Wolford v. Barron

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: July 15, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01689
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 AUDREY JEAN WOLFORD, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-01689-MJP 11 Petitioner, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND 12 v. OVERRULING OBJECTIONS 13 HOWARD C. BARRON, 14 Respondent. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Audrey Wolford’s Objections to the 17 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Peterson. Having reviewed the R&R 18 (Dkt. No. 18,) the Objections (Dkt. No. 19,) and all supporting materials, the Court 19 OVERRULES the Objections, ADOPTS the R&R, and DISMISSES this action. 20 ANALYSIS 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, the district court must resolve de novo any 23 part of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R that has been properly objected to and may accept, reject, or 24 1 modify the recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 2 Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). “[A] district court has discretion, but is 3 not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party’s objection to a 4 magistrate judge’s recommendation.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir.

5 2000). 6 B. The petition is not ripe for review. 7 The R&R recommends dismissal of Petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas 8 corpus because the petition is not ripe. The Court agrees. 9 Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 10 “actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 11 One component of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement is the concept that a claim 12 must be ripe for review. Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 “[R]ipeness addresses when litigation may occur.” Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 14 1997) (emphasis in original). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent

15 future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United 16 States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 Petitioner’s claims regarding improperly denied time credits under the FSA will be ripe 18 for review only once she has earned enough to equal the end of her sentence. See, e.g., Adkins v. 19 Engleman, 2022 WL 14966123, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2022), report and recommendation 20 adopted, 2022 WL 15116425 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022) (finding that “[f]ederal courts around the 21 country read Section 3624(g)(1)(A) to mean that the BOP is permitted to apply time credits only 22 once an inmate has earned enough that equal the remainder of her sentence.”). The Magistrate 23 Judge calculated that the earliest date that Petitioner will be eligible for release is in mid-June

24 1 2026. At that point, Petitioner’s claims may potentially be ripe for review, although by then she 2 may have already “accrued the statutory maximum number of credits that may be applied to 3 her sentence.” (R&R at 7–8.) 4 C. Petitioner’s objections to the R&R.

5 Petitioner raises two objections to the R&R. Neither objection changes the Court’s 6 decision that her Petition is not ripe for review. Both objections are discussed below. 7 Petitioner first objects to the R&R on the basis that she was “arrested since April 9, 8 2021” rather than on October 7, 2022. (Dkt. No. 19 at 1.) The R&R does not say that Petitioner 9 was arrested on October 7, 2022, but rather was “admitted to an in-transit facility” on that date. 10 (Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) In any event, the date of Petitioner’s arrest has no bearing on the ripeness of 11 Petitioner’s claims and the first objection is therefore overruled. 12 The Court notes that that the date of Petitioner’s arrest does not factor into her 13 accumulation of FSA credits. This is because FSA credits may only be earned by eligible 14 “prisoners.” See 18 U.S.C. ¶ 3632(d)(4)(A). Prisoners are those who have “been sentenced to a

15 term of imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal offense,” or are “in the 16 custody of the Bureau of Prisons.” 18 U.S.C. ¶ 3635(4). Rather than focusing on Petitioner’s 17 arrest, the R&R correctly focused on Petitioner’s sentencing and custody (i.e., when she would 18 begin to receive FSA credits). 19 Petitioner’s second objection draws the Court’s attention to Yufenyuy v. Warden, FCI 20 Berlin, 659 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.N.H. 2023), as support for her argument that she is owed FSA 21 credits that are being improperly withheld. But this is an argument on the merits of Petitioner’s 22 claim. The R&R does not reach the merits; rather it narrowly finds that Petitioner’s claim is not 23

24 1 ripe for review. Because Petitioner’s second objection does not bear on the ripeness of her 2 claims, it too is overruled. 3 CONCLUSION 4 The R&R correctly determined that because Petitioner is not yet entitled to have FSA

5 time credits applied to her sentence, the issue is not ripe for adjudication. Petitioner’s Objections 6 to the R&R fail to address the Magistrate Judges’ findings on ripeness. The Court therefore 7 OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections and ADOPTS the R&R. The Petition is DISMISSED. 8 Because the Petitioner has demonstrated the merit of her underlying concern, the Court does not 9 consider its dismissal of the Petition as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 10 The Court directs the Clerk to enter separate judgment. 11 The Court directs the Clerk to provide copies of this order to Petitioner, all counsel, and 12 Magistrate Judge Peterson. 13 Dated July 15, 2024. A 14 15 Marsha J. Pechman 16 United States Senior District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24