Woodfin v. Tuboscope Co.

91 So. 2d 902, 1957 La. App. LEXIS 572
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 2, 1957
DocketNo. 4335
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 91 So. 2d 902 (Woodfin v. Tuboscope Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodfin v. Tuboscope Co., 91 So. 2d 902, 1957 La. App. LEXIS 572 (La. Ct. App. 1957).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this suit for workmens compensation in the maximum amount, alleging total and permanent disability as the result of an alleged accident to his left ankle, leg and foot on May 14, 1952, and a second accident and injury on December 18, 1954 to his left arm, shoulder and back.

Defendants admitted the accident and injury of May 14, 1952 to plaintiff’s foot and ankle but took the position that although there was some residual stiffness of the injured ankle, plaintiff was only entitled to recover under the specific disability provision of the workmens compensation law for partial loss of the use of the foot, but specifically denied that plaintiff was in any way disabled from performing the duties required of him in connection with his employment. Defendants further alleged that even should it be determined that the plaintiff had become disabled due to one or more neuromas which had formed on the side of the injured foot that such disability from these neuromas terminated prior to the institution of suit when plaintiff refused to permit such disability to be removed by a simple surgical procedure recommended by the medical examiners and offered to plaintiff at defendant’s expense. Defendants further alleged that they had attempted to discharge their admitted liability to plaintiff by offering to pay the amount due him for said disability prior to the institution of this suit, but that plaintiff had refused said offer. Defendants therefore denied that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of anything over and above the admitted liability for workmens compensation benefits, as for the specific disability of partial loss of use of the foot, less the aggregate amount of workmens compensation benefits previously paid, which was admittedly $1,380.

The defendants also denied the second accident of December 18, 1954 and averred that any disability in the cervical back, shoulder and arm, if present, was not referable to or in any way associated with any accidental injury.

The Lower Court held that as to the shoulder injury “the testimony was very clear, definite and positive, that the trouble there is due to degenerative changes and not to accidental injury there is no causal connection between this disability and the work in which plaintiff was engaged. It seems that it was brought on by some virus involvement, for which Vitamin B-12 is given. It was not proved in this ca§e that the heavy lifting or straining or excessive exertion had caused or contributed to the physical breakdown complained of or had accelerated its occurrence.” The judgment of the Lower Court, therefore, denied the claim for disability for the alleged shoulder, back and arm injury but rendered a judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants in solido “for a partial permanent loss of function of his foot for a period of 125 weeks from May 14, 1952, at the rate of $18.20 per week, less a credit of 46 weeks for the period when plaintiff collected compensation, plus legal interest on the delinquent installments, de[904]*904fendants to pay all costs, including the fees of the doctors.”

Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment and the defendants have answered the appeal asking that they be relieved from the payment of costs, because they had tendered to the plaintiff on June 8, 1955, which was prior to the institution of this suit, $895 which was more than plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled to at the time the tender was made and was equal to the amount the court found that he was entitled to as for the specific disability and, therefore, under the general rule that costs, in every case, shall be paid by the party cast except where compensation has been allowed or real tenders made, in which latter event plaintiff is allowed to recover only the sum tendered him, citing Louisiana Code of Practice, Articles 549, 415.

In view of the fact that we believe that the plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled as a result of an accident on December 18, 1954, the reasons for which will be hereinafter set forth, and the plaintiff having been paid any and all compensation due as a result of his foot injury up to and including the time of the second accident and resulting disability on December 18, 1954, we will not discuss in detail plaintiff’s claim to total and permanent disability as a result of the foot injury.

This boils down to the question of plaintiff’s refusal to accept a third operation for the removal of the neuroma or neuromas (one doctor found five neuromas on the side of the foot at the time of the trial) which the evidence reveals is the only valid claim for total and permanent disability as a result of the accident and injury to the plaintiff’s foot and ankle.

The preponderance of the medical testimony is to the effect that even though these neuromas are excised by surgery that they have re-formed after each previous operation and that they will do so in the future. One doctor suggests that the nerve be severed far enough back in the soft tissue so that if the neuromas reappear they will not cause pain and disability, however, this doctor had previously operated on the plaintiff for this same trouble and the painful neu-romas re-formed.

Considering the facts we will not order that plaintiff undergo another operation or a series of operations to remove these re-forming neuromas. He is entitled to permanent and total disability for the injury to his foot.

The record reveals that plaintiff was forty-three years of age, married and on the date of the trial, October 21, 1955, was selling vacuum cleaners and floor polishes. He held a high school diploma and had attended junior college for a year and a half, but most of his work since the age of twenty on had been manual labor, such as laying concrete drainage tile for a fish hatchery in Alabama and loading slip scrapes for moving dirt, construction work for contractors and working with the telephone company. He had also worked for a tree surgeon. He started working for the telephone company in 1937 and continued until February 3, 1945, at which time he went into sales work for Paul, Rice and Levy out of New Orleans, where he suffered an automobile accident and as a result of his suit collected some compensation, however, his chest was injured in that accident and there is no connection shown between his present disability and that accident. He went to work for the defendant herein, the Tuboscope Company, on July 1, 1951, doing manual labor in connection with the inspection of oil field drilling pipe work. He was not given a physical examination when he went to work for the defendant company, lost no time nor had any trouble until his first accident of May 14, 1952 when a pipe fell on his left leg, ankle and foot. It is shown that he was definitely a good, conscientious workman, ambitious and on the second of January, 1952 he was sent to school in Houston by the defendant company and thereafter was given a rating of an operator. He was first a common laborer, next an assistant operator and then [905]*905an operator within six months, however, plaintiff testified that this was not any faster nor any slower than the average man would have been promoted with the same amount of experience. There is no question of plaintiff being a malingerer, however, there is some medical testimony that he might be exaggerating his symptoms.

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Bluebook (online)
91 So. 2d 902, 1957 La. App. LEXIS 572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodfin-v-tuboscope-co-lactapp-1957.