Woodruff v. Mayor of East Orange

64 A. 466, 71 N.J. Eq. 419, 1 Buchanan 419, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 41
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedJuly 25, 1906
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 64 A. 466 (Woodruff v. Mayor of East Orange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodruff v. Mayor of East Orange, 64 A. 466, 71 N.J. Eq. 419, 1 Buchanan 419, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 41 (N.J. Ct. App. 1906).

Opinion

Pitney, Y. C.

The complainant, Mr. Woodruff, is the owner of a dwelling-house and lot in the corporate limits of the city of East Orange, [420]*420which dwelling is supplied with water for domestic purposes by the defendant, the municipal corporation of that city.

The gravamen of the bill is that the defendant, in fixing its charges against the complainant’s house for its supply of water, has discriminated against complainant in such a manner as to charge him a much greater sum for the same supply and service of water than is charged by it to other houses of the same size and situation as complainant’s house. And he asks this court to enjoin the defendant from so doing.

It is alleged by the bill and admitted by the answer and clearly appears by the proofs that prior to about three years ago the borough was supplied with water for domestic and other purposes by a private corporation, and that at. about that time defendant purchased the distributing plant and supply of the private corporation, and shortly after acquired a new source of water about ten miles away and erected a plant thereon and commenced to supply itself and its inhabitants with water. Two years or more elapsed between the time of the purchase of the private plant and the time, January 1st, 1905, when the new supply was introduced. In the meantime the city was obliged to purchase from the city of Newark a quantity of water to supplement the amount it could obtain from the supply of the old company. I stop here to say that I am satisfied from the evidence that that supply was ample if a very large portion of it had not been wasted and allowed to escape from open and leaky faucets into the then complete sewer system of the city.

In all this the city was acting under the authority of the act of the legislature of April 21st, 1876. P. L. 1876 p. 366; 1 Gen. Stat. p. 61‡6.

Section 9 of that act (1 Gen. Stat. p. 649) provides that the municipal authorities shall have authority “to ordain and establish ordinances, resolutions and regulations * * * for fixing and collecting the water rents or prices for water.” No question was raised but that under that act the city had power to fix rates.

The municipal authorities of East Orange, acting upon that authority, on the 28th of July, 1903, adopted an ordinance fixing [421]*421tlie rates for the supply of water to domestic consumers upon two plans.

One I shall call the “fixture” plan, also called the “fixed and assessed” rate, and the other the “measured” plan.

The fixture plan was a fixed sum for each faucet, kitchen boiler, bath tub, water closet, and for each horse, cow and carriage.

The other plan was by the measure, and was at the rate of $2.25 for one thousand cubic feet of water, which equals seven thousand five hundred gallons, and which amounts to thirty cents per thousand gallons.

(Hydraulic engineers make use of the unit of a cubic foot of water for measuring water power, and the unit of one gallon in dealing with water for domestic purposes. Why this confusing practice is maintained I cannot conceive. Metres for measuring water for all purposes register the amount passing in cubic feet.) Under the sj^stem in use by the private company at the time of the purchase by the defendant of its works, metres were not in use, but charges to consumers were based entirely upon the number and character of fixtures in the houses and grounds of consumers.

The same ordinance which fixed these rates expressly reserved the right to the city at any time to set and maintain a metre upon any service pipe, and to charge the metre price after all water is delivered through any service pipe according to the amount indicated by the said metre.

Later on the city resolved to install metres in all houses used as boarding-houses, and this was done.

Complainant’s house, being at the time used as a boardinghouse, a metre was therein installed on or before the 1st day of October, 1904, and the house was charged for water by the amount used from that time until the filing of this bill in August, 1905, and thence up to October 1st, 1905.

The complaint of the complainant is that the result of charging his house by the metre was to increase the rate charged to him nearly four times.

That will appear by the following statement:

The charge by the metre continued until the 1st of Septem[422]*422her, 1905, a period of eleven months, and amounted to $56.85, an average of $5.17 per month, which equals $62.02 per year. The charges by the fixture would have been $16.25 per year. (A careful scrutiny of the complainant’s bills show that he was, by mistake, overcharged $2.97 for the month of June, and actually paid that much more than was warranted by the water actually consumed.)

Now, the question is whether the defendant’s conduct in installing a metre in complainant’s house, which produced the result of increasing his water rates so greatly, is so inequitable and unjust that this court ought to interfere.

Unless it is inequitable and unjust to him as an individual I can see no ground upon which this court can assume jurisdiction.

The power to establish water rates is clearly given by the statute to the municipal government, and the exercise of their judgment in that matter cannot be called in question in this court except on some such ground.

Its reasonableness as against water consumers generally can only be called in question by the supreme court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction by the machinery of the writ of certiorari. This proposition seems to me so clear in reason and so thoroughly established by authority that I shall abstain from citing authorities thereon.

The case is in marked contrast with the case of Long Branch Commission v. Tintern Manor Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 71. There the. water rates were fixed by the defendant,_ a private water company, and the question was how much the water company ought to charge in the aggregate/ and how that amount should be distributed between the municipality at large and the citizens, and again as between the citizens themselves. Manifestly this court was the only tribunal which could stand between a private corporation and the municipality and its citizens. Besides, the question of jurisdiction of this court was distinctly waived and both parties agreed to submit to it the question of the reasonableness of the water company’s charges.

At the hearing herein a large amount of evidence was gone [423]*423into and admitted, under objection, showing ■ the total cqst of defendant’s works and the present income therefrom, with the object of showing that it was charging and collecting from the individual water takers more than the circumstances required. The argument was put forth that the defendant and its officers were putting the whole cost of maintenance upon the water takers, and that the city, as such, was obtaining not only a monied profit on the investment, but were using a large quantity of water for public schools and drinking fountains and sewer flushing and the like free of charge, and that the general rates to the water takers should be reduced, and a portion of the interest, charges, &c., for maintaining the works should be charged to and collected from the taxpayer at large.

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Bluebook (online)
64 A. 466, 71 N.J. Eq. 419, 1 Buchanan 419, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodruff-v-mayor-of-east-orange-njch-1906.