Wolf v. City of Aberdeen

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 15, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-05954·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA LOUIS AREN WOLF, Case No. 3:23-cv-05954-TMC Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO DISMISS CITY OF ABERDEEN et al., Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Louis Aren Wolf’s complaint (Dkt. 9). Upon review of the parties’ briefs and relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion. Mr. Wolf filed his complaint on October 23, 2023, against the Defendants City of Aberdeen (the “City”); the Mayor of Aberdeen, Peter J. Shave; Planning Director, Lisa D. Scott; Assistant Planning Director, William Sidor; Deputy Corporation Counsel, Forest W. Worgum III; Code Compliance Specialist, Lindy A. Dansare; and Aberdeen police officers Charles W. Chastain, Kyle Hoffman, Ross Lampkey, Dillon M. Mitchell, and Gary M. Sexton. Dkt. 1. Mr. Wolf claims: (1) the City, Scott, Sidor, Dansare, and the named Aberdeen police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights in carrying out unreasonable searches or seizures of his property; and (2) the City, Scott, Sidor, Worgum, and officers Chastain, Lampkey, and Sexton maliciously prosecuted him for fraudulent criminal misdemeanor allegations. Dkt. 1-1 at 1–2; Dkt. 9 at 2.

On January 23, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Wolf’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, asserting that Mr. Wolf’s Fourth Amendment claims are barred by the statute of limitations and his malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Dkt. 9 at 1–2. Mr. Wolf responded on February 16 (Dkt. 10), and Defendants replied (Dkt. 13). On June 22, 2020, Aberdeen police officers Lampkey and Sexton approached Mr. Wolf at his property regarding service of process. Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Mr. Wolf alleges that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by peering over his backyard fence to demand he meet them in his front yard, in violation of his curtilage. See id. The next day, Officer Sexton emailed Assistant Planning Director Sidor and a parking enforcement officer for assistance in serving Mr. Wolf via entering his property for a safety code inspection; Planning Director Scott approved of Officer Sexton’s request and had Mr. Wolf’s neighbor surveil him as part of an investigation into his property. Id. Sometime between June 26 and 30, Sidor moved a stone on Mr. Wolf’s property and dug under part of his fence. Id. On July 2, Scott, Sidor, and Officers Chastain, Lampkey, and Sexton obtained a building code safety inspection warrant to search Mr. Wolf’s property. Id. at 2. Mr. Wolf alleges that Sidor submitted false information to obtain the warrant. Id. On July 6, 2020, Sidor, Code Compliance Specialist Dansare, and Officers Chastain, Hoffman, and Mitchell executed the search warrant on Mr. Wolf’s property. Id. Mr. Wolf alleges that on July 27, Deputy Corporation Counsel Worgum began a malicious prosecution of him at Sidor’s behest. Id. All charges against Mr. Wolf were dismissed by the Aberdeen municipal court on August 24, 2021. Id.

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). And pro se pleadings are construed “liberally on a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). But the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims under Section 1983 is governed by the forum state’s law for personal injury actions. See Bonelli v. Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 953 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019)). “In Washington, personal injury torts have a three-year statute of limitations period.” A.T. v. Everett Sch. Dist., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 794 F. App’x 601 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Joshua v. Newell, 871 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Therefore, in a Washington forum, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim . . . is three years.” Id. 1. Accrual of Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims Section 1983 claims for search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment accrue on the date of the violation. In other words, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the wrongful search and seizure. Bonelli, 28 F.4th at 952 (“For Fourth Amendment violations, federal law holds that a cause of action for illegal search and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs.” (quotations and citation omitted)). 2. Accrual of Malicious Prosecution Claims The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not begin to run until the underlying criminal prosecution against the Section 1983 plaintiff has ended in the plaintiff’s favor. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2154–55 (2019). Favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution is required to avoid parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the possibility of conflicting judgments. Id. at 2156–57. C. Malicious Prosecution A claim of malicious prosecution requires showing that a defendant “instigated a criminal proceeding with improper purpose and without probable cause.” Id. at 2156. Government

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