Woodcock v. City of Worcester

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Woodcock v. City of Worcester

138 Mass. 268, 1885 Mass. LEXIS 165

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedJanuary 10, 1885

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 138 Mass. 268 (Woodcock v. City of Worcester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Woodcock v. City of Worcester, 138 Mass. 268, 1885 Mass. LEXIS 165 (Mass. 1885).

Pincite

Opinion

Holmes, J.

The court might, in its discretion, reject evidence of the condition of the sidewalk as to ice a week before the accident happened, so far as offered to prove the condition at the time of the accident, even if, under special circumstances, it would have been warranted in admitting it. Berrenberg v. Boston, 137 Mass. 231. The witness called did not undertake to speak to the continuance of the same defect down to the moment of the accident, from daily observation, and, although the counsel for the plaintiff stated that he expected to prove by this and other witnesses that the defect had existed in substantially the same way for eight or ten days, yet in view of the plaintiff’s own testimony that, the day before the accident, snow fell to the depth of four or five inches, followed by rain and then by a thaw, we must take it that the intended proof was by way of inference from other testimony like that offered, which the court very properly considered too remote. The plaintiff argues that the evidence was admissible to prove notice. What we have said applies to this argument also, for the'notice to be proved must be notice of the same defect. Furthermore, the defence was not put on want of notice of the condition of the sidewalk, such as it was, but on a denial that the condition was defective. Exceptions overruled.

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Holmes, J.

The court might, in its discretion, reject evidence of the condition of the sidewalk as to ice a week before the accident happened, so far as offered to prove the condition at the time of the accident, even if, under special circumstances, it would have been warranted in admitting it. Berrenberg v. Boston, 137 Mass. 231. The witness called did not undertake to speak to the continuance of the same defect down to the moment of the accident, from daily observation, and, although the counsel for the plaintiff stated that he expected to prove by this and other witnesses that the defect had existed in substantially the same way for eight or ten days, yet in view of the plaintiff’s own testimony that, the day before the accident, snow fell to the depth of four or five inches, followed by rain and then by a thaw, we must take it that the intended proof was by way of inference from other testimony like that offered, which the court very properly considered too remote. The plaintiff argues that the evidence was admissible to prove notice. What we have said applies to this argument also, for the'notice to be proved must be notice of the same defect. Furthermore, the defence was not put on want of notice of the condition of the sidewalk, such as it was, but on a denial that the condition was defective. Exceptions overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

138 Mass. 268, 1885 Mass. LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodcock-v-city-of-worcester-mass-1885.

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