Wood v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Wood v. State

94 So. 256, 18 Ala. App. 654, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 286

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 20, 1922

Docket3 Div. 432.

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 94 So. 256 (Wood v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wood v. State, 94 So. 256, 18 Ala. App. 654, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 286 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922).

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Opinions

SAMPORD, J.

There were many objections and exceptions l-eserved during the trial, many of which axve clearly without merit, and while we have i-ead and considered them, as the law requires, it will serve the pui'pose of this appeal to treat only such exceptions as have been specifically pointed out in brief of counsel, who have therein presented every question of merit.

It is here insisted that the court erred in permitting the witxiess Naftel to refresh his recollection as to certain articles of merchandise alleged to have been sold to one Monerief, and from which package a part had been stolen; but no objection was made to the questions eliciting this testimony, or to the reading of the list of articles from the ■bill, until after it had been read to the jury, and the defendant objected to the witness reading from the bill anything other than the pi-operty alleged to have been stolen, and this objection of defendant was sustained by the court, and no exception is reserved to any ruling of the court pertaining to this evidence. There is, therefore, nothing for this court to review.

The argument of the solicitor as to how defendant came into the possession of the articles found in his store was not the statement of a fact outside the record, but was based upon his conclusions drawn from the evidence.

That one McQueen was the yard conductor, who had charge of the making up of the train, in which was the car from which the goods were stolen; that he could move them to any place he chose; that McQxxeen had sole control of the car at a time when the seal theretofore affixed had beexx taken off, so that the door could be opened; that McQueen lived in the house with defendaxxt near the railroad yards — might well have been left in as a part of the evidence in the case, in view of the fact that a part of the stolen px-operty was found ixx the recent possession of defendaxxt; but the court in his general charge to the jury, by explicit and ample instructions, excluded this testimony from the jury, thereby leaving defendant without exception.

We think there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to whether the goods stolen were taken from the railx-oad freight car, but whether that is so or not is not material to a conviction under the second count of the indictment. Under that count, the proof of the corpus delicti does not depend upon the place from whence the goods were stol- en, or who stole them. That they were stolen by somebody is all that is required to establish the corpus delicti, and there was ample evidence for this purpose. Leverett v. State, ante, p. 578, 93 South. 347.

The corpus delicti having been proven, the recent unexplained possession of some of the stolen goods coupled with the character of the merchandise, the unusual maxxner in which they came into his possession, his evasive statements concerning them, together with the attending surrounding circumstances, were sufficient facts upon which. to predicate a verdict of guilt.

We find no reversible error in the record. Let the judgment be affirmed.

Affirmed.

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SAMPORD, J.

There were many objections and exceptions l-eserved during the trial, many of which axve clearly without merit, and while we have i-ead and considered them, as the law requires, it will serve the pui'pose of this appeal to treat only such exceptions as have been specifically pointed out in brief of counsel, who have therein presented every question of merit.

It is here insisted that the court erred in permitting the witxiess Naftel to refresh his recollection as to certain articles of merchandise alleged to have been sold to one Monerief, and from which package a part had been stolen; but no objection was made to the questions eliciting this testimony, or to the reading of the list of articles from the ■bill, until after it had been read to the jury, and the defendant objected to the witness reading from the bill anything other than the pi-operty alleged to have been stolen, and this objection of defendant was sustained by the court, and no exception is reserved to any ruling of the court pertaining to this evidence. There is, therefore, nothing for this court to review.

The argument of the solicitor as to how defendant came into the possession of the articles found in his store was not the statement of a fact outside the record, but was based upon his conclusions drawn from the evidence.

That one McQueen was the yard conductor, who had charge of the making up of the train, in which was the car from which the goods were stolen; that he could move them to any place he chose; that McQxxeen had sole control of the car at a time when the seal theretofore affixed had beexx taken off, so that the door could be opened; that McQueen lived in the house with defendaxxt near the railroad yards — might well have been left in as a part of the evidence in the case, in view of the fact that a part of the stolen px-operty was found ixx the recent possession of defendaxxt; but the court in his general charge to the jury, by explicit and ample instructions, excluded this testimony from the jury, thereby leaving defendant without exception.

We think there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to whether the goods stolen were taken from the railx-oad freight car, but whether that is so or not is not material to a conviction under the second count of the indictment. Under that count, the proof of the corpus delicti does not depend upon the place from whence the goods were stol- en, or who stole them. That they were stolen by somebody is all that is required to establish the corpus delicti, and there was ample evidence for this purpose. Leverett v. State, ante, p. 578, 93 South. 347.

The corpus delicti having been proven, the recent unexplained possession of some of the stolen goods coupled with the character of the merchandise, the unusual maxxner in which they came into his possession, his evasive statements concerning them, together with the attending surrounding circumstances, were sufficient facts upon which. to predicate a verdict of guilt.

We find no reversible error in the record. Let the judgment be affirmed.

Affirmed.

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94 So. 256, 18 Ala. App. 654, 1922 Ala. App. LEXIS 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-v-state-alactapp-1922.

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