Woodburn v. Woodburn

123 Ill. 608
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 11, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 123 Ill. 608 (Woodburn v. Woodburn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodburn v. Woodburn, 123 Ill. 608 (Ill. 1887).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Sheldon

delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is solely the judgment of the Appellate Court which the appellant, Phebe A. Woodburn, complains of as erroneous, and that is in the respects, first, in ordering that Phebe A. Woodburn should be paid her annuity provided for by the will of George W. Woodburn, upon the basis of $800 per annum, in place of $1000 per annum, as directed by the will; second, in the disposition it ordered to be made of the notes and mortgage of Phebe A. Woodburn, for $2180.

The purport of the first assignment of error is, .that the Appellate Court erred in sustaining the agreement of March 13, 1873, between Mrs. Woodburn and James H. Woodburn, whereby she relinquished all the interest of the fund provided by the will for her support except the interest on the sum of $8000. The cross-bill of Mrs. Woodburn sought to have the agreement set aside on the ground that it had been fraudulently obtained from her by James H. Woodburn. Neither of the lower courts appears to have found there was any fraud in the transaction, and we concur in the same view, not finding the charge of fraud to be sustained by the evidence. But the circuit court did find that the agreement was without any good and valuable consideration, and on that ground set it aside. Waiving any question as to the variance of this finding from the allegations of the cross-bill, we will consider as to the correctness of the finding.

The evidence shows that upon the death of George W. Wood-bum, all his interest in the real estate in question ceased, and the whole title was in James H. Woodburn, except for the technical estoppel of the partition proceeding which had been had between George W. and James H. There was no evidence in the record of that proceeding to sustain the decree therein; but the decree was by default, and no evidence may have been necessary. The time for suing out a writ of error had not expired, so that there was yet opportunity to question the correctness of the partition decree on writ of error or by bill of review. There was, to some extent, a cloud upon the title, in the public mind, and this was manifested at the time of the .public sale at auction, by inquiry upon the subject, in response 'whereto James H. Woodburn, before the commencement of the sale, made public announcement that he had made arrangement with Mrs. Woodburn, and would quitclaim to the purchaser at the sale all his interest in the land. The question is not whether James H. Woodburn had actual title or interest in the land, but whether he honestly claimed an interest, or there was a cloud upon the title the removal of which by James H. would tend to promote the sale and enhance the price which the land would bring. We think, from the evidence, there did exist such a cloud upon the title; that its removal by James H. was of benefit to Mrs. Woodburn, in its tendency to enhance the price to be obtained for the land, and thereby increase the fund from the interest on which her annuity was to come, and that it would be of inconvenience to him in making a deed of relinquishment of his interest. We are of opinion there is found sufficient to furnish a consideration for the agreement made by Mrs. Woodburn.

As respects the notes for $2180, of Mrs. Woodburn, the proceeds of the sale of the real estate ($15,150) constituted, under the will of George W. Woodburn, a fund, the interest of which, to the extent of $1000, was to be paid to Mrs. Woodburn during her life. After her death this fund was to go to James H. Woodburn, for his use during his lifetime, and at his death to go to his children. Of the land bought by James H. at the executor’s sale, he sold a portion—the homestead—to Mrs. Woodburn, for which she gave her notes to the executor for $2180. He took these notes and held them, by the understanding of all the parties, as a part of this fund. He gave credit for that amount on the notes of James H. Woodburn, which he had given to the executor for the purchase price of the whole land. Mrs. Woodburn, in her answer, states that she gave the executor two notes, of $1250 each, and secured the same by mortgage, “of which said sum so secured by said mortgage, defendant (Mrs. Woodburn) is informed and believes that $2180 was to be regarded as a part of said fund, and to be substituted for the notes and mortgage that said complainant (James H. Woodburn) was to have executed and delivered to said Ege, as executor, as aforesaid.” So, then, these notes were a part of this trust fund, and should have been held and kept intact, and it was improper to cancel them, and order them to be surrendered up to Mrs. Woodburn in payment of her individual debt due from the executor. Nor was the error relieved by the direction that when the amount of the notes should afterwards be collected from the executor it should be re-invested in securities to be held as a part of the fund. We are of opinion the Appellate Court ordered rightly in respect to these notes.

The appellee James H. Woodburn has assigned cross-errors in this court, as follows: That the Appellate Court erred in holding that under said agreement James H. Woodburn should pay Mrs. Woodburn $800 per annum, instead of “the interest on the sum of $8000 per annum,” as the agreement reads. Where interest, simply, is named, the rate of interest, where nothing appears to the contrary, will be six per cent, the rate fixed by the statute, where there is no contract as to rate. It is not unlikely, from all the attendant circumstances, that the parties intended the rate of interest here to be ten per cent, and that the agreement, as it reads, fails to express the understanding of the parties in that regard. It was probably ten per cent interest that was in their minds. The notes James H. gave for the land he bought, bore that rate of interest. The notes Mrs. Woodburn gave for the part she purchased from James H. bore ten per cent interest. It was ten per cent interest ($800) which was paid to Mrs. Woodburn, under the agreement, for several years. In a letter of James H. to Mrs. Woodburn, he alludes to it as $800 which she was to have under the agreement.

But it is said that this order of the court, in this respect, amounted to a reforming of the contract by the Appellate Court, and that there was no allegation in the cross-bill to warrant it, there being in it no charge of any mistake in the contract, or prayer for the correction of any mistake. This may be a debatable question, and as there is to be a reversal on another ground, there will be afforded opportunity to amend the cross-bill in this respect, and we will dismiss this question without further remark. We can not say the court erred in ordering the costs of the entire consolidated suits to be paid from the trust fund. Manifestly, the sale of the real estate to James H. Woodbum should not be set aside, as is insisted, for the reason that at the date of the sale he was the beneficial and real owner of the lands sold. He could not be said to be such owner in the face of the partition decree. That decree can not be put aside and disregarded in this collateral proceeding.

A further assignment of cross-error is in respect of the note of James H. Woodburn to George W. Woodbum, the testator, for $3050, which was claimed to belong to James H. as a donatio mortis causa made to him by the testator. In respect of this note the circuit court rendered a judgment against Peter Ege, as executor of the last will of George W. Woodbum, deceased, for the face of the note and interest, amounting to the sum of $8604.52.

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123 Ill. 608, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodburn-v-woodburn-ill-1887.