | Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) is granted, and the action is terminated with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 3 Dated this 2nd day of September, 2022. 4 5 ' ° 7 = James A. C rg Senior United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28