18-1007 Wong v. Barr BIA
Loprest, IJ
A036 850 251
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 2 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 3 York, on the 16th day of June, two thousand twenty. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 8 Circuit Judges, 9 KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, 1 10 District Judge. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 KWOK SUM WONG, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-1007 17 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Margaret W. Wong, Margaret Wong & Associates 24 LLC, Cleveland, OH. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Carl 27 McIntyre, Assistant Director; Andrew Oliveira, Trial 28 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United 29 States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
1 Judge Katherine Polk Failla, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration 2 Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 3 petition for review is GRANTED. 4 Petitioner Kwok Sum Wong, a native of Hong Kong and citizen of the People’s Republic 5 of China, seeks review of two decisions of the BIA. The BIA affirmed the April 24, 2015 and 6 February 10, 2012 decisions of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering Wong’s removal as an alien 7 convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude (“CIMT”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 8 finding him ineligible for a waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). In re Kwok Sum Wong, No. 9 A036 850 251 (B.I.A. Mar. 20, 2018, May 15, 2012), aff’g No. A 036 850 251 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 10 City Apr. 24, 2015, Feb. 10, 2012). We assume familiarity with the facts, procedural history and 11 the issues presented for review. 12 In 2005, Wong was convicted of theft by deception in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-4. 13 In 2006, he was convicted of forgery in the second degree in violation of New York Penal Law 14 (“NYPL”) § 170.10. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Wong as 15 removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of two CIMTs. On 16 appeal, Wong argues (1) that his theft by deception offense does not constitute a “conviction” 17 within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) 18 and, if it does, the offense is not a CIMT; (2) that his forgery conviction does not qualify as a 19 CIMT; and (3) that the agency erred in finding him ineligible for a § 1182(h) waiver. We grant the 20 petition for review and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 21 DISCUSSION 22 Wong pleaded guilty to theft by deception in violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:20-4 and was 23 ordered to pay a $200 fine. Wong argues to us that his plea did not count as a “conviction” under
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1 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under New Jersey law, theft by deception is a disorderly persons 2 offense. A disorderly persons theft is one that involves less than $200. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20- 3 2(b)(4)(a). The offense is not a “crime” as defined in the New Jersey constitution. Id. §§ 2C:1- 4 4(a)-(b); 2C:20-2(b)(4). New Jersey law also provides that “[t]here shall be no right to indictment 5 by a grand jury nor any right to trial by jury on such offenses. Conviction of such offenses shall 6 not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.” Id. § 2C:1- 7 4(b). 8 The INA defines “conviction” as:
9 a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt 10 has been withheld, where-- 11 (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 12 or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, 13 and 14 (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 15 alien’s liberty to be imposed. 16 17 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
18 The BIA’s prior decisions about what constitutes a “conviction” leave us with uncertainty 19 as to whether and why disorderly persons theft satisfies this definition. In In re Eslamizar, the BIA 20 determined that by “judgment of guilt,” Congress meant a “judgment entered in a genuine criminal 21 proceeding”—a “proceeding that must, at minimum, be criminal in nature under the governing 22 laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction.” 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 688 (B.I.A. 2004). In that case, the BIA 23 determined that a judgment of guilt as to third-degree theft, a violation under Oregon law, did not 24 qualify as a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A). In making that determination, the BIA considered 25 “the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon a criminal adjudication” and the 26 consequences associated with the conviction under the laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction. Id. at
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1 687. Like New Jersey law, Oregon law provides that “conviction of a violation does not give rise 2 to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.” Id. (internal quotation 3 marks and alterations omitted). Moreover, the BIA considered whether the offense must be proved 4 beyond a reasonable doubt and its conclusion was influenced by the fact that the violation could 5 be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 687-88. Notably, the BIA did not hold that 6 any one of these factors was dispositive or to be given lesser weight, nor did it explain how they 7 did or did not fit together. 8 The Government argues that New Jersey requires a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable 9 doubt for conviction of a disorderly persons offense, which is sufficient to render Wong’s 10 adjudication a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A). The Third Circuit considered this issue in 11 Castillo v. Attorney General of the United States, 729 F.3d 296, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2013), where the 12 Government also argued that New Jersey’s disorderly persons offenses qualified as convictions 13 under § 1101(a)(48)(A) because the standard was “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Third Circuit 14 rejected the Government’s contention that the standard of proof was dispositive. Id. at 306. Instead, 15 it concluded that In re Eslamizar requires a “more ‘open-ended’ inquiry” and “that there are several 16 other factors that may be relevant in deciding if the judgment was entered in a true or genuine 17 criminal proceeding, including how the prosecuting jurisdiction characterized the offense at issue, 18 the consequences of a finding of guilt, and the rights available to the accused as well as any other 19 characteristics of the proceeding itself.” Id. at 307. The Third Circuit then remanded to the agency 20 to reconsider In re Eslamizar or to apply the factors discussed. Id. at 311. 21 Subsequent BIA decisions have not definitively clarified whether the standard of proof is 22 the dispositive factor or how other factors enter into the mix. See, e.g., Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 23 24 I. & N. Dec. 484, 486-87 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding a conviction where reasonable doubt standard
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1 applied and “trial by court-martial d[id] not infringe on the constitutional rights of an accused . . . , 2 despite the absence of some protections afforded civilian defendants, such as the right to a trial by 3 jury”). In Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 853 (B.I.A. 2012) (internal quotation 4 marks omitted), the BIA, found that a municipal court conviction was a conviction under the INA, 5 emphasizing the presence of a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The BIA, however, also 6 noted that the municipal court judge could impose fines and order incarceration, that the judgment 7 was “a valid conviction for purposes of calculating the defendant’s criminal history” under the 8 state’s sentencing laws, and there was right to trial de novo in state district court. Id. at 853-55. 9 The BIA did not say whether the burden of proof was determinative or whether and how these 10 other factors mattered. 11 Furthermore, it is unclear if the BIA appropriately considered whether the disorderly 12 persons proceedings was “criminal in nature under the governing laws of the prosecuting 13 jurisdiction,” a key requirement in its In re Eslamizar analysis. The BIA acknowledged that 14 Wong’s offense was not considered a crime under New Jersey law but determined that Wong was 15 convicted in a criminal proceeding because his offense was a crime as “conventionally defined,” 16 Certified Administrative Record at 541, that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and 17 that he was indicted by a grand jury. The reasoning behind this conclusion is unclear to us. We are 18 uncertain about the analytical path the BIA walked to decide that Wong’s offense was a CIMT 19 when the offense was not a crime under New Jersey law but nonetheless was a crime as 20 “conventionally defined.” 21 Wong was indicted by a grand jury for theft by deception in the third degree, but he 22 eventually pleaded guilty to the much lower disorderly persons offense theft. A disorderly persons 23 offense does not require an indictment by a grand jury. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4. The BIA’s
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1 reliance on Wong’s indictment raises a number of questions. If Wong never pled to the offense for 2 which the grand jury indicted him but instead pled to the disorderly persons offense, why does the 3 indictment prove anything at all, much less an adjudication for a CIMT? 4 Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA failed to analyze with sufficient precision the 5 factors necessary to its determination of what constitutes a “conviction” or “a judgement of guilt” 6 or a “criminal proceeding” and how the factors relate to each other. Nor has the BIA satisfactorily 7 explained how an offense that is not a crime under the laws of the jurisdiction where it was 8 committed can become a “crime” for purposes of the INA. We remand to afford the BIA the 9 opportunity to clarify these matters. See Ying Zheng v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 201, 203-04 (2d Cir. 10 2007) (remanding to the BIA where the BIA had not opined in a published, precedential opinion 11 what standards it used to review an issue and it appeared that the BIA’s non-precedential decisions 12 had taken contrary positions). 2 13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case is 14 REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
2 Because the agency ordered Wong removed under a provision that requires the government to establish two CIMT convictions, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and we remand as to whether the theft by deception offense qualifies as a INA conviction, we do not reach the other issues raised by Wong.