Woods v. Drolson Co.

75 F. Supp. 758, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3013
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 17, 1948
DocketCiv. A. No. 2631
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 75 F. Supp. 758 (Woods v. Drolson Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woods v. Drolson Co., 75 F. Supp. 758, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3013 (mnd 1948).

Opinion

JOYCE, District Judge.

This is an action by the Housing Expediter under Section 206(b) of the Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947, 80th Congress, Public Law 129, Chap. 163, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1896(b), to enjoin defendant from charging over-ceiling rents and to compel refunds to tenants of any over-ceiling rents already collected. The proceeding is now before the court on plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction.

The facts are as follows; The Drolson Company, a Minnesota corporation with offices at 3 South 8th Street, Minneapolis, is the owner, operator and landlord of a building located at 1425 LaSalle Avenue, Minneapolis. When acquired by - the Drolson Company in November, 1943, it was known as Vine Hall. It is a four story brick structure and on June 30, 1947 had 74 rooms, divided into 22 sleeping rooms and. 16' apartments, plus 1 basement apartment. The 22 sleeping rooms were furnished and from November, 1943 until February, 1947' received linen and maid service once a week. From February, 1947 until July'28, 1947, no maid service was provided or available to théáe 22 rboms or any of -the apartments, although no rediaction in rent accompanied the decreased service. Linen service was received during that period by all of the units-' except 14 apartmeiits. All but two of the apartments, consisting of bedroom, living room, kitchen and bath, were furnished. Although a telephone in the lobby with extensions on. each floor is now available and call buzzers to each room are being installed, the evidence is clear that as of June 30, 1947, no telephone service was available to the tenants unless they had their own phones. Whatever • desk or secretarial service was available was of too inconsequential a character to be deemed desk-service within the meaning of the Act.. The manager of the building was fireman, plumber and janitor and lived in an apart[759]*759ment on the ground floor. Ilis duties ,as such occupied all of his time. He had no authority to collect or receive rentals. The tenants were under the necessity of going to the company offices at 3 South 8th Street, several blocks distant, to make such payments. There was no bellboy service except to the extent that the building manager’s fourteen year old son would sometimes run errands after school, though under no obligation to do so, and he was not an employee of defendant. That Vine Hall is within a defense-rental area was conceded, and defendant in hs answer admitted that the rents were increased on September 1, 1947. The pleadings also establish that these increases brought the rents above the ceilings allowable as of June 30, 1947.

The issues of constitutionality of the Act, the validity of the regulations as amended, and the meaning of the phrase “are provided” as it appears in the Act and the regulations, were decided by this court in the case of Woods v. Benson Hotel Corporation, D.C., 75 F.Supp. 743, which is incorporated by reference herein. The applicable regulations are set out in detail in that opinion and will not be repeated here.

The questions remaining to be determined in this case are (1) was Vine Hall on June 30, 1947, an “establishment which is commonly known as a hotel in the community in which it is located”; and (2) did Vine Hall provide the requisite customary hotel services.

I am of the view that the weight of the evidence establishes that on June 30, 1947, Vine Ilall was not commonly known as a hotel in the community in which it is located. The residents of the building did not think of it as such, nor did civic-minded residents of the area who formed a committee for the purpose among other things of aiding people in securing housing and kept a list of nearby hotels. The building was not advertised as a hotel, nor listed in the telephone book as such. It was not known to the secretary of the local hotel association as a hotel, nor did the manager of a hotel across the street consider it a hotel. The fact that state and local hotel licenses were obtained in the Spring of 1947 and a sign saying “Vine Ilall Hotel” was put up about that time does not persuade the court that Vine Hall was in fact a hotel when consideration is given to the fact that the doors to the building were locked at about 9 or 10 in the evening, that the building never had any transient guests, the laundry facilities and the mail boxes were those of the ordinary apartment house, and no safe for valuables was provided.

I am also of the view that although some limited services were extended tenants that are akin to hotel services, Vine Hall did not on June 30, 1947 provide the tenants with the services required to be provided before an establishment could be decontrolled under the Act and the regulations issued thereunder.

Defendant also attempted to show that at some time subsequent to June 30, 1947, Vine Hall was commonly known as a hotel and did provide the requisite services. For example, maid and linen service were claimed to have been made available the last week in July. It is significant that the first application for decontrol was filed the 28th of July, and notices of increases of rent effective September 1, 1947 were mailed to most of the tenants on July 31, 1947. As this court construes the Act, however, the facts as of June 30, 1947 - are determinative of the status of the housing accommodations for the purpose of controls. Section 204(b) of the Act reads: “During the period beginning on the effective date of this title and ending on the date this title ceases to be in effect, no person shall demand, accept, or receive any rent for the use or occupancy of any controlled housing accommodations greater than the maximum rent established under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and in effect with respect thereto on June 30, 1947 * * * The act was approved June 30, 1947 and became effective July 1, 1947, and its termination date is February 29, 1948. The reference to June 30th as the controlling date is clear upon a reading of the whole Act. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1881 et seq. [760]*760Ceiling rents are carried forward as of that date, and exceptions to controls are also determined as of then. To interpret the Act otherwise would make it impossible for it to be administered with any degree of uniformity, since any time an establishment changed its mode of operation it would be necessary to re-examine it in order to determine its status. If an establishment was eligible for decontrol on June 30, 1947, no matter what course it followed subsequent to that time, it remained decontrolled. If it was not decontrollable as of June 30th it remained under control.

Defendant also contended that Vine Hall was eligible for decontrol under Section 1 (b) (8) of the Rooming Houses Regulation as amended August 22, 1947, but that regulation also requires that the customary hotel services be provided just as in the cáse of hotels, and as has been found defendant does not meet that requirement.

I conclude that plaintiff is entitled to a temporary injunction as prayed. This determination, however, is without prejudice to any rights defendant might have with reference to decontrol of those units created by conversion on or after February 1, 1947, under Section 202 (c) (3) of the Act, and Section 1 (b) (9) of “Controlled Rooms in Rooming Houses and Other Establishments” regulations as amended.

Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for writ will be filed in accordance with the foregoing views, and this memorandum will become a part thereof.

An exception is granted defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
75 F. Supp. 758, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3013, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woods-v-drolson-co-mnd-1948.