Wood v. Wood

186 Iowa 713
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJuly 2, 1919
StatusPublished

This text of 186 Iowa 713 (Wood v. Wood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wood v. Wood, 186 Iowa 713 (iowa 1919).

Opinion

Preston, J.

On November 15, 1915, the D. E. Baker Lumber Company made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, the property assigned being its lumber yards in Traer, Dinsdale, and Clutier, the real estate on which same were located, and its business, notes, accounts, etc., all in the value of more than $60,000. Plaintiff’s claim is in the form of a note, given May 21, 1915, for $4,479, signed by the lumber company. This note was given in renewal of two notes signed by 1). E. Baker, one for $1,500, dated August 23, 1911, and one for $3,000, dated May 1, 1912. The two original notes above described were the individual notes of 1). E. Baker, but the plaintiff claims that the corporation received the benefit thereof; while appellee contends otherwise, and that, though I). E. Baker signed the name of the lumber company, he was coerced into doing so, and that the note in suit -was given for the private debt of I). E. Baker. Appellant’s claim and theory of the case, stated as [714]*714briefly as may be, is that the D. E. Baker Lumber Company, while technically a corporation, was, in fact, D. E. Baker; that he conducted its affairs; that he was its manager, board oí directors, and the whole corporation; that he owned or controlled all the stock, and managed its business as an individual enterprise; and that, when the corporation permitted Baker to handle its affairs as he pleased, the same as though he was the corporation, it thereby, by implication, granted to him all the authority necessary in the premises. They concede, however, that, were this an ordinary corporation, with officers elected and acting in the usual way, if claimant loaned D. E. Baker individually the $1,500, and then accepted a corporation note in payment of his individual debt, plaintiff could not recover, at least without showing authority from the corporation. The legal propositions, and the authorities cited by appellant to sustain them, are based upon. the assumption that their theory, as befoi’e stated, is sustained by the testimony; and if the facts are not as assumed, then, of course, the authorities do not apply. After all, it is very largely a question of fact, and it is conceded that the only question in the case is whether or not the claim is the debt of D. E. Baker.

The only witnesses testifying for plaintiff are the plaintiff himself and I). E. Baker, and at some points there is a conflict in their testimony. One witness testifies for the defendant, but the case largely depends upon the testimony of plaintiff’s two witnesses. We think appellant, in selecting isolated statements of witness Baker, has, in some instances at least, misconstrued his testimony. Taking the evidence altogether, and after reading the entire record, we think appellant’s contention as to the facts is not sustained by the evidence. We shall not attempt to set out the evidence at any considerable length.

It may be that we should have stated the objections filed. They are, in substance, that the note was never ex[715]*715ecuted by the corporation, nor was it the indebtedness of the corporation; that it was without consideration on the part of the corporation; that the claim for which the alleged note was taken, was the individual claim against D. E. Baker, and not against the lumber company, and that it was taken in an effort to secure an apparently good note and claim against the said corporation, for the purpose of collecting the obligation that D. E. Baker owed personally to the claimant; and that the note was not issued or taken in good faith; that it is not a bona-ffde claim, but was issued and taken for the purpose of diverting the funds of the corporation to the payment of an individual claim against Baker, and is illegal, without consideration, fraudulent, and, therefore, not a valid claim against the estate; and further, that the pretended note was secured by plaintiff by a conspiracy between him and Baker, for the purpose of converting the personal debt of Baker into an apparent obligation of the corporation. An amended claim was filed, to which objections were also filed, asking an equitable accounting and marshaling of the assets; but, as said, the vital point in the case is whether the .note should be considered as the debt of Baker or of the lumber company, and this is the point argued and relied upon.

Some of the facts are not disputed. . Some of the more important facts which are either undisputed or are sustained by the evidence are that D. E. Baker started in the lumber business at Traer in 1885, in partnership with another man, for a year or two, and then Baker ran the business alone, to about 1901. Thereafter, and until 1906, one or two other parties were in partnership with Baker. Baker individually owned the real estate. When one War-field bought into the firm, in 1906, the business was regularly incorporated as a corporation for pecuniary profit, Baker and Warfield each buying in one half the stock; and the board of directors consisted of those two. In 1910, [716]*716Baker bought Warfield’s stock, and at that time, there was approximately $20,000 of the stock held by others. Thereafter, the board of directors consisted of D. E. Baker and Ralph L. Baker, his son. The paid-up capital stock was $58,000, of which D. E. Baker owned $38,600, and Ralph Baker, $1,000. The balance, or $18,400 of the stock, was owned by other stockholders, including^ the objecting stockholders. The principal office of the corporation was at Traer, with branches at Dinsdale and Clutier. As said, the real estate on which the business was carried on and the buildings were owned by Baker himself, during all the time and for a considerable while after the corporation was formed; he collected rent thereon from the partnership or the corporation, at $110 a month, until the Clutier property was sold by Baker, and. another property purchased there, with corporation funds; and thereafter, rent was paid upon the Dinsdale and Clutier properties only, until November, 1914, when Baker conveyed the real estate in Traer aud Dinsdale to the corporation,- by warranty deed, The consideration for this transfer was $20,000, and credit was given upon Baker’s account with the corporation for that amount. This appears to have been substantially the value of the real estate, and perhaps a little more. The corporation paid Baker a salary, and this, with his rents, was credited to his personal account. Baker had no personal account at a bank, and money borrowed by him went into the lumber company’s account, credit being given him for the same. When he drew his salary, rents, etc., he drew the firm’s checks to himself, and charged them upon his ledger account. His household expenses and the like were paid with checks of the corporation, running to him and then endorsed by him. The public bought lumber of the lumber company, and made checks payable to the lumber company. Occasionally, though not often, they were made to Baker. Wholesale houses dealt with the concern as D. E. Baker [717]*717Lumber Company. It is true that, for several years, plaintiff made his checks payable to Baker, but this was during the time that there were others associated in the business with Baker, first as partners, and later as stockholders, and Wood knew of the partnerships and of the corporation. At one time, he took stock of the corporation as collateral upon a loan. After Warfield withdrew, both D. E. Baker and Ralph Baker participated in the management, although D. É. was the general manager, and conducted the principal business of the corporation. Plaintiff testifies that the concern was supposed' to be the D. E. Baker Lumber Company, but all was done by D. E. Baker.

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186 Iowa 713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-v-wood-iowa-1919.