Wooding v. Zasciurinskas

540 A.2d 93, 14 Conn. App. 164, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 126
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
DecidedApril 19, 1988
Docket5834
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 540 A.2d 93 (Wooding v. Zasciurinskas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wooding v. Zasciurinskas, 540 A.2d 93, 14 Conn. App. 164, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 126 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

O’Connell, J.

The defendants appeal from a plaintiffs’ judgment in a dog bite case tried to the court. The plaintiff Michael Wooding, a minor, brought this action through Raymond Wooding, his father and “next friend,” for injuries sustained in an attack by a German Shepard dog owned by the defendant city of New Haven and kept by the defendant police officer Anthony Zasciurinskas.

After service of process, the defendants filed an appearance and interrogatories but never filed an answer. The plaintiffs did not file a motion for default for failure to plead, but instead filed a claim for the trial list. Although the pleadings were not closed, the case was placed on the trial list and assigned for trial. Over the objection and exception of the defendants, the trial court proceeded to hear the matter as a hearing in damages. The extent to which the defendants were allowed to venture into areas normally beyond the scope of a hearing in damages is disputed. Judgment was rendered in favor of the minor plaintiff for $15,350 and of his father for $628.45 as reimbursement for medical expenditures made on behalf of his son.

The claims of error raised in this appeal are (1) that the court erred in going forward with the case as a hearing in damages when the defendants had neither filed an answer nor been defaulted, and (2) that the award of damages was excessive. We find error.

Practice Book § 253 restricts the cases that may be placed on the trial list to two categories: (1) cases in [166]*166which the pleadings have terminated in an issue of fact; and (2) hearings in damages on default.1

The plaintiffs argue that § 253 does not require closing of the pleadings, but only that the pleadings be completed to the stage wherein the issues of fact determinative of the merits of the case are established. We find no authority for this distinction. “Closing the pleadings” is the vernacular for the more cumbersome, albeit in some instances more accurate, terminology of § 253. It is impossible to determine what issues are decisive of the merits without benefit of an answer, and perhaps further pleadings such as special defenses and replies thereto. For example, we do not know, inter alia, whether at commencement of “trial,” the defendants denied ownership of the dog, claimed that the injured plaintiff was teasing or tormenting the dog, or were relying on the doctrine of governmental immunity. An effort by the trial court to resolve the matter of these potential defenses in its memorandum of decision, comes too late in the trial sequence to determine the scope of the issues at the start of trial. Furthermore, the memorandum of decision fails to shed any light upon questions of fact and law which might have been raised if the issue had been joined. We conclude that this case did not warrant assignment to the trial list under the first category of § 253. See Alpha Crane Service, Inc. v. Capitol Crane Co., 6 Conn. App. 60, 70, 504 A.2d 1376, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 807, 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).2

[167]*167The second category of cases which may be placed on the trial list are hearings in damages on default. Practice Book § 363 prescribes the procedure for establishing the default of a nonpleading defendant.3 The plaintiffs did not comply with § 363 by filing a motion to have the defendants declared in default for failure to plead. A defendant who has not filed an answer may not be exposed to a hearing in damages unless he has been defaulted according to this rule. Only after the defendant has been defaulted pursuant to § 363 for failure to plead does § 253 allow the case to be placed on the trial list. See Practice Book § 253. This case was erroneously placed on the trial list. There is no authority under which a trial court may summarily declare that it will conduct a hearing in damages in a case that appears before it by mistake.

Practice Book §§ 367 and 368 delineate the defendants’ rights to contest liability in a hearing in damages after default.4 Unless the defendant gives the plaintiff [168]*168written notice of his defenses within ten days after receiving notice from the clerk that a default has entered, the defendant is foreclosed from contesting liability. Because the defendants were never defaulted for failure to plead, the peremptory order of the trial court declaring that the case would be treated as a hearing in damages deprived the defendants of their right to give notice of defenses under §§ 367 and 368.

The plaintiff relies on a line of cases holding that failure of a party to deny an allegation shall be construed as an admission of that allegation. None of those cases, with the exception of those that constituted hearings in damages after properly entered defaults, involved circumstances analogous to those of the present case, where no answer whatsoever had been filed. Thus, these precedents are inapposite.

Upon discovering that the present case did not meet the procedural requisites of Practice Book § 253, the trial court should have stricken the case from the trial list and returned it to the presiding judge to await further motions or pleadings. It was error , for the trial court to hear the matter as a hearing in damages when the defendants had not been defaulted in accordance with the rules of practice.

[169]*169In view of the disposition of the first claim, we do not reach the second claim of error.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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Bluebook (online)
540 A.2d 93, 14 Conn. App. 164, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wooding-v-zasciurinskas-connappct-1988.