Wood v. Mandrilla

140 P. 279, 167 Cal. 607, 1914 Cal. LEXIS 505
California Supreme Court·Decided April 8, 1914·No. Sac. No. 2089.·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

LORIGAN, J.

This is an action in ejectment to recover a strip of ten acres of land, part of the southwest quarter of section 30, township 20 south, range 24 east, in Tulare County. This quarter section was originally government land—the fractional quarter section containing 178.98 acres as returned by the surveyor under the government survey, but as shown by the evidence in the case in fact contains about one hundred and eighty acres. This quarter section, under one entry and as one tract, was patented in 1872 to the predecessor in title of plaintiff. On October 22, 1909, plaintiff, while still the owner of the whole quarter section, conveyed a portion of it to defendant, the deed describing the part conveyed as “The east half of the southwest quarter of section 30, township 20 south, range 24 east, Mount Diablo base and meridian.” No acreage was mentioned in the deed. Defendant, claiming *609 that the deed conveyed to him the east half of the quarter section in quantity or acreage, took possession of about ninety acres thereof. Plaintiff claiming, on the other hand, that such deed did not convey the east half in quantity of the quarter section, but only eighty acres, as such east half, and that a strip of land of about ten acres running north and south taken possession of by defendant, was part of the west half and not the east half of the section, brought this action to recover possession of said strip. The court found that the defendant under his deed from plaintiff acquired title to the east half of the quarter section in acreage and quantity, which included the strip in dispute, and accordingly gave judgment in his favor. Plaintiff appeals from this judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The principal question arising on this appeal is whether the deed to respondent included the strip in question. As the quarter section owned by appellant contained approximately one hundred and eighty acres, the deed of appellant to respondent of the east half of it, without mention of the number of acres intended to be conveyed thereby (unless there is some merit in the claim of appellant presently to be noticed) transferred to respondent one-half in quantity, and hence included the strip in controversy as a part thereof. Words used in a conveyance are to be given their ordinary and popular meaning, unless used in a technical sense, or having a special meaning, or the context shows that they are used in a different sense. The word “half” has a plain, common, and natural meaning, and when used in describing lands is to be understood literally. There is nothing uncertain or equivocal in the term, and if used without qualification in the deed to respondent must be given its literal significance as one of two equal parts into which anything may be divided, and to have conveyed to him the east half of the quarter section in quantity and acreage. (Jones v. Pashby, 62 Mich. 614, [29 N. W. 374] ; Cogan v. Cook, 22 Minn. 137.)

Appellant does not question but what the usual construction of the word “half” means one-half in quantity, but insists that, as used in describing a tract of land conveyed as the east half or west half of a subdivision of a government survey, the terms “east half” or “west half” thereof are not used with reference to quantity, but with reference to a line *610 fixed by governmental survey as dividing such subdivision into east and west halves; that the expression in the deed to respondent “Mount Diablo base and meridian” as part of the description of the land conveyed operates, as appellant states it, to “tie the description to the United States government survey” and that a plat of such survey introduced in evidence by consent of both parties shows that this fractional quarter section was subdivided by a government survey into east and west halves, the east half containing eighty acres, and hence excludes the idea that any greater quantity was intended to be conveyed by the deed. The effect of the deed is discussed by both parties on the theory that the government survey of the township in which this fractional quarter section lies is incorporated as a part of the description thereof, the position taken by respondent being that under the survey, and the application thereto of the acts of Congress, the same result follows as would follow from giving the word “half” its literal meaning and that the deed conveys one-half in quantity, which includes the strip in controversy.

In surveying a township where fractional sections occur these are thrown on the west and north lines of the township. Such fractional sections occur in the survey of this township. The plat of the township was, as said, introduced in evidence, as there was also testimony respecting the lines of the fractional quarter section under consideration as shown by the field notes of the survey thereof.

Section 2395 of the Revised Statutes of the United States [Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1471, 6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 363], required the surveyor-general, upon the return to him of the surveys in the field of government land by the deputy surveyors, to “cause therefrom a description of the whole lands surveyed to be made out and transmitted to the officer who may superintend the sales. He shall also cause a fair plat to be made of the townships and fractional parts of townships, of the lands describing the subdivisions thereof and the marking of all the corners,” and send copies to the place of sale and to the general land-office.

In conformity with this requirement the plat introduced in evidence was prepared. On it a line was drawn, presumably when the plat was prepared in the surveyor-general’s office, running north and south through all the tier of fractional *611 quarter sections on the west side of the township, including the fractional quarter section in question. To the east of this line so drawn and in each fractional section are marked the figures “80,” doubtless intended to mean eighty acres, and to the west of said line figures are placed representing whatever the remaining acreage is of each fractional section as the total acreage of each of these quarter sections was computed by the surveyor-general; the figures to the west of the line in this fractional quarter section being “98.98.” It is by reason of this line on the plat prolonged through this particular fractional quarter that appellant bases his claim that by government survey the east half thereof is fixed at eighty acres in quantity, and 'hence, only that acreage was conveyed by the deed. While this is a reasonable argument to make on the face of the plat, there is to be taken into consideration, the fact that it is not the plat alone that governs in the .matter. The plat is only a record of the surveys and must be made in conformity thereto. The surveys in the field of government land, and the acts of Congress relative to them and to which the plat must conform, control as to what various subdivisions of the township have been created by the surveys, or when a division of a subdivision thereof has not been actually segregated by a survey, the method by which such division should, be ascertained, should occasion arise in a disposition of the public lands to do so. We have already referred to the section of the Revised Statutes (2395) relative to the plat to be made by the surveyor-general from the surveys returned.

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Wood v. Mandrilla, 140 P. 279, 167 Cal. 607, 1914 Cal. LEXIS 505 (Cal. 1914).

140 P. 279 (Wood v. Mandrilla) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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