Woodard v. United States

167 Ct. Cl. 306, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 125, 1964 WL 8684
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 17, 1964
DocketNo. 190-60
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 167 Ct. Cl. 306 (Woodard v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodard v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 306, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 125, 1964 WL 8684 (cc 1964).

Opinion

JONES, Senior Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for disability retirement pay. Plaintiff, a former lieutenant in the Army Air Corps who was demobilized in July 1945, contends that he was permanently incapacitated for active service at the time of that release. The main thrust of his cause of action is that a 1959 decision to the contrary by the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records was arbitrary in fact and unsupported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff asserts as the basis of his claim for retirement two disabilities, both equally the enduring result of a 1943 service-connected head injury: (1) certain damage to the muscles and nerves associated with his right eye, resulting principally in a condition known as diplopia, or double vision, in which both eyes fail to focus simultaneously in the same direction, thereby producing blurred, double images; and (2) chronic brain damage, described variously as “chronic brain syndrome associated with head trauma,” with grand mal, and as “encephalopathy due to head trauma,” with grand mal (resulting in such symptoms as nausea, an inability to concentrate, seizures and blackout spells, and considerable personality changes). The former was clearly diagnosed as early as several weeks after the 1943 head injury. The latter disability, however, was never diagnosed before plaintiff’s release from service; and while certain behavior was observed by 1950 which gave rise in the mind of plaintiff’s physician to suspicion of brain damage, no [309]*309such actual diagnosis was made until 1955, 10 years after plaintiff’s release, when for the first time a complete neurological examination (including electroencephalograms) was administered.

It is with plaintiff’s wartime injury that the story begins. Plaintiff had been serving in the Pacific Theater for 5 months as a bombardier, his military occupational specialty (MOS). He was stationed in New Guinea when the accident occurred in mid-September 1943'. He was riding near his base in a jeep with his superior officer behind the wheel when that vehicle collided headon with an Army truck, hurling him forward and causing his forehead to strike the windshield violently. The diagnosis rendered in the first hours after the accident revealed that he had suffered, inter alia, major and minor lacerations both above the right eye (closing that eye) and on the scalp, a mild cerebral concussion, and a broken nose. The condition of double vision first became apparent a week later when the bandages were removed from his head and face. It was that condition which was responsible for his extended hospitalizations in the Pacific Theater from early October to the end of 1943 and, following his transfer home as recommended by a Disposition Board, from January to August 1944.

Plaintiff appeared before three Disposition Boards in the period between his 1943 accident and his 1945 release, the first in Australia and the last two in the States. The first Board, in recommending in October 1943 his return to the United States for further observation, treatment, and disposition, concluded that he was physically unfit for military service in the Pacific Theater by reason of diplopia (double vision) caused by the jeep accident.

The second Board, which in July 1944 considered plaintiff’s condition after he had been stateside 7 months, concluded that he had received maximum benefit from hospitalization. He was assigned to temporary limited duty, with a re-examination and re-evaluation to be made at the end of 6 months. During this period he at first supervised the collection of trash, then later attended classes in personnel affairs.

[310]*310The third Disposition Board, reviewing plaintiff’s condition in February 1945 at the end of the 6 months, assigned him to a second 6 months of limited service (directing that he was to be given no responsibilities requiring a substantial amount of close work). At the end of this period he was to be re-examined and re-evaluated once again.

The re-examination, re-evaluation (and presumably the definitive disposition concerning plaintiff’s permanent status which had been, in effect, postponed to permit observation for the two 6-month periods) which the third and last Disposition Board envisioned never took place, however; for before the second 6-month period had elapsed he was demobilized, effective July 1945. This release followed a routine physical examination,1 the report on which contains the statement that plaintiff was not permanently incapacitated for general service — this despite the fact that he was assigned to only limited and not general service at the time.

Virtually from the date of his release from service plaintiff has experienced numerous and serious physical impediments to ordinary living. His double vision continued, becoming especially aggravated when he was tired and rendering both reading and night driving exceedingly difficult tasks. Additionally, he suffered as early as 1944 from recurrent headaches and nausea and as early as mid-1945 from acute nervousness, dizzy spells, and occasional seizures or blackouts.

Examined in October 1945 by Dr. W. O. Smith, a highly accredited eye, ear, nose, and throat specialist, plaintiff was found to have an extreme imbalance of the eye muscles. Dr. Smith testified that plaintiff’s double vision was then so severe that he considered him to be totally disabled, unable at that time to do any physical or mental work.

Dr. O. B. McCoy, a general practitioner who treated him for several years beginning in late 1949, observed that plaintiff was suffering frequent severe headaches, blackout spells, loss of temper, periodic desire for solitude and avoidance of people, loss of ability to concentrate, and depression. Dr. McCoy, who had served as an Air Force flight surgeon during [311]*311the war, testified that he did not believe that plaintiff could have been fit at the time of his release for general or any save the most limited service.

Plaintiff was admitted to a Veterans Administration hospital in 1955 with complaints of headaches, blurring and double vision, and blackout spells. The record of this hospitalization states that “the patient does have a convulsive disorder which is secondary to a traumatic brain syndrome due to traumatic gross force, received as the result of a jeep accident while in military service in New Guinea in 1943.” On the basis of a final diagnosis of “chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma,” with grand mal, the Veterans Administration assigned plaintiff a 30 percent disability rating.

Plaintiff’s condition has continued since his 1955 hospitalization much the same as before. He continues to suffer spells, for example, in which he does not seem to see or hear and which are followed by confusion, headaches, and occasional falls. Two subsequent Veterans Administration hospitalizations in 1957 and 1959, each for a month or more, have confirmed the 1955 diagnosis; for after each one plaintiff was discharged with a diagnosis of encephalopathy due to head trauma, with grand mal.

Plaintiff first took his claim to the Correction Board in 1956, but his application was denied unless and until additional material evidence was presented. With his submission of an additional statement (by Dr. Smith), he sought reconsideration in 1959. The Board, however, denied reconsideration in December of that year, concluding that plaintiff had not been permanently incapacitated for active service at the time of his release.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Walls v. United States
582 F.3d 1358 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
Pope v. United States
15 Cl. Ct. 218 (Court of Claims, 1988)
Lewis v. United States
1 Cl. Ct. 158 (Court of Claims, 1983)
Callan v. United States
450 F.2d 1121 (Court of Claims, 1971)
Merson v. United States
401 F.2d 184 (Court of Claims, 1968)
Francis G. Brown v. The United States
396 F.2d 989 (Court of Claims, 1968)
Brown v. United States
396 F.2d 989 (Court of Claims, 1968)
Robert J. Cosgriff v. The United States
387 F.2d 390 (Court of Claims, 1967)
Imhoff v. United States
177 Ct. Cl. 1 (Court of Claims, 1966)
Wood v. United States
176 Ct. Cl. 737 (Court of Claims, 1966)
Hoppock v. United States
176 Ct. Cl. 1147 (Court of Claims, 1966)
Powers v. United States
176 Ct. Cl. 388 (Court of Claims, 1966)
William R. Farrar v. The United States
358 F.2d 965 (Court of Claims, 1965)
Farrar v. United States
358 F.2d 965 (Court of Claims, 1965)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
167 Ct. Cl. 306, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 125, 1964 WL 8684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodard-v-united-states-cc-1964.