Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedApril 3, 2023
Docket1:18-cv-00264
StatusUnknown

This text of Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction (Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction, (D. Idaho 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ANDREW J. J. WOLF, Case No. 1:18-cv-00264-REP Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND v. ORDER

JOSH TEWALT, et al.,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Andrew J. J. Wolf (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”). Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed on injunctive relief claims against Defendants Tewalt, Page, the IDOC, and the Idaho Board of Correction (collectively, “Defendants”), in their official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that IDOC’s policy of prohibiting open flames, such as candles and incense, from being used indoors—even in religious ceremonies—violates two statutes: (1) the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; and (2) Idaho’s Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act, Idaho Code § 73-401 et seq.1 All other claims against all other Defendants have been dismissed. See Dkt. 93 at 13–14.

1 Plaintiff does not allege that one religious group is being allowed use of these items indoors, while his Roman Catholic religion is not. Rather, he alleges that the general prison ban on indoor open flames is violating the rights of all prisoners of various faiths who desire to use candles or incense in their indoor worship services. Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which is now ripe for adjudication.2 Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff cannot establish that his exercise of religious belief has been substantially burdened, (2) the policy furthers a compelling

governmental interest, and (3) the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest. The Court previously ordered Plaintiff to address the content of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, especially regarding (1) the obvious present safety and security hazard of an open flame in prison; (2) the 2021 opinion of Tish Thornton,

Director of the Office of Worship of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, that battery- operated candles are acceptable for Catholic worship services (which supports the IDOC’s grievance response to Plaintiff in 2017); and (3) the fact that the prison has offered to permit an open flame in outdoor worship services if Plaintiff—unlike the Diocese—requires an open flame in his worship. See Dkt. 116 at 6.

All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. See Dkt. 88. Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. See D. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, the Court will grant

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

2 Also pending are two motions filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct Docket Filing Error (Dkt. 118) will be granted, to the extent the Court has considered Plaintiff’s additional exhibit in its ruling. Plaintiff’s Fifth Motion for Extension of Time to File Response (Dkt. 117) will be granted, and the response is deemed timely filed. DISCUSSION 1. Standard of Law Governing Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or

defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[] by which factually insufficient

claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. In resolving a summary judgment motion, the Court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, unless the non-moving party’s version of the facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record[] so that no reasonable jury could believe

it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). If such a blatant contradiction exists, then there is no “genuine” dispute as to that fact. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden to show that each material fact cannot be disputed. Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary

facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). To show that the material facts are not in dispute, the moving party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record or show that the non-moving party is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). The Court must consider “the cited materials,” but it may also consider “other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment ....” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. Rather, a case will survive summary judgment only if there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. If the moving party meets this initial responsibility, the burden of production then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact

does indeed exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient. Instead, “there must be evidence on which [a] jury could reasonably find” for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary

judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court’s] attention to specific, triable facts.” So. Ca. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). That is, “if a defendant moving for summary judgment has produced enough

evidence to require the plaintiff to go beyond his or her pleadings, the plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his or her own.” Butler v. San Diego Dist. Attorney’s Office, 370 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2004).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Cutter v. Wilkinson
544 U.S. 709 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Thomas v. Ponder
611 F.3d 1144 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Joe Lowell McElyea Jr. v. Governor Bruce Babbitt
833 F.2d 196 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Lance Wood v. Keith Yordy
753 F.3d 899 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Holt v. Hobbs
135 S. Ct. 853 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Warsoldier v. Woodford
418 F.3d 989 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Angel Soto v. Unknown Sweetman
882 F.3d 865 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Fraser v. Goodale
342 F.3d 1032 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill
360 F.3d 1024 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolf-v-idaho-state-board-of-correction-idd-2023.