Wolf v. Driggs

44 N.J. Eq. 363
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 15, 1888
StatusPublished

This text of 44 N.J. Eq. 363 (Wolf v. Driggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wolf v. Driggs, 44 N.J. Eq. 363 (N.J. Ct. App. 1888).

Opinion

Van Fleet, V. C.

This is a foreclosure suit. The complainant’s bill is founded on two mortgages, embracing the same lands, both made by the .defendant and her husband (Spencer B. Driggs), now deceased, .to Joseph Tilney, the first of which bears date May 20th, 1874, and was given to secure the payment of $7,760, at the end of .five years from its date, with interest payable semi-annually; and the second of which bears date March 20th, 1875, and was given to secure the payment of $4,500 at the end of eighteen months from its date, with interest payable semi-annually. The mortgaged premises consist of nearly five hundred acres of marsh lands situate in the county of Bergen. The defendant’s husband signed both bonds with the defendant. The complainant obtained title to the mortgages June 9th, 1883, by assignment from the mortgagee. The due execution of the mortgages, and also of the bonds which the mortgages were given to secure, is admitted by the defendant’s answer. The defendant, however, says that no [365]*365money or other valuable thing was given or delivered on the execution of the mortgages, but that they were given as security for money to be advanced by the mortgagee, with the understanding that the same was to be expended in draining the mortgaged premises, by the erection of dikes and in the construction of sluices and ditches, but that no part of the sums mentioned in the mortgages has been so expended, except about $2,500, and that the amount thus expended has been so expended as to result in no benefit to her lands. The arrangement between the mortgagee and herself, in respect to the purpose for which the first mortgage was given, is described by the defendant, in her answer,, as follows :

“ At the time of signing the same, and before the delivery of the same to Tilney, this defendant personally informed Tilney that the same was only executed, and to be delivered to him, for the purpose of securing such advances as he might thereafter make, * * * for the purpose of diking said lands, and the mortgage was received by Tilney upon such understanding and agreement.”

And with regard to the purpose for which the second mortgage-was executed, the answer says that

“ On or about March 20th, 1875, this defendant was informed that the-$7,760, secured by the first mortgage, had not been sufficient to complete the [366]*366■diking and draining o.f her lands, and that a further sum of $4,500 would be necessary to complete the same, and that Tilney would make further advances, to that amount, for that purpose, and that thereupon this defendant executed the second mortgage for the further sum of $4,500, to be advanced for the completion of said works.”

The only defence sought to be made in this case is such as is set forth in the quotations made above from the answer.

The answer, it will be perceived, does not show that the mortgagee was under any duty or -obligation whatever to the defend.ant. So far as appears, he was under no legal obligation to advance a penny on the mortgages; but, if it be true, as is alleged, that they were given for no present consideration, passing at the time of their delivery, but to secure advances to be made in the future, then, of course, until something was advanced, they would be without the support of a consideration, and, consequently, unenforceable. It is not alleged, it will be noticed, that the mortgagee had promised to do the work, necessary to be ■done, to drain the defendant’s lands, nor to do any work on her lands, nor to apply any money, which he should advance on the mortgages, to the payment of debts which the defendant had incurred, or should thereafter incur, in draining her lands, or for any other purpose. No contract of any kind has been proved, by which the mortgagee became bound to the defendant for anything. So far as appears, they never had but a single interview. That occurred, according to the defendant’s own evidence, on the day she executed the first bond and mortgage, and very soon after she had put her signature to those papers. She describes what took place at that interview, as follows: She says that, after signing the papers, she left the office of the commissioner before whom the papers had been executed, and went to the office of the mortgageethat she found him in his inner office, just opening his safe, and that she said to him :

“1 Mr. Tilney, I have just signed a mortgage on those lands; ’ he said, ‘Yes;’ I said, ‘I want none of that money given to Mr. Driggs — I want it spent on the lands; ’ he said, ‘ Of course, of course, Mrs. Driggs; you know it is a mere bagatelle to the value of the land ; is there any other mortgage on the land?’ I said, ‘No other;’ there were a few other words, of no importance, passed, or none, as far as I can remember, and I left the office.”

[367]*367The mortgagee denies the whole of this conversation. He says that no conversation ever took place between the defendant and himself respecting either of the mortgages, and that the only thing the defendant ever said to him about the mortgages, was said in a letter, which she wrote to him in July, 1874, and which was delivered to him by her husband, together with the first bond and mortgage. The defendant admits that she never spoke to the mortgagee about the second mortgage, but that she executed that without giving any direction how it should be used, or how the money raised on it should be applied, supposing, however, as she says, that the direction which she had given respecting the use of the first would be followed in the use of the second.

From this statement, it would seem to be entirely clear, that when the answer is stripped of its immaterial allegations, or mere gloss, the only substantial defence which it sets up is this: that the mortgages in question were executed to secure advances to be made in the future, and that as only $2,500 have been advanced, the complainant’s recovery must be limited to that sum. The defendant, it is true, says that the complainant is not even entitled to that sum, but as no reason is either alleged or proved why the amount which she admits the mortgagee has expended in diking her lands should not be paid, her defence, in this respect, must be regarded as baseless. It appears, however, that the sum which the defendant admits is nearly double the amount actually expended. The mortgagee testifies that the sum which he paid for work done on the defendant’s lands, is $1,252.31. The recovery of the complainant, on that account, must be limited to that'sum, with interest.

The defendant, by her answer and also by her oath, on her direct examination, said, that no money had ever been paid to her on the mortgages, either directly or indirectly. Her cross-examination, however, proved conclusively that this was a mistake. Checks drawn by the mortgagee to her order, and drafts drawn by her husband, on the mortgagee, in her favor, amounting to over $2,200, running in date from December 19th, 1874, to May 3d, 1875, all of which were paid by the mortgagee at .•about the time they respectively bear date, were exhibited to her [368]*368on her cross-examination, and she thereupon admitted that they had all been endorsed by her. These moneys must be regarded as having been paid directly to her. So that the proofs show,, beyond all doubt, a perfect consideration of over $3,450 for one or the other of the mortgages.

The case so far seems to be free from the least doubt.

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Bluebook (online)
44 N.J. Eq. 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolf-v-driggs-njch-1888.