Woodcock v . Bristol Myers Squibb CV-03-168-PB 6/27/05
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Lana Woodcock
v. Case No. CV-03-168-PB Opinion No. 2005 DNH 097 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lana Woodcock brings this action against her former
employer, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“Bristol-Myers”) claiming
that she was “wrongfully discharged” in violation of New
Hampshire law. Bristol-Myers moves for summary judgment (Doc.
N o . 2 0 ) , arguing that Woodcock’s claims are preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). For the following reasons, I grant the motion
for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Lana Woodcock was a Bristol-Myers employee from September
1997 until January 2000, when she was “voluntarily terminated” for failing to return to work following a leave of absence for a
short-term disability. While employed at Bristol-Myers, Woodcock
was responsible for overseeing the company’s hospital-related
sales efforts in New England, which required her to spend much of
her time traveling by automobile to institutions throughout the
region.
On May 3 , 1999, Woodcock was injured in a work-related
automobile accident. Unable to perform many of the functions of
her job, Woodcock immediately filed for short-term disability
(“STD”) benefits. STD benefits are available to Bristol-Myers
employees through the “BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY SHORT TERM
DISABILITY PLAN” (hereafter referred to as “the Plan”). Whether
an employee qualifies for these benefits is determined by a
third-party “Claims Administrator.” In this case, the Claims
Administrator was CORE, Inc.
Upon receipt of information regarding Woodcock’s condition,
CORE immediately concluded that her injuries prevented her from
performing the essential functions of her job. Thus, it granted
her full STD benefits from May 3 , 1999 to June 6, 1999, and
Temporary Alternative Work Duty benefits from June 6, 1999 to
-2- October 1 3 , 1999.1 In an October 2 5 , 1999 letter, however, CORE
determined that Woodcock was no longer eligible for protection
under the Plan because her physicians had failed to respond to a
number of CORE’s inquiries. Woodcock disagreed with this
conclusion and immediately exercised her right to appeal.
In November 1999, while her appeal was pending, Woodcock,
who had become pregnant in May 1999, began to experience
cramping. Doctors interpreted these symptoms as the early
warning signs of a premature birth and ordered that she be placed
on bed rest. Nonetheless, on December 9, 1999 and January 5 ,
2000, Bristol-Myers insisted that she return to work, threatening
to terminate her if she did not.
Woodcock responded in three ways. First, she informed her
supervisor, Anthony McBride, that she was six months pregnant and
that she could not return to work. Second, on January 6, 2000,
she forwarded a letter from her physician to CORE, requesting
that CORE begin to process a new claim for disability benefits
based on her pregnancy. Third, she attempted to return to work
1 Under the Plan, “the Claims Administrator may approve an Employee’s return to work on a full-time or part-time basis performing the responsibilities of a Temporary Alternative Work Duty assignment.”
-3- in a full-time capacity.
These efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, and on January
2 6 , 2000, Bristol-Myers terminated Woodcock as a company employee
effective immediately. Bristol-Myers later changed the date of
termination to January 5 , 2000 without explanation.
Three months later, on March 2 0 , 2000, CORE notified
Woodcock that both her STD benefits appeal and her independent
pregnancy-based claim for STD benefits had been denied. As to
Woodcock’s pregnancy-based claim, CORE explained that it had been
denied because it was filed on January 6, 2000 and thus post-
dated the effective date of her termination.
Woodcock initiated her “wrongful termination” claim against
Bristol-Myers in Rockingham County Superior Court on January 3 ,
2003. She argued that the manner in which she was terminated
violated: (1) the public policy in favor protecting an unborn
life; (2) the public policy in favor of protecting injured
workers from further injury; (3) the public policy in favor of
-4- the good faith administration of company-provided benefits; (4)
the public policy in favor of protecting the jobs of workers
suffering from on-the-job injuries; and (5) the public policy
against permitting retaliation against employees for reporting
wrongful conduct.
Bristol-Myers successfully removed the case to federal
court.2 Woodcock then filed a motion to remand (Doc. N o . 9 )
which this court denied in a June 1 7 , 2003 order (Doc. N o . 1 0 ) .
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A trial is necessary only if there is a genuine factual
issue “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
2 The basis for removal was that cases involving ERISA preemption are “‘necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of congress,’” and therefore that this case “‘arises under . . . the laws . . . of the United States’” for jurisdictional purposes. Fitzgerald v . Codex Corp., 882 F.3d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
-5- because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 250
(1986). A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the
suit. See id. at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See
Navarro v . Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 9 0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001). The
party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323
(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “produce evidence on
which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof
burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce
such evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v .
Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). Neither conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, nor unsupported speculation are sufficient to defeat
-6- summary judgment. See Carroll v . Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 2 3 1 , 236-
37 (1st Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Bristol-Myers argues that Woodcock’s state law claim for
“wrongful termination” is preempted by § 1144(a) of ERISA.
Section 1144(a) provides for the “preemption of all state law
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Woodcock v . Bristol Myers Squibb CV-03-168-PB 6/27/05
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Lana Woodcock
v. Case No. CV-03-168-PB Opinion No. 2005 DNH 097 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lana Woodcock brings this action against her former
employer, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“Bristol-Myers”) claiming
that she was “wrongfully discharged” in violation of New
Hampshire law. Bristol-Myers moves for summary judgment (Doc.
N o . 2 0 ) , arguing that Woodcock’s claims are preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). For the following reasons, I grant the motion
for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Lana Woodcock was a Bristol-Myers employee from September
1997 until January 2000, when she was “voluntarily terminated” for failing to return to work following a leave of absence for a
short-term disability. While employed at Bristol-Myers, Woodcock
was responsible for overseeing the company’s hospital-related
sales efforts in New England, which required her to spend much of
her time traveling by automobile to institutions throughout the
region.
On May 3 , 1999, Woodcock was injured in a work-related
automobile accident. Unable to perform many of the functions of
her job, Woodcock immediately filed for short-term disability
(“STD”) benefits. STD benefits are available to Bristol-Myers
employees through the “BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY SHORT TERM
DISABILITY PLAN” (hereafter referred to as “the Plan”). Whether
an employee qualifies for these benefits is determined by a
third-party “Claims Administrator.” In this case, the Claims
Administrator was CORE, Inc.
Upon receipt of information regarding Woodcock’s condition,
CORE immediately concluded that her injuries prevented her from
performing the essential functions of her job. Thus, it granted
her full STD benefits from May 3 , 1999 to June 6, 1999, and
Temporary Alternative Work Duty benefits from June 6, 1999 to
-2- October 1 3 , 1999.1 In an October 2 5 , 1999 letter, however, CORE
determined that Woodcock was no longer eligible for protection
under the Plan because her physicians had failed to respond to a
number of CORE’s inquiries. Woodcock disagreed with this
conclusion and immediately exercised her right to appeal.
In November 1999, while her appeal was pending, Woodcock,
who had become pregnant in May 1999, began to experience
cramping. Doctors interpreted these symptoms as the early
warning signs of a premature birth and ordered that she be placed
on bed rest. Nonetheless, on December 9, 1999 and January 5 ,
2000, Bristol-Myers insisted that she return to work, threatening
to terminate her if she did not.
Woodcock responded in three ways. First, she informed her
supervisor, Anthony McBride, that she was six months pregnant and
that she could not return to work. Second, on January 6, 2000,
she forwarded a letter from her physician to CORE, requesting
that CORE begin to process a new claim for disability benefits
based on her pregnancy. Third, she attempted to return to work
1 Under the Plan, “the Claims Administrator may approve an Employee’s return to work on a full-time or part-time basis performing the responsibilities of a Temporary Alternative Work Duty assignment.”
-3- in a full-time capacity.
These efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, and on January
2 6 , 2000, Bristol-Myers terminated Woodcock as a company employee
effective immediately. Bristol-Myers later changed the date of
termination to January 5 , 2000 without explanation.
Three months later, on March 2 0 , 2000, CORE notified
Woodcock that both her STD benefits appeal and her independent
pregnancy-based claim for STD benefits had been denied. As to
Woodcock’s pregnancy-based claim, CORE explained that it had been
denied because it was filed on January 6, 2000 and thus post-
dated the effective date of her termination.
Woodcock initiated her “wrongful termination” claim against
Bristol-Myers in Rockingham County Superior Court on January 3 ,
2003. She argued that the manner in which she was terminated
violated: (1) the public policy in favor protecting an unborn
life; (2) the public policy in favor of protecting injured
workers from further injury; (3) the public policy in favor of
-4- the good faith administration of company-provided benefits; (4)
the public policy in favor of protecting the jobs of workers
suffering from on-the-job injuries; and (5) the public policy
against permitting retaliation against employees for reporting
wrongful conduct.
Bristol-Myers successfully removed the case to federal
court.2 Woodcock then filed a motion to remand (Doc. N o . 9 )
which this court denied in a June 1 7 , 2003 order (Doc. N o . 1 0 ) .
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A trial is necessary only if there is a genuine factual
issue “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
2 The basis for removal was that cases involving ERISA preemption are “‘necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of congress,’” and therefore that this case “‘arises under . . . the laws . . . of the United States’” for jurisdictional purposes. Fitzgerald v . Codex Corp., 882 F.3d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
-5- because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 250
(1986). A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the
suit. See id. at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See
Navarro v . Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 9 0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001). The
party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323
(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “produce evidence on
which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof
burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce
such evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v .
Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). Neither conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, nor unsupported speculation are sufficient to defeat
-6- summary judgment. See Carroll v . Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 2 3 1 , 236-
37 (1st Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Bristol-Myers argues that Woodcock’s state law claim for
“wrongful termination” is preempted by § 1144(a) of ERISA.
Section 1144(a) provides for the “preemption of all state law
causes of action ‘insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan.’” McMahon v . Digital Equip. Corp., 162
F.3d 2 8 , 36 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). This
provision is “conspicuous for its breadth” and has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to preempt state
law claims even if a claim’s effect on ERISA is “indirect.”
Hampers v . W.R. Grace & Co., Inc., 202 F.3d 4 4 , 49 (1st Cir.
2000) (citing, inter alia, District of Columbia v . Greater Wash.
Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992)).
ERISA preemption analysis involves “two central questions:
(1) whether the plan at issue is an ‘employee benefit plan’ and
(2) whether the cause of action ‘relates to’ this employee
benefit plan.” McMahon, 162 F.3d at 36 (citing Rosario-Cordero
-7- v . Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 46 F.3d 1 2 0 , 124 (1st Cir.
1995). Both parties agree that this case involves an ERISA
employee benefit plan. The question, then, is whether Woodcock’s
cause of action for “wrongful termination” “relates” to Bristol-
Myers’ employee benefit plan for preemption analysis purposes.
According to the First Circuit, a cause of action “‘relates
to a covered employee benefit plan . . . if it [1] has a
connection with or [2] a reference to such a plan.’” Carpenters
Local Union N o . 26 v . U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136,
140 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v . Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997)).
Woodcock claims that because the basis of her suit was
Bristol-Myers’ decision to “terminate” her, her cause of action
neither connects with, nor refers t o , an ERISA plan. I disagree.
In its January 2 6 , 2000 letter, Bristol-Myers explicitly stated
that its decision to “terminate” Woodcock depended directly on
CORE’s finding that Woodcock was no longer entitled to STD
benefits. There can be no question, then, that, despite
Woodcock’s characterization of the claim, at the heart of this
dispute are facts that are both “connected with” and “refer to”
-8- an ERISA plan. See McMahon, 162 F.3d at 38-39 (concluding that
the re-characterization of state law claims did not save the suit
from preemption because, at the core of the suit, was an ERISA
plan); see also Metropolitan Life Insurance C o . v . Taylor, 481
U.S. 5 8 , 61-62 (1987) (wrongful termination claim preempted by
ERISA where termination resulted from employee’s refusal to
return to work after disability benefits were terminated).
Woodcock’s “wrongful termination” cause of action is therefore
preempted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bristol-Myers’ motion for summary judgment is granted (Doc.
No. 2 0 ) . Woodcock shall have 30 days to file an amended
complaint stating a claim under ERISA.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge June 2 7 , 2005
cc: James Kazan, Esq. Mark Swirbalus, Esq.
-9-