Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles

151 F. Supp. 459, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3569
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 22, 1957
DocketCiv. A. No. 12408
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 151 F. Supp. 459 (Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles, 151 F. Supp. 459, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3569 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).

Opinion

BYERS, District Judge.

The plaintiff Wong Yoke Sing by .his alleged brother Wong Kim Sing, seeks a‘declaratory judgment that shall, (a) designate him to be a United States citizen pursuant to Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes;1 (b) direct the defendant to issue to him a passport or , “other travel document to enable him [460]*460to travel from Hong Kong to the United States;” and (c) further relief.

For convenience, the plaintiff will be ■referred to as Yoke, and his brother as Kim.

The complaint, reciting that it is on behalf of a man born in China who is unable to leave that country, was filed January 28, 1952; ■ the cause was twice marked off the calendar and for the second time it was restored by order of July 3, 1956. A motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Galston on October 28, 1954 in a decision which held that the complaint was legally sufficient as a matter of pleading, and that the issues raised required determination as the result of trial.

In October of 1953 a motion to direct the defendant to issue to Yoke a certificate of identity to enable him to come to this country to prosecute this cause was denied by an order which recited that it was without prejudice to a renewal in accordance with these provisions:

“The plaintiffs are given ninety days to obtain a blood test of the alleged mother during which time the defendant is directed to render all possible assistance, and it is further
“Ordered, that within thirty days thereafter, the defendant is directed to allow or deny the issuance of a Certificate of Identity, in writing, with his reasons therefor. Any further motion will be determined on the entire record.”

The legal effect of the last paragraph above quoted has not been presented for decision herein, and is therefore not discussed. See however,

Dulles v. Lee Gnan Lung, 9 Cir., 212 F.2d 73;
Eng v. Acheson, D.C., 108 F.Supp. 682;.
Wong Fon Haw v. Dulles, D.C., 114 F.Supp. 906.

The blood test aspect of the case requires brief discussion. In his opening, plaintiff’s counsel made this observation:

“The mother had been blood typed in July, 1952, and the application before Judge Bruchhausen was sometime during the summer of 1953 * * * I think that the defendant, the State Department, was even unaware that its own files did contain such a report of blood typing.”

Inquiry was addressed to both attorneys by the court subsequent to the trial, because the record did not disclose any facts in amplification of the quoted statement.

The inquiry developed from both counsel that under date of March 5, 1954 the Director of the Passport Office of the Department of State advised plaintiff’s counsel in material part as follows:

“By despatch dated October 15, 1953 the Consulate General at Hong Kong reported that the applicant and his mother had Group 0, Type M blood. The Department has not as yet been notified of the blood group and type of the alleged brother in this country, Wong Kim Sing.
“In addition, the Consulate General notified this office by cable dated December 4,1953 that it had learned that your client actually is a Ma family man and is not a member of the Wong family.
“In view of this serious implication of fraud, the Department has ordered that a full investigation be conducted and reports submitted as expeditiously as possible. A decision concerning the issue of a certificate of identity will be deferred until the Department has had an opportunity to evaluate the reports received.”

It is assumed that the court may accept the foregoing in view of the written statement of plaintiff’s counsel dated May 14, 1957 in reply to the court’s inquiry, as follows:

“On June 17, 1954, the .attorney for the defendant submitted a motion to this Court for Re-argument, [461]*461and attached to said Motion a letter of the defendant, dated March 5, 1954. The original letter was addressed to the undersigned, and I am, enclosing it, with the request that it be returned when it has. served its purpose. As to the information being a part of the record, I presume that all moving papers, such as the Motion for Re-argument, are a part of the record before this Court.”

It is assumed therefore that compatibility between the blood of the applicant and his alleged mother has been shown. This, however, does not establish the affirmative of the proposition that Yoke is indeed the applicant, or that he is the son of his alleged father.

The weight to be given to blood tests is discussed in the third edition of Wig-more, § 165(a), from which the following is quoted:

“* * * In other words, the blood-composition of a child may be some evidence as to the child’s paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be used only negatively, i.e. to evidence that a particular man P is not the father of a particular child C. * * * thus (a) In a special case it may be possible by the test to disprove the alleged paternity of a particular person. (6) In no case will it be possible to prove by the test the paternity, of a particular person. (c) Whether the special case of (a) will be available for such disproof depends on the probabilities of that case occurring; the. chances of its occurring vary from 1 -in 2 and 1 in 17.”

The complaint alleges Yoke’s birth October 29, 1921. at Hoi Ping, Canton, China, and his residence in Hong Kong; that his father “was a native and citizen of the United States, having been born on September 23, 1881 at Seattle, Washington.”

It may be here observed that no legal evidence was offered in support of this allegation which is fundamental to the plaintiff’s cause. Since the defendant does not rely upon a deficiency in proof in that connection, the subject will not be discussed, and decision will procee'd on the theory that the quoted allegation is to be accepted as true for the purposes of this case.

The complaint continues by alleging' Yoke’s derivative citizenship; that he had lived continuously in China since his birth, and has made several unsuccessful attempts to come to this country, etc. That on February 23, 1951 he submitted affidavits to the American Consulate at Hong Kong, “and applied at said consulate for a United States passport or other travel document in order to proceed to this country;” that his application was denied “on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish his American citizenship” and for this denial of his constitutional rights he seeks judgment as above stated. It will appear below that the application was denied, but not for the failure so alleged.

The answer contains only denials, and pleads as a defense that the court is without jurisdiction; as to this, the order of October 24, 1954 is thought not to be dispositive except as to the sufficiency of the complaint as a pleading.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

C-Y-L
9 I. & N. Dec. 286 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1961)
Chin Kai Su v. Dulles
157 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. New York, 1957)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
151 F. Supp. 459, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wong-yoke-sing-v-dulles-nyed-1957.