Woods v. Corr

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 2, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01118
StatusUnknown

This text of Woods v. Corr (Woods v. Corr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woods v. Corr, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ LAWRENCE C. WOODS, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-cv-1118-pp

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, STATE OF WISCONSIN, JACOB D. CORR, and HANNA RITCHIE KOLBERG,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Lawrence C. Woods, Jr., an inmate at the Milwaukee County Jail who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt determination of probable cause to detain him. Dkt. No. 1. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens the complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On July 22, 2020, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $6.02. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on September 11,

2020. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the balance of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint

if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison,

668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff has sued the City of Milwaukee, Assistant Attorney General Jacob D. Corr and Assistant City Attorney Hanna R. Kolberg. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Although he did not list the State of Wisconsin as a defendant on the first page of his complaint, in his request for relief he asks the court to order injunctive

relief against the state, id. at 4, so the court assumes that he also meant to sue the state. The plaintiff alleges that he is a pretrial detainee at the Milwaukee County Jail, awaiting trial in Case No. 2019CF00411. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He alleges that on January 24, 2019, a Wauwatosa police officer Martin Keck (not a defendant) arrested him without an arrest warrant and booked him into the Milwaukee County Jail. Id. The plaintiff says that “[t]he state’s prosecution permitted a 5 day delay between the time of arrest (January 24, 2019) and the

plaintiff’s initial appearance (January 29, 2019).” Id. The plaintiff asserts that “[t]he failure to comply with the 48 hour promptness requirement rule for judicial determination violated [his] 4th Amendment Right under the United States Constitution.” Id. He contends that “the state’s prosecution on this case does not take the 48 hour promptness requirement serious,” which is why “the rule was disregarded and the state government went ahead with bre[a]ching [his] civil rights.” Id. at 2–3. The plaintiff claims that the “unlawful duration of [his] confinement” caused him emotional distress, anxiety and mental

instability, and says he suffered rapid weight loss, suicidal thoughts, depression and insomnia. Id. at 3. The plaintiff says he has reported most of this to mental and healthcare providers at the jail. Id. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. He also asks the court to order the City of Milwaukee and the State of Wisconsin to “implement and influence staunch obedience to the 48 hour promptness requirement.” Id.

C. Analysis The Supreme Court has held that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of [Gerstein v.

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Bluebook (online)
Woods v. Corr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woods-v-corr-wied-2020.