Woodham v. HireRight, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-4119
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-4119 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 13, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ROBERT EVAN WOODHAM,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-4119 (D.C. No. 2:25-CV-00328-DBP) HIRERIGHT, LLC; UBER (D. Utah) TECHNOLOGIES LLC; AMAZON.COM LLC; RICHARD E. MRAZIK; ROBERT P. FAUST; PARK CITY; WEST VALLEY CITY; SALT LAKE CITY; GLENDALE, ARIZONA; PHOENIX, ARIZONA; JOSHUA N. MOZELL,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before FEDERICO, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has *

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-4119 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2026 Page: 2

Robert Evan Woodham, proceeding pro se, 1 sued various defendants

for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The

district court dismissed his complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6),

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Woodham appeals. But he fails to develop any

argument for reversal, so exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

Before discussing the merits of Woodham’s appeal, we first review the

facts alleged in his complaint and describe the relevant procedural history.

As we normally do when reviewing a district court’s dismissal of the

complaint, we draw the facts from the allegations in the complaint itself.

See, e.g., Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d

1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).

1 “While we generally construe pro se pleadings liberally[,] the same

courtesy need not be extended to licensed attorneys.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). From the record, it appears that Woodham is a law school graduate who is not currently licensed to practice law. We have afforded the benefit of liberality to such pro se litigants in the past and we will do the same here. See, e.g., West-Helmle v. Denver District Attorney’s Office, 2025 WL 2317368 at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (we cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding precedent pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1(A)). Even so, we cannot act as his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

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A

Woodham is a Utah resident. Until last year, Woodham worked for

Uber and Amazon. During his time working for these two companies, he

experienced several problems. For example, at both Uber and Amazon,

Woodham labored under mandatory masking policies adopted during the

COVID-19 pandemic. In 2023, he was temporarily suspended from driving

for Uber after a third-party company, HireRight, provided Uber with a

background check on Woodham indicating that he had been previously

convicted for driving while his license was suspended. Although Woodham

was reinstated, his contract was later terminated by Uber after the

company received another allegation about Woodham. Woodham’s contract

with Amazon was also terminated after several packages were marked as

stolen.

In addition to Woodham’s employment problems, he has also

experienced some licensure and traffic troubles. 2 In West Valley City, Utah,

his license was suspended. A week later, in Salt Lake City, his car was

impounded by the police after he was caught driving while his license was

suspended. In Park City, Utah, he received another traffic citation.

2 The timeline for these events is a little unclear from the complaint,

but also is ultimately irrelevant.

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Woodham appealed that citation all the way to the Utah Supreme Court,

which ultimately affirmed Woodham’s conviction. Park City Municipal

Corporation v. Woodham, 545 P.3d 221, 226 (Utah 2024). Woodham has

“filed a pending post-conviction petition.” R. at 27.

Finally, in addition to Woodham’s employment and traffic issues, he

has also experienced some issues in his family life. He had previously

obtained a protective order against his father in Arizona and tried to

“transfer” the order to Utah. A Utah court declined Woodham’s request. In

Arizona, Woodham’s father challenged the protective order. In other

proceedings, the Arizona courts denied Woodham’s protective order

petitions.

B

In the district court, Woodham brought clusters of claims that roughly

fall into each of these three fact categories. With respect to his employment

issues, Woodham brought FCRA claims against HireRight and Uber and

ADA claims against Uber and Amazon. With respect to his traffic issues,

Woodham brought due process claims against West Valley City, Salt Lake

City, Park City, and a Utah judge who presided over Woodham’s Park City

proceedings. With respect to his family issues, Woodham brought due

process claims against the Utah judge who presided over his protective

order proceedings, his father’s attorney in Arizona, and the cities of Phoenix

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and Glendale in Arizona, where he had additional protective order

proceedings.

Upon screening Woodham’s complaint, the district court ordered

Woodham to file an amended complaint that addressed the court’s concerns

that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that the complaint failed to state

a claim, and that Woodham’s allegations were frivolous. Woodham declined

to file an amended complaint, instead filing a “response” to the district

court’s order. The district court thereafter dismissed Woodham’s complaint

on all the grounds it had previously flagged. This timely appeal followed.

II

We generally review the dismissal of a complaint de novo. Hunt v.

Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999). “In determining whether

dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true

and we must construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that

might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court may dismiss a complaint where its

allegations are insufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court may dismiss a

complaint where its allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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Under § 1915(e), however, we review the district court’s decision to

dismiss a claim as “frivolous or malicious” for an abuse of discretion. Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 33 (1992); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The

district court abuses its discretion when its decision rests on an erroneous

conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. United States v.

McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007). “[A] complaint. . . is frivolous

where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams¸ 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “[T]he statute accords judges not only

the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s

factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

clearly baseless[.] Examples of the latter class are claims describing

fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges

are all too familiar.” Id. at 327–28.

The district court dismissed Woodham’s complaint on Rule 12(b)(1),

Rule 12(b)(6), and § 1915 grounds. We address each in turn and find

Woodham’s appeal to be meritless.

The district court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over Woodham’s

complaint “to the extent he seeks to challenge state court proceedings,”

citing the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines. R. at 77.

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Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state

judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim

that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v.

De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994). “Even when a federal court would

otherwise have jurisdiction to hear a claim, the court may be obliged to

abstain when a federal-court judgment on the claim would interfere with

an ongoing state proceeding implicating important state interests. The

classic example of this proposition, generally referred to as the Younger

doctrine, is a federal suit to enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding.”

D.L. v. Unified School District No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir.

2004).

On appeal, Woodham’s exclusive argument with respect to

jurisdiction is that “[o]bviously, 1983 suits regarding misconduct are not

appeals of state court decisions and have nothing to do with Rooker.” Op.

Br. at 2. To the contrary, Rooker-Feldman is often implicated in § 1983

suits. See, e.g., PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir.

2010) (malicious prosecution claim barred by Rooker-Feldman). Even

construing Woodham’s complaint in his favor and liberally construing his

appellate brief, Woodham cannot escape the conclusion that the cluster of

due process claims involving his traffic and family legal troubles are barred

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by Rooker-Feldman because they invite the federal courts to “review and

reject[]” his unfavorable state court judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Woodham also never once

addresses Younger abstention, so we deem that issue waived. United States

v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019). 3

That said, Rooker-Feldman and Younger are jurisdictional limits.

Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 514–15 (10th Cir.

2023); D.L., 392 F.3d at 1228–29. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction must

ordinarily be without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d

1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court’s judgment does not reflect

whether dismissal was entered with or without prejudice. Out of an

abundance of caution, and as we have done in the past, we will vacate this

part of the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to

“modify the dismissal of these claims to be without prejudice.” McAuliffe v.

Vail Corporation, 69 F.4th 1130, 1156 (10th Cir. 2023).

3 Woodham may also have a problem under Heck v. Humphrey, which

bars federal court review of state criminal convictions or sentences that have not been terminated “in favor of the accused.” 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). But since Rooker-Feldman and Younger suffice to affirm, we do not reach this issue.

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With respect to Woodham’s remaining claims, the district court held

that the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to survive

Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. There is no basis for reversing this conclusion.

Woodham argues that the district court erroneously required him to attach

evidence in support of his claims; it did no such thing, so far as the record

discloses. Woodham argues that the district court did not adequately credit

his prior legal experience as a factor in support of his complaint’s

plausibility. But that would have been an impermissible factor for the

district court to rely on because the court cannot determine a complaint’s

plausibility based on its own determination of a plaintiff’s credibility.

AlexSam, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 119 F.4th 27, 41 (Fed. Cir. 2024). At bottom,

Woodham did not allege any more than what the Supreme Court has said

cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6): “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

C

The district court also held that Woodham’s complaint was frivolous

under § 1915. Woodham does not address § 1915 or the frivolousness

inquiry on appeal. We therefore deem this issue waived. Walker, 918 F.3d

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at 1151. We affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Woodham’s

claims, not otherwise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as frivolous.

III

Finally, appellate filings that “do little more than attempt to impugn

(without basis) the integrity of the district judge [or his staff] . . . are

intolerable, and we will not tolerate them.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux

& Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005). 4 “We admonish [Woodham]

that we will not allow liberal pleading rules and pro se practice to be a

vehicle for abusive documents. Our pro se practice is a shield against the

technical requirements of a past age; it is not a sword with which to insult

a trial judge [or his staff].” West-Helmle v. Denver District Attorney’s Office,

2025 WL 2317368 at *8 n.6 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (unpublished) (internal

quotations omitted).

With these observations, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED

in part and VACATED in part. We vacate the district court’s judgment only

4 As one example, Woodham takes aim at the district court judge’s law

clerk, characterizing them as a “bossy 25-year old,” “haughty,” and “too busy struggling with rudimentary reading and writing composition,” among other unnecessary and inflammatory insults. Op. Br. at 3, 4, 9.

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as to claims barred by Rooker-Feldman or Younger, and we remand with

instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge