Wolverton v. Thomas

176 S.W.2d 335, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 677
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 29, 1943
DocketNo. 2414.
StatusPublished

This text of 176 S.W.2d 335 (Wolverton v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wolverton v. Thomas, 176 S.W.2d 335, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinion

LESLIE, Chief Justice.

On the theory that they were mining partners, M. H. Wolverton instituted this suit against Leon Thomas, M. B. Moore and J. B. Templeton to recover from them, jointly and severally, for services alleged to have been rendered them by him in oil drilling operations in Kimble County, Texas. Plaintiff's suit was based primarily on two written contracts, one of date March 23, 1940, and one of date June 4, 1940. Wolverton was not a party to the contract of March 23rd. J. B. Templeton did not personally sign the contract of June 4th. A considerable portion of Wolverton’s services were performed under oral agreements made subsequent to both written contracts, but in connection therewith.

In substance it is Templeton’s contention that he was in no manner a party to said oral arrangements and was not bound thereby. In his answer Templeton denied that the contract of March 23rd, taken by itself or in connection with the contract of June 4th or in connection with any subsequent oral contract, had the. effect of making him such partner. Templeton also presented a cross action against Thomas and Moore on certain promissory notes executed by them to him for money expended by them in said operations.

Defendant M. B. Moore answered, denying the allegations of plaintiff’s petition, wherein Wolverton alleged the facts which he deemed sufficient to constitute Moore, Thomas and himself a mining partnership. In addition to such denial, Moore alleged: “(c) This Defendant (Moore) says that the instruments executed between Moore and Thomas on the one hand and Templeton on the other, speak for themselves, but he specifically alleges that if at any time Thomas and Moore made any statements to said Wolverton, or did any other act which in anywise lead said Wolverton to believe that Templeton was a partner in such drilling operations, that such statements were made to said Wolverton by Thomas, without this Defendant’s knowledge or consent.”

Defendant Moore’s prayer concluding that pleading is as follows: “Wherefore, this Defendant admits that said Plaintiff Wolverton is entitled to recover his judgment against defendants Moore and Thomas in an amount not to exceed $14,906.00; but he prays that otherwise the plaintiff be denied all relief sued for.”

In a separate answer to the second amended original answer of his co-defendant (Thomas), said Moore “specially denies the conclusion of law alleged by said Thomas in his said amended original answer, to the effect that said Thomas, Moore and J. B. Templeton were partners.” Moore also denies the other allegations in Thomas’ said answer and concludes by alleging: “This Defendant (Moore) says that said M. H. Wolverton is entitled to recover his just compensation for the services rendered to said Thomas and M. B. Moore, but that the partnership which existed between said Thomas and said Moore has never been dissolved, except to the extent that they spent all of the money furnished by said Moore and said Templeton and ’ all drilling operations ceased, and all of said leases lapsed, but all debts owing by said partnership are owed jointly by said Thomas and said Moore, * *

Defendant Thomas in his second amended original answer denies only the allegations contained in the pleadings of his co-defendants Templeton and Moore. He expressly affirms therein the partnership re *337 lation alleged by plaintiff Wolverton, but further alleges that he (Thomas) was practically ejected therefrom and required to relinquish his interest to Moore and Templeton, who assumed the partnership debts then due and to become due. Hence he prays for judgment against Moore and Templeton for any amount plaintiff might recover against him.

Said Thomas further alleged that the notes sued on herein by Templeton in his cross action against Moore and Thomas were a part of such partnership debts, and that under his agreement with Moore and Templeton he was relieved from further obligations thereon.

The cause was tried by the Court without the intervention of a jury, and at the conclusion of the testimony the trial court found the instrument of March 23, 1940, was sufficient to constitute Leon Thomas, M. B. Moore and J. B. Templeton mining partners. The Court awarded a judgment against Thomas, Moore and Templeton, jointly and severally, for the sum of $1,000.

The trial court also rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Wolverton and against Thomas and Moore, jointly and severally, for the sum of $18,331, but plaintiff was denied like recovery for that sum against Templeton.

On his cross action the Court awarded judgment in favor of Templeton, against Thomas and Moore, on said notes.

Neither Thomas nor Moore appealed from any part of the judgment. Wolver-ton appeals, seeking to hold Templeton along with Thomas and Moore, jointly and severally, for the full amount of the judgment, $19,331, and Templeton appeals, seeking to avoid liability for the $1,000 judgment against him and also to demonstrate the correctness of the trial court’s judgment in exonerating him from any liability as a partner of Thomas and Moore for the further sum of $18,331.

Appellee Templeton presents an alternative contention “that even if the instrument, of date March 23, 1940, could be construed as being sufficient to constitute Leon Thomas, M. B. Moore and this Appellee (Tem-pleton) a mining partnership, such partnership was for the fixed, definite and limited purpose of completing a particular well which was then in process of being drilled and definitely limited this Appellee’s maximum liability to $3000.00, of which the undisputed evidence showed that he had already advanced the sum of $2,000.00, and hence ■ in no event could he be held liable for more than the additional sum of $1,000.00.”

The instrument of March 23, 1940, deals with certain oil and gas leases embracing lands in Kimble County, Texas, and apparently owned by Thomas and Moore, who, when they entered into negotiations with Templeton, were endeavoring to drill an oil well and test out the oil possibilities on said land. They had then reached a depth of 492 feet and were unable financially to proceed with the enterprise. In this situation they sought financial assistance from Templeton.

They set out in a letter to Templeton a summarized statement of the condition of their enterprise, the depth of the well, the oil possibilities of the acreage, and their needs for further prosecution of drilling thereon, as well as possible future plans. Following such statement the letter, which constitutes the contract of March 23rd, is in part as follows:

“* * * Your proposition was to advance us $750.00, we to give you two notes in amount of $250.00. each aggregating $500.00, to take care of the expense in getting the pipe to the location and test the Adams Branch Sand. In the event this proves successful we will then want to drill several shallow wells, if it doesn’t, our plan now is to go to the next pay sand; or to our contract depth of 2000' if we all agree it is advisable. For the added expense we will give you additional notes at the same ratio not to exceed $3000.00 total cost. We do hereby agree that any and all returns from the sale or operations of any and all interests we have in the above described acreage and rights will first be applied as a payment to you for all money advanced by you on this project. After this obligation is satisfied all further returns we agree to give you a one third interest.

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Bluebook (online)
176 S.W.2d 335, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 677, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolverton-v-thomas-texapp-1943.