Woodman v. NPAS Solutions, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJanuary 23, 2025
Docket2:22-cv-01540
StatusUnknown

This text of Woodman v. NPAS Solutions, LLC (Woodman v. NPAS Solutions, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodman v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 BRITTANY WOODMAN,

5 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:22-cv-01540-GMN-DJA vs. 6 ORDER 7 NPAS SOLUTIONS, LLC.,

8 Defendant. 9 10 Pending before the Court is Defendant NPAS Solutions, LLC’s Motion in Limine 11 (“MIL”), (ECF No. 61). Plaintiff Brittany Woodman filed a Response, (ECF No. 65), and 12 Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 81), which the Court STRIKES.1 Also pending before the 13 Court is Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine, (ECF No. 62). Defendant filed a Response, (ECF No. 14 67). 15 The Court additionally heard oral arguments regarding these motions at Calendar Call 16 on January 21, 2025. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 17 61) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 62) 18 is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The Court incorporates by reference the Background Section stated in its Order Denying 21 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (See generally Order, ECF No 38). Plaintiff filed 22 a Complaint in this Court, alleging violations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 23 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 24 25 1 Local Rule 16-3 states that Motion in Limine “Replies will be allowed only with leave of the court.” Defendant did not request nor receive leave to file a Reply. Accordingly, the Court did not consider Defendant’s Reply in this Order and the Court STRIKES Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 81). 1 and her common law right of Intrusion Upon Seclusion. (Compl., ECF No. 1). The case is now 2 set for trial and the Parties filed their respective Motions in Limine. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 In general, “[t]he court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence 5 is admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). In order to satisfy the burden of proof for Federal Rule of 6 Evidence (“FRE”) 104(a), a party must show that the requirements for admissibility are met by 7 a preponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) 8 (“We have traditionally required that these matters [regarding admissibility determinations that 9 hinge on preliminary factual questions] be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 10 “Although the [FRE] do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has 11 developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” 12 Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) (citing FRE 103(c)). In limine rulings “are 13 not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always change his mind during the course of a 14 trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000); see also Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. 15 Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. See Jenkins v. Chrysler 16 Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). However, a motion in limine should not be 17 used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. C&E Servs., Inc., v. Ashland, Inc., 539 F. 18 Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008). To exclude evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence 19 must be inadmissible “on all potential grounds.” See, e.g., Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 20 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary

21 rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential 22 prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 831 F. 23 Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 24 / / / 25 / / / 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Defendants’ MIL No. 1 to Preclude Evidence and Reference to Telephone Number 800-223-9899 and its Alleged Ownership 3 Defendant seeks to exclude the introduction of any evidence and/or reference to or 4 mention of the Court’s judicial notice of the telephone number listed on the Better Business 5 Bureau (“BBB”) website as being Defendant’s telephone number, telephone number 800-223- 6 9899, its alleged ownership, or any information obtained from the BBB website. (See Deft.’s 7 MIL 4:3–8, ECF No. 61). Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim as to the 8 ownership of the above-mentioned telephone number, obtained from the BBB website, and of 9 which the Court took judicial notice of in the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary 10 Judgment, (1) is inadmissible hearsay, and (2) lacks foundation. (Id. 3:9–13). In response, 11 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion fails to justify why any reference whatsoever to the 12 telephone number 800-223-9899 should be excluded. (Pl.’s Resp. 2:24–27). Moreover, if 13 Defendant is seeking only to exclude reference to the BBB website and the Court’s judicial 14 notice thereof, Plaintiff opposes this relief. (Id. 2:22–24). 15 16 The Court declines to decide the admissibility of the telephone number 800-223-9899, 17 its alleged ownership, or any information obtained from the BBB website in this Order. It is 18 not clear how Plaintiff intends to admit such evidence to the jury. Defendant may object to 19 Plaintiff’s proffer of the BBB website during trial, and Plaintiff may counter any of 20 Defendant’s objections. The Court will then determine admissibility based on the manner of 21 the proffer and the reasonableness of the objection. Moreover, while the Court took judicial 22 notice of the telephone number listed on the BBB website at the summary judgment stage, 23 Plaintiff did not present any case law that establishes that the Court is required to take judicial 24 notice of the same fact at trial nor that it may advise the jury about the Court’s prior ruling. 25 Indeed, FRE 201 states that a court “may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.” 1 Fed. R. Evid. 201 (emphasis added). The permissive language of FRE 201 does not mandate 2 that a fact judicially noticed at one stage must be judicially noticed at a subsequent stage. 3 Accordingly, Plaintiff is precluded from stating or eliciting testimony of the fact that the Court 4 took judicial notice of the telephone number listed on the BBB website. Therefore, the Court 5 GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1. The Motion 6 is granted insofar as Plaintiff may not reference that the Court previously took judicial notice at 7 the summary judgment stage; however, Plaintiff may request at trial that the Court take judicial 8 notice of the information provided on the BBB website. The motion is denied in regard to 9 precluding Plaintiff from proffering evidence of the BBB website in general and seeking 10 admissibility of the information contained on the website.2 11 B. Defendant’s MIL No.

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Related

Luce v. United States
469 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Bourjaily v. United States
483 U.S. 171 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Ohler v. United States
529 U.S. 753 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Horvath v. Federal Deposit Insurance
20 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1998)

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Woodman v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodman-v-npas-solutions-llc-nvd-2025.