United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 91–2361
Summary Calendar.
Peggy WOOD, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
HOUSTON BELT & TERMINAL RAILWAY and Transportation Communications International Union, Defendants–Appellees.
April 13, 1992.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Peggy Wood appeals from the summary judgment in favor of her
employer and union in this hybrid breach of contract/breach of duty
of fair representation case. Because her claims are barred by the
six-month statute of limitations, we AFFIRM.
I
Wood was employed by Houston Belt & Terminal Railway ("HB &
T") as a clerk. HB & T is a carrier covered by the Railway Labor
Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. The Transportation
Communications International Union ("the Union") is the certified
bargaining representative for certain employees at HB & T. HB & T
and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
established by the RLA and controlled and arbitrated under its
jurisdiction. The terms and conditions of Wood's employment were
governed by the collective bargaining agreement between HB & T and the Union ("the Agreement").
On June 29, 1987, HB & T notified Wood that she was terminated
for failing to return to work within ten days, after being recalled
from furlough status. Wood claimed that she had not returned to
work because she was threatened by another employee when she
attempted to report for work on June 18. The Union investigated
the matter and requested that Wood provide written statements to
substantiate her allegations. The Union never filed a formal
grievance on behalf of Wood because she failed to provide the
requested written statements, and because no other employees
reported the alleged threats. D.D. Willey, the Union's general
chairman and union representative, notified Wood by letter dated
February 12, 1988, that the Union would not pursue the matter any
further. Willey did not refer to the internal appeals procedure
set forth in the Union's constitution. Willey instead advised Wood
that "the only angle I can think of that might be of some help to
you in obtaining separation pay might be through some legal action
against the Company." Willey advised Wood to consult with an
attorney regarding the alleged threat, and provided her with a list
of attorneys from which to choose.
The Union's international president, R.I. Kilroy, also
responded to Wood's complaints that the Union had not fairly
represented her. Kilroy detailed the steps the Union had taken on
her behalf and informed her that the Union was closing its files.
He did not refer to the internal appeals process provided for in the Union's constitution.
On April 22, 1988, Wood filed charges against the Union with
the Texas Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the Union "failed to
fairly represent" her because of her age and sex. After conducting
an investigation, the EEOC field office determined on June 24,
1989, that the evidence regarding Wood's charges did not establish
discrimination. Wood sought review of the field office's
determination and, on September 21, 1989, the EEOC's Washington,
D.C. office upheld the field office's finding.
II
On December 29, 1989, Wood filed suit against HB & T and the
Union in Texas state court. She alleged that HB & T and the Union
(1) breached her employment contract by failing to allow her to
work at HB & T and failing to pay her a separation allowance; (2)
intentionally interfered with the contract between her and HB & T;
(3) made fraudulent misrepresentations to her; (4) conspired to
refuse her employment at HB & T; and (5) were negligent in failing
to enforce the employment agreement. She sought actual and
punitive damages. HB & T and the Union removed the case to federal
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, alleging that
Wood's claims arose under the RLA. HB & T and the Union moved for
dismissal or, in the alternative, summary judgment, on the grounds
that (1) Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before
filing suit; and (2) Wood's claims are time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of HB & T and the Union on
the ground that Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Wood timely appealed.
III
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Our review of summary judgment is plenary, and we view all facts
and the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d
267, 268 (5th Cir.1992). If the summary judgment evidence could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Although the district court granted summary judgment on the
ground that Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,
"[w]e may affirm a summary judgment on grounds other than those
relied upon by the district court when we find in the record an
adequate and independent basis for that result." Brown v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th
Cir.1990). In this case, the record clearly establishes that
Wood's claims are time-barred. When an employee has a dispute with her employer involving
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as a
claim against her union for breach of the union's duty of fair
representation, "the employee may bring a "hybrid' action alleging
claims against both the union and the employer." Trial v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 896 F.2d 120, 123 (5th
Cir.1990). In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–72, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293–95, 76
L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that
hybrid actions brought under the National Labor Relations Act and
the Labor Management Relations Act are governed by the six-month
statute of limitations in section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
160(b). The six-month statute of limitations also applies to
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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 91–2361
Summary Calendar.
Peggy WOOD, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
HOUSTON BELT & TERMINAL RAILWAY and Transportation Communications International Union, Defendants–Appellees.
April 13, 1992.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Peggy Wood appeals from the summary judgment in favor of her
employer and union in this hybrid breach of contract/breach of duty
of fair representation case. Because her claims are barred by the
six-month statute of limitations, we AFFIRM.
I
Wood was employed by Houston Belt & Terminal Railway ("HB &
T") as a clerk. HB & T is a carrier covered by the Railway Labor
Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. The Transportation
Communications International Union ("the Union") is the certified
bargaining representative for certain employees at HB & T. HB & T
and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
established by the RLA and controlled and arbitrated under its
jurisdiction. The terms and conditions of Wood's employment were
governed by the collective bargaining agreement between HB & T and the Union ("the Agreement").
On June 29, 1987, HB & T notified Wood that she was terminated
for failing to return to work within ten days, after being recalled
from furlough status. Wood claimed that she had not returned to
work because she was threatened by another employee when she
attempted to report for work on June 18. The Union investigated
the matter and requested that Wood provide written statements to
substantiate her allegations. The Union never filed a formal
grievance on behalf of Wood because she failed to provide the
requested written statements, and because no other employees
reported the alleged threats. D.D. Willey, the Union's general
chairman and union representative, notified Wood by letter dated
February 12, 1988, that the Union would not pursue the matter any
further. Willey did not refer to the internal appeals procedure
set forth in the Union's constitution. Willey instead advised Wood
that "the only angle I can think of that might be of some help to
you in obtaining separation pay might be through some legal action
against the Company." Willey advised Wood to consult with an
attorney regarding the alleged threat, and provided her with a list
of attorneys from which to choose.
The Union's international president, R.I. Kilroy, also
responded to Wood's complaints that the Union had not fairly
represented her. Kilroy detailed the steps the Union had taken on
her behalf and informed her that the Union was closing its files.
He did not refer to the internal appeals process provided for in the Union's constitution.
On April 22, 1988, Wood filed charges against the Union with
the Texas Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the Union "failed to
fairly represent" her because of her age and sex. After conducting
an investigation, the EEOC field office determined on June 24,
1989, that the evidence regarding Wood's charges did not establish
discrimination. Wood sought review of the field office's
determination and, on September 21, 1989, the EEOC's Washington,
D.C. office upheld the field office's finding.
II
On December 29, 1989, Wood filed suit against HB & T and the
Union in Texas state court. She alleged that HB & T and the Union
(1) breached her employment contract by failing to allow her to
work at HB & T and failing to pay her a separation allowance; (2)
intentionally interfered with the contract between her and HB & T;
(3) made fraudulent misrepresentations to her; (4) conspired to
refuse her employment at HB & T; and (5) were negligent in failing
to enforce the employment agreement. She sought actual and
punitive damages. HB & T and the Union removed the case to federal
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, alleging that
Wood's claims arose under the RLA. HB & T and the Union moved for
dismissal or, in the alternative, summary judgment, on the grounds
that (1) Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before
filing suit; and (2) Wood's claims are time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of HB & T and the Union on
the ground that Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Wood timely appealed.
III
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Our review of summary judgment is plenary, and we view all facts
and the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d
267, 268 (5th Cir.1992). If the summary judgment evidence could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Although the district court granted summary judgment on the
ground that Wood failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,
"[w]e may affirm a summary judgment on grounds other than those
relied upon by the district court when we find in the record an
adequate and independent basis for that result." Brown v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th
Cir.1990). In this case, the record clearly establishes that
Wood's claims are time-barred. When an employee has a dispute with her employer involving
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as a
claim against her union for breach of the union's duty of fair
representation, "the employee may bring a "hybrid' action alleging
claims against both the union and the employer." Trial v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 896 F.2d 120, 123 (5th
Cir.1990). In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–72, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293–95, 76
L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that
hybrid actions brought under the National Labor Relations Act and
the Labor Management Relations Act are governed by the six-month
statute of limitations in section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
160(b). The six-month statute of limitations also applies to
hybrid actions under the RLA. Brock v. Republic Airlines, Inc.,
776 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir.1985). "The limitations period under
the RLA begins to run when the claimants discover, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, the acts that
form the basis of their duty of fair representation claim." Trial,
896 F.2d at 124.
HB & T and the Union satisfied their summary judgment burden
on the statute of limitations issue by producing evidence
demonstrating that Wood had knowledge of the acts that form the
basis of her duty of fair representation claim against the Union at
least as early as February 12, 1988, when Willey and Kilroy
informed her that the Union would do nothing further for her, and
certainly no later April 22, 1988, when she filed EEOC charges against the Union, contending that it "failed to represent" her.
Accordingly, in order to avoid summary judgment against her, Wood
was required to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial" as to when she became aware of the facts
to support her claims, and whether she had a legally valid excuse
for her delay in filing suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). She failed to satisfy her burden.
Wood argues, as she did in the district court, that because
the Union deliberately misled her regarding her appellate rights,
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until she completed
her appeal through the EEOC on September 21, 1989. She further
contends that the Union's suggestion to her that the next step in
an appeal was to contact the EEOC "exemplifies the inequity in
asserting that the statute of limitations began to run from the
date of such suggestion."
Wood failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to her contention that the Union misled her regarding her
right to institute legal action against either HB & T or the Union.
There is no evidence to support Wood's conclusory assertion that
the Union advised her to contact the EEOC as the "next step" in an
appeal, or with regard to her complaints about the Union's
representation; rather, Willey's letter to Wood indicates that he
advised her to contact the EEOC regarding allegations of sexual
harassment by an HB & T official. Nevertheless, Wood's EEOC charge against the Union alleges that the Union "failed to represent" her
because of her age and sex, and states that the most recent
discrimination took place on February 12, 1988. This undisputed
evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that Wood had knowledge
of the basis of her claim against the Union no later than April 22,
1988, the date she filed the EEOC charge. However, she did not
file suit until December 29, 1989, long after the expiration of the
six-month statute of limitations.
Wood's position seems to be that the limitations period should
not have begun until she had an opportunity to consult an attorney
and learned of the existence of a potential legal remedy against
the Union. Obviously, such a rule would seriously undermine the
strong federal policy supporting "relatively rapid final resolution
of labor disputes," which is the rationale for the six-month
statute of limitations. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168, 103 S.Ct. at
2292. Wood's knowledge of the legal basis for her claim against
the Union is irrelevant; the statute of limitations begins to run
when a potential plaintiff has knowledge of the facts which could
support a legal remedy.
IV
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding
the proper application of the six-month statute of limitations.
Because Wood's claims are time-barred, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.