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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 WOLFGANG OLSON, 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. C20-1616 TSZ 10 NORTHWEST MOTORSPORT, INC. ORDER and NORTHWEST MOTORSPORT, 11 LLC, 12 Defendants. 13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of 14 Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, docket no. 147. Having reviewed all papers filed in support 15 of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court enters the following order. 16 Background 17 On June 12, 2024, the Court entered its Amended Judgment, docket no. 138, in 18 this action in favor of Plaintiff Wolfgang Olson against Defendants Northwest 19 Motorsport, Inc. and Northwest Motorsport, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), in the 20 total amount of $289,171.41. The Court previously awarded Plaintiff reasonable 21 attorney’s fees for prevailing at trial, pursuant to the Washington Consumer Protection 22 Act (“CPA”), RCW 19.86.090, and the “prevailing party” attorney fee provision of the 1 “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” for the truck purchased by Plaintiff from Defendants. See 2 Conclusions of Law at ⁋ 50 (docket no. 111); see also Order at 2, 10 (docket no. 137).
3 On November 6, 2025, Defendants filed a motion, docket no. 139, to vacate the Amended 4 Judgment as void pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), contending that the 5 Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter following the dismissal of the claims of former plaintiffs Seth Villafan and Josh Graves on June 14, 2023, because Plaintiff Olson failed 6 to plead and prove complete diversity. See Mot. at 7–8, 14–16 (docket no. 139). On November 7 17, 2025, Defendants filed an amended motion, docket no. 141, to vacate the Amended 8 Judgment, asserting the same argument. See Mot. at 7–8, 14–16 (docket no. 141). The motions 9 will hereafter be referred collectively to as the “motion to vacate.” On January 6, 2026, the 10 Court denied the motion to vacate. Minute Order at 1 (docket no. 146). On January 20, 2026, 11 Plaintiff filed a motion for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees for successfully defeating 12 Defendants’ motion to vacate. See Mot. at 2–4 (docket no. 147). 13 Discussion 14 Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees should be denied in 15 its entirety because there is no basis to award fees, and (2) even if Plaintiff is entitled to 16 attorneys’ fees, the requested amount should be reduced substantially. Opp. at 1 (docket 17 no. 152). The Court addresses each argument in turn. 18 A. Entitlement to attorneys’ fees 19 Defendants contend that neither the CPA nor the attorney fee provision in the 20 parties’ contract offer a basis for an award of attorneys’ fees in these circumstances. 21 Opp. at 1 (docket no. 152). The Court disagrees. 22 1 “The general rule in Washington is that attorney fees will not be awarded for costs 2 of litigation unless authorized by contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity.”
3 Durland v. San Juan Cnty., 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014). Plaintiff again relies 4 on RCW 19.86.090 and the “prevailing party” attorney’s fee provision of the “Vehicle 5 Buyer’s Order” as bases for being entitled to his request. 6 The CPA permits an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. RCW 7 19.86.090 (“That such person may bring a civil action in the district court to recover his 8 or her actual damages . . . including reasonable attorney’s fees.”). Where a contract
9 specifically provides that attorneys’ fees shall be awarded to one of the parties, whether 10 he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, the prevailing party “shall be 11 entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.” RCW 4.84.330. “Prevailing party” means the 12 party in whose favor final judgment is entered. Id. The “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” 13 contains a prevailing party attorney’s fees shifting provision: “In any litigation regarding
14 this Agreement, Buyer shall reimburse Dealer for all reasonable attorney fees and court 15 costs should Dealer prevail.” Findings of Fact at ⁋ 21 (docket no. 111); Ex. 1 at ⁋ 22 to 16 Beckett Decl. (docket no. 148 at 16). 17 The Ninth Circuit has held that a party was entitled, pursuant to a contractual 18 provision, to attorney fees for defending against a Rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate an
19 arbitration award. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 20 791 F.2d 1334, 1340–41 (9th Cir. 1986). In Lafarge, arbitrators awarded monetary 21 damages in relation to a lawsuit based on breach of contract, and the district court 22 awarded attorney fees after denying a motion to vacate the award. Id. at 1337. The 1 parties’ contract contained an attorney fees provision, entitling the party to an award of 2 fees “in any action to enforce the contract.” Id. The defendant challenged the fee award
3 on appeal, arguing that its motion to vacate was based on a right granted by federal 4 procedure, not state substantive law, and thus the fee provision of the contract did not 5 apply. See id. at 1340. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, because the underlying 6 contract between the parties was not “collateral to the proceedings” but played an integral 7 part in defining the rights of the parties by setting forth arbitration as the agreed means of 8 dispute resolution. Id. (distinguishing In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1985)).
9 Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the fee provision in the Vehicle 10 Buyer’s Order. Although Defendants grounded their Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the theory 11 that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the underlying “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” 12 played an integral role in defining the rights of the parties and led directly to the entry of 13 the Amended Judgment after the Court’s finding of liability. Therefore, the “Vehicle
14 Buyer’s Order” was not collateral to the proceedings of Defendants’ motion to vacate.1 15 B. Amount to be awarded 16 The Court now decides the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees request. 17 Plaintiff requests a total of $46,678.00 for defending against Defendants’ motions to 18
20 1 Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s motion for fees should be denied because the merger doctrine 21 forecloses recovery. Opp. at 6 (docket no. 152). Under the merger doctrine, “when ‘a valid and final judgment for the payment of money is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the original claim of the plaintiff 22 is extinguished and a new cause of action on the judgment is substituted for it.’” Johnson v. Peter, 2023 WL 22021, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2023) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 47)). The 1 vacate and filing a reply brief in support of its motion for fees. See Amended Reply at 2 7–8 (docket no. 156); Ex. 1 at 4 to Amended Reply (docket no. 156-1).
3 The reasonableness of an attorney’s fees request is evaluated using the lodestar 4 method. Collins v. City First Mortg. Servs., LLC, 177 Wn. App. 908, 927, 317 P.3d 5 1047 (2013) (citation omitted). Under the lodestar method, the Court must determine the 6 reasonable number of hours expended on a matter, excluding any “wasteful or duplicative 7 hours and any hours pertaining to unsuccessful theories or claims” from the total. Id.
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 WOLFGANG OLSON, 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. C20-1616 TSZ 10 NORTHWEST MOTORSPORT, INC. ORDER and NORTHWEST MOTORSPORT, 11 LLC, 12 Defendants. 13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of 14 Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, docket no. 147. Having reviewed all papers filed in support 15 of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court enters the following order. 16 Background 17 On June 12, 2024, the Court entered its Amended Judgment, docket no. 138, in 18 this action in favor of Plaintiff Wolfgang Olson against Defendants Northwest 19 Motorsport, Inc. and Northwest Motorsport, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), in the 20 total amount of $289,171.41. The Court previously awarded Plaintiff reasonable 21 attorney’s fees for prevailing at trial, pursuant to the Washington Consumer Protection 22 Act (“CPA”), RCW 19.86.090, and the “prevailing party” attorney fee provision of the 1 “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” for the truck purchased by Plaintiff from Defendants. See 2 Conclusions of Law at ⁋ 50 (docket no. 111); see also Order at 2, 10 (docket no. 137).
3 On November 6, 2025, Defendants filed a motion, docket no. 139, to vacate the Amended 4 Judgment as void pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), contending that the 5 Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter following the dismissal of the claims of former plaintiffs Seth Villafan and Josh Graves on June 14, 2023, because Plaintiff Olson failed 6 to plead and prove complete diversity. See Mot. at 7–8, 14–16 (docket no. 139). On November 7 17, 2025, Defendants filed an amended motion, docket no. 141, to vacate the Amended 8 Judgment, asserting the same argument. See Mot. at 7–8, 14–16 (docket no. 141). The motions 9 will hereafter be referred collectively to as the “motion to vacate.” On January 6, 2026, the 10 Court denied the motion to vacate. Minute Order at 1 (docket no. 146). On January 20, 2026, 11 Plaintiff filed a motion for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees for successfully defeating 12 Defendants’ motion to vacate. See Mot. at 2–4 (docket no. 147). 13 Discussion 14 Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees should be denied in 15 its entirety because there is no basis to award fees, and (2) even if Plaintiff is entitled to 16 attorneys’ fees, the requested amount should be reduced substantially. Opp. at 1 (docket 17 no. 152). The Court addresses each argument in turn. 18 A. Entitlement to attorneys’ fees 19 Defendants contend that neither the CPA nor the attorney fee provision in the 20 parties’ contract offer a basis for an award of attorneys’ fees in these circumstances. 21 Opp. at 1 (docket no. 152). The Court disagrees. 22 1 “The general rule in Washington is that attorney fees will not be awarded for costs 2 of litigation unless authorized by contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity.”
3 Durland v. San Juan Cnty., 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014). Plaintiff again relies 4 on RCW 19.86.090 and the “prevailing party” attorney’s fee provision of the “Vehicle 5 Buyer’s Order” as bases for being entitled to his request. 6 The CPA permits an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. RCW 7 19.86.090 (“That such person may bring a civil action in the district court to recover his 8 or her actual damages . . . including reasonable attorney’s fees.”). Where a contract
9 specifically provides that attorneys’ fees shall be awarded to one of the parties, whether 10 he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, the prevailing party “shall be 11 entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.” RCW 4.84.330. “Prevailing party” means the 12 party in whose favor final judgment is entered. Id. The “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” 13 contains a prevailing party attorney’s fees shifting provision: “In any litigation regarding
14 this Agreement, Buyer shall reimburse Dealer for all reasonable attorney fees and court 15 costs should Dealer prevail.” Findings of Fact at ⁋ 21 (docket no. 111); Ex. 1 at ⁋ 22 to 16 Beckett Decl. (docket no. 148 at 16). 17 The Ninth Circuit has held that a party was entitled, pursuant to a contractual 18 provision, to attorney fees for defending against a Rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate an
19 arbitration award. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 20 791 F.2d 1334, 1340–41 (9th Cir. 1986). In Lafarge, arbitrators awarded monetary 21 damages in relation to a lawsuit based on breach of contract, and the district court 22 awarded attorney fees after denying a motion to vacate the award. Id. at 1337. The 1 parties’ contract contained an attorney fees provision, entitling the party to an award of 2 fees “in any action to enforce the contract.” Id. The defendant challenged the fee award
3 on appeal, arguing that its motion to vacate was based on a right granted by federal 4 procedure, not state substantive law, and thus the fee provision of the contract did not 5 apply. See id. at 1340. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, because the underlying 6 contract between the parties was not “collateral to the proceedings” but played an integral 7 part in defining the rights of the parties by setting forth arbitration as the agreed means of 8 dispute resolution. Id. (distinguishing In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1985)).
9 Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the fee provision in the Vehicle 10 Buyer’s Order. Although Defendants grounded their Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the theory 11 that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the underlying “Vehicle Buyer’s Order” 12 played an integral role in defining the rights of the parties and led directly to the entry of 13 the Amended Judgment after the Court’s finding of liability. Therefore, the “Vehicle
14 Buyer’s Order” was not collateral to the proceedings of Defendants’ motion to vacate.1 15 B. Amount to be awarded 16 The Court now decides the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees request. 17 Plaintiff requests a total of $46,678.00 for defending against Defendants’ motions to 18
20 1 Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s motion for fees should be denied because the merger doctrine 21 forecloses recovery. Opp. at 6 (docket no. 152). Under the merger doctrine, “when ‘a valid and final judgment for the payment of money is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the original claim of the plaintiff 22 is extinguished and a new cause of action on the judgment is substituted for it.’” Johnson v. Peter, 2023 WL 22021, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2023) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 47)). The 1 vacate and filing a reply brief in support of its motion for fees. See Amended Reply at 2 7–8 (docket no. 156); Ex. 1 at 4 to Amended Reply (docket no. 156-1).
3 The reasonableness of an attorney’s fees request is evaluated using the lodestar 4 method. Collins v. City First Mortg. Servs., LLC, 177 Wn. App. 908, 927, 317 P.3d 5 1047 (2013) (citation omitted). Under the lodestar method, the Court must determine the 6 reasonable number of hours expended on a matter, excluding any “wasteful or duplicative 7 hours and any hours pertaining to unsuccessful theories or claims” from the total. Id. at 8 927–28 (citations omitted). Once the total reasonable number of hours has been
9 determined, the Court multiplies that number by a reasonable hourly rate to determine the 10 lodestar amount. Id. at 928 (citations omitted). The lodestar amount may, in the Court’s 11 discretion, be increased or decreased based on various factors such as the 12 contingent nature of success, id. at 929 (citation omitted), the level of skill required by 13 the litigation, see Brand v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. of State of Wash., 139 Wn.2d 659,
14 666, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999), and whether any work is “useful in ancillary or parallel 15 litigation,” Absher Const. Co. v. Kent School Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn. App. 841, 847, 917 16 P.2d 1086 (1995) (citation omitted). “The Court is not bound by the lodestar value, but 17 rather, is charged with making ‘an independent decision’ as to what represents a 18 reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees.” Seattle Times Co. v. LeatherCare, Inc., 2019 WL
19 1651664, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2019) (quoting Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 20 Wn.2d 735, 744, 733 P.2d 208 (1987)). 21 The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s attorneys Guy Beckett, Kelly Holler, and 22 Eugene Bolin’s hourly rates are reasonable. See Beckett Decl. at ⁋ 9 (docket no. 148) 1 ($450/hr); Holler Decl. at ⁋ 9 (docket no. 149) ($250/hr); Bolin Decl. at ⁋ 3 (docket 2 no. 150) ($510/hr). Defendants challenge only Mr. Bolin’s hourly rate of $510, arguing
3 that his previously attested hourly rate of $425 from Plaintiff’s prior motion for 4 attorney’s fees, docket no. 113, should apply and Mr. Bolin “has given no justification for 5 this sudden 20% increase.” Opp. at 7 (docket no. 152). Mr. Bolin need not provide a 6 “justification,” and the increase of his rate was not “sudden.” Mr. Bolin’s prior 7 attestation dates back nearly two years ago, and he now states that his current rate 8 “increased to $510 approximately two years ago.” Bolin Decl. at ⁋ 3 (docket no. 150).
9 An increase of $85 an hour is not so shocking such that the Court should reject it. 10 Defendants cite no authority that would suggest otherwise. 11 The Court further concludes, however, that the hours these three attorneys spent 12 on Defendants’ motion to vacate and Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, docket 13 no. 147, are excessive. Mr. Beckett claims he spent a total of 52.7 hours (36.8 + 15.9),
14 see Beckett Decl. at ⁋ 10 (docket no. 148) & Second Beckett Decl. at ⁋ 2 (docket 15 no. 154), Ms. Holler claims a total of 63.7 hours (51.3 + 12.4), see Holler Decl. at ⁋ 10 16 (docket no. 149) & Second Holler Decl. at ⁋ 3 (docket no. 155), and Mr. Bollin claims a 17 total of 13.8 hours, see Ex. 1 to Bollin Decl. (docket no. 150 at 10). The Court revises 18 down the attorneys’ hours as follows: 33.9 hours for Mr. Beckett, 41 hours for Ms.
19 Holler, and 8.9 hours for Mr. Bolin. 20 Accordingly, Plaintiff is AWARDED $30,044.00 in additional attorneys’ fees, 21 consisting of $15,255.00 of services provided by Guy Beckett, $10,250.00 of services 22 provided by Kelly Holler, and $4,539.00 of services provided by Eugene Bolin. 1 Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:
3 (1) Plaintiff Wolfgang Olson’s motion for attorneys’ fees, docket no. 147, is 4 GRANTED as follows: Plaintiff is AWARDED $30,044.00 in attorneys’ fees, consisting 5 of $15,255.00 of services provided by Guy Beckett, $10,250.00 of services provided by 6 Kelly Holler, and $4,539.00 of services provided by Eugene Bolin. 7 (2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a supplemental judgment consistent with 8 this Order and to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated this 28th day of May, 2026. 11 A 12 Thomas S. Zilly 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22