Wood v. United States of America

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided July 21, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-00636·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MICHAEL A. WOOD, CASE NO. 2:22-CV-636-DGE-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER CONVERTING INDIVIDUAL 12 v. BOP DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS TO MOTION FOR 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND al., GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 14 MOTION FOR DISCOVERY STAY Defendants. 15 16 17 The District Court referred this action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. 18 Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to United States Magistrate Judge 19 David W. Christel. Currently pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss brought by 20 Defendants Kevin Posalski, Dr. Dy, Scottie Bussell, James Corliss and Israel Jacquez 21 (“Individual BOP Defendants”) (Dkt. 57) and the motion to stay discovery brought by the 22 Individual BOP Defendants and Defendants John Westland and Matthew Lilje (“USMS 23 Defendants”) (Dkt. 78). 24 ORDER CONVERTING INDIVIDUAL BOP DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS TO 1 The Individual BOP Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 57) must be considered under 2 the rules applicable to motions for summary judgment; the Court therefore converts the motion 3 dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, re-notes the motion and establishes a schedule for 4 optional additional briefing. The Court grants-in-part and denies-in-part Defendants’ motion to

5 stay discovery (Dkt. 78). 6 A. Individual BOP Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 57) 7 The Individual BOP Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them on 8 the ground that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the 9 Prisoner Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Dkt. 57. 10 Exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 11 (2001). All “available” remedies must be exhausted. Id. 12 However, “failure to exhaust under the PLRA is ‘an affirmative defense the defendant 13 must plead and prove.’” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. 14 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). Defendants bear the initial burden “to prove that there was an

15 available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. 16 at 1172 (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). If the 17 Defendants meet their burden to show an available administrative remedy, “the burden shifts to 18 the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case 19 that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to 20 him.” Id. (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 788 n.5). The “ultimate burden of proof remains with the 21 defendant.” Id. (citing Jones). 22 When alleging a plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a defendant may 23 move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 only in the extremely rare event the

24 ORDER CONVERTING INDIVIDUAL BOP DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS TO 1 plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is clear on the face of the complaint. Albino 2 v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “Otherwise, defendants must produce evidence 3 proving failure to exhaust” in a summary judgment motion brought under Rule 56. Id. 4 Here, Defendants have submitted and rely upon evidence outside of the pleadings. See

5 Dkt. 58. Therefore, their motion must be considered as one for summary judgment under Rule 6 56, not as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12. See Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 7 1984). Thus, the Court converts Defendants’ motion under Rule 12 into a Rule 56 motion for 8 summary judgment and provides the Parties with leave to file additional briefing and evidence. 9 Because Defendants’ original Notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 10 952 (9th Cir. 1998) presented the motion as one under Rule 12 and stated Plaintiff “must rely on 11 what is stated in [his] Complaint,” (Dkt. 59 at 2), the Court provides the following warning to 12 Plaintiff regarding his obligation to respond to a motion for summary judgment: 13 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 14 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for 15 summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is 16 no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to 17 judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is 18 properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must 19 set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in 20 Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine 21 issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may 22 be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 23 24 ORDER CONVERTING INDIVIDUAL BOP DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS TO 1 Rand, 154 F.3d at 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 2 B. Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt. 78) 3 The Court has previously stayed discovery against the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 4 pending the consideration of its motion to dismiss. Dkt. 60. The Individual BOP Defendants and

5 the USMS Defendants now also seek a stay of discovery pending the decision of their pending 6 motions to dismiss. Dkt. 78. Plaintiff has filed a response. Dkt. 79. The moving parties have not 7 replied. 8 A court may relieve a party of the burdens of discovery while a dispositive motion is 9 pending. DiMartini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989), amended at 906 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 10 1990); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Ministerio Roca Solida v. U.S. 11 Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, 288 F.R.D. 500, 506 (D. Nev.

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