Woodin v. SSA

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 28, 1997
• Docket: CV-95-601-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Woodin v. SSA CV-95-601-M 08/28/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Charles Woodin

v. Civil No. 95-601-M

John J. Callahan, Commissioner Social Security Administration1

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Charles Woodin, moves for an award of attorney's

fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 2 i

U.S.C.A. § 2412 following judgment in his social security case

reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding for further

proceedings. See Order, December 18, 1996, and Judgment entered

December 19, 1996. For the reasons that follow, the motion is

denied.

Discussion

The EAJA provides:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner opposes Woodin's

motion on grounds that the government's position was

1 The President appointed John J. Callahan as Acting Commissioner of Social Security, effective March 1, 1997, to succeed Shirley S. Chater. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (1), John J. Callahan is thus substituted for Shirley S. Chater as the defendant in this action. substantially justified within the meaning of the EAJA.

Therefore, the Commissioner bears the burden of showing that even

though the government's motion for affirmance was denied, the

claimant's motion to reverse was granted, and the case was

remanded for further proceedings, the government's position

nevertheless had a "reasonable basis in law and fact" and was,

therefore, "substantially justified." Morin v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 835 F.Supp. 1431, 1434 (D.N.H. 1993)

(guotations omitted); see also United States v. One Parcel of

Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 208 (1st Cir. 1992). Even if the

government's position is rejected by a court, if reasonable

people could differ as to whether the government's position was

appropriate, it is "substantially justified." Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

The Commissioner's decision denying Woodin's claim for

benefits was reversed and remanded for two reasons. First, the

Administrative Law Judge did not adeguately explain why he had

not credited the opinions of Woodin's treating physicians, as

reguired by the applicable regulations. Second, he failed to

consider (or at least to formally address in the record) all

factors relevant to assessing Woodin's subjective complaints of

pain, under Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 797

F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986). Thus, the ALJ's determination was

not found by the court to be "wrong;" but was found to have been

inadeguately supported on the record to permit an affirmance. In

addition, the court found that the record presented a close case

2 and acknowledged that the medical evidence in the record showed

differences of opinions as to the nature, source, and severity of

Woodin's pain.

A close case, such as the present one, is by definition a

case in which reasonable minds could differ as to whether the

disability determination was appropriate and whether the

government's position seeking an affirmance was "substantially

justified." See Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 498 (7th

Cir. 1991) (citing cases). In addition, where the reversal and

remand are grounded in a record that fails to disclose whether

conflicting medical opinion evidence and factual evidence of pain

was appropriately weighed and considered (as opposed to one

showing an unjustifiable or substantially unjustified weighing),

the government's position in support of the Commissioner's denial

of benefits is substantially justified. See Albrecht v. Heckler,

765 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1985). Under these circumstances,

because the government's position here was substantially

justified within the meaning of the EAJA, Woodin is not entitled

to an award of attorney's fees.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for attorney's

fees (document no. 17) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

3 August 28, 1997

cc: Raymond J. Kelly, Esq. David L. Broderick, Esq.