Wolcott v. Doremus

101 A. 868, 11 Del. Ch. 277, 1917 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedApril 30, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 101 A. 868 (Wolcott v. Doremus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wolcott v. Doremus, 101 A. 868, 11 Del. Ch. 277, 1917 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22 (Del. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

The cause *is an information in the nature of a bill filed by the Attorney General on the relation of two citizens to perpetually enjoin the members of a trapshooting club from continuing a public nuisance. After answer filed an application for a preliminary injunction was heard on the information, answer, ex parte affidavits and exhibits. It having been proved that shot from guns. used in the trapshooting fell into the public road on which the premises of the club abutted, and that the safety of persons using the highway was seriously endangered thereby, an injunction was awarded enjoining the shooting from all the traps of the club until the further order of the Chancellor. Afterwards the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, based largely on allegations that since the granting of the injunction the location of all of the traps and the direction in which the shots were fired were so changed as that it was impossible for shbt to reach the highway. Testimony of many witnesses was heard in the cause in January, 1916, and in lieu of oral arguments briefs of counsel were filed March 12, 1917.

In the opinion filed when the preliminary injunction was granted the general facts were fully stated, and it is not necessary to review them here, except as to the new matters.shown. It was shown that travelers along the road cannot be struck by shot fired from guns by persons using the traps as now arranged. But these traps were all moved much closer to the public road, and the gunners would now stand in handicap contests at firing points in the traps which are about 45, 55, 105, 165 and 205 feet from the public road. The traps as newly arranged have not in fact been used, the rearrangement thereof being made after the preliminary injuction had been issued against shooting from any of the traps. Under the old location of the traps the one closest to the road was about. 183 feet distant therefrom. It is clear, therefore, that danger to the users of the highway from shot from the guns fifed from the traps as now located is now eliminated from the case as a ground for relief, but that the traps are all much closer to the road. There was no allegation of disorder, breaches of the peace, or other improprieties at the club.

[279]*279In order to determine whether a public nuisance will result from a further operation of the club under the changed conditions, two questions of fact must be found.as to the effect of noises from the firing'of the guns: (1) Whether animals traveling in the public road will be frightened or iñjuriously affected thereby; and (2) whether the health or comfort of the community has been, or will be, injuriously affected thereby.

The jurisdiction of the court in such cases is not in dispute, and is the same whether the acts complained of are also indictable or not, for the fact that the keeping of a nuisance is a crime does not deprive the Court of Chancery of power to enjoin the nuisance. The same is true whether, or not, it is by statute made a misdemeanor for the club to keep and use the trapshooting conveniences within 300 yards of the public road. The criminality of the act will neither give nor oust jurisdiction which otherwise attaches. As a general proposition a court of equity cannot enjoin the commission of crime, for its powers relate to civil rights. Where, however, the rights of the public are interfered with, the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the wrongful acts. 4 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, § 1043; 2 Morawetz on Private Corporations, §§ 921-923; 1 Wood on Nuisances, § 14. The jurisdiction attaches where the public health or safety is affected, or the use of public property interfered with. The use made of their property by persons owning land abutting a highway ma;'- be a public nuisance if the highway be made unsafe for travel thereon, and a Court of Chancery will prevent the injury though it cannot punish the offender. In two Delaware cases the power of the Court of Chancery to enjoin as a public nuisance an act interfering with public rights was recognized, though not applied. Harlan, etc., Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del. Ch. 435, 470; Gray, Atty. Gen., v. Baynard, 5 Del. Ch. 499. In Murden v. Lewes, 6 Boyce 48, 96 Atl. 506, which concerned a physical obstruction of a highway, it was said that “a nuisance is public when it affects rights to which every citizen is entitled,” and it follows, of course, that a nuisance which affects the right of travelers on a public highway, or the health of the community is a public nuisance. Joyce on Nuisance, § 5, p. 11. To give the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to enjoin [280]*280a public nuisance, the evidence must be clear and convincing. If the evidence is conflicting and the injury to the public is doubtful, the Chancellor should not act. 4 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, § 1439; Harlan, etc., Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del. Ch. 435, 470. Each case presented to the court must be tested by its own circumstances. Gray v. Baynard, supra.

Of course, noises alone may constitute a nuisance. Whether a particular kind or volume of noise in a particular locality is, or is not, a public nuisance, depends upon the effect thereof on persons of normal nerves and sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes, habits and modes of living, and not on persons who are delicate bodily and abnormally nervous, or ill. The effect produced must be an actual physical discomfort produced upon a person of average sensibilities. These principles are so well established and so reasonable that it is not deemed necessary to cite authorities on the point. Indeed, the solicitor for the relators in his brief does not dispute the principle, and makes as the test of liability a substantial discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities. So, also, to render the highway unsafe the effect of noises on horses, or other animals passing along the highway, must be such as to injure or frighten a horse of normal temperament, or as is’frequently held, horses of “ordinary gentleness.” Joyce on Nuisances, § 256; Wood on Nuisances, p. 402; Wabash, etc., Co. v. Farver, 111 Ind. 195, 12 N. E. 296, 297, 60 Am. Rep. 696; Stone v. Langworthy, 20 R. I. 602, 40 Atl. 832, 833; Patton, etc., Co. v. Drennon, 104 Tex. 62, 133 S. W. 871.

"The character of the noises will not' be altered by moving the traps closer to the public road. As to the character of the noises it was shown that’ the club had a large membership; was used not only by members but also by visitors who were made welcome; and the traps were used for large tournaments, which lasted several days. It was claimed for it that the club was, or would be made, very prominent in that kind of sport, and was in fact the largest of its kind in the world. • On some days at least 5,000 shots were fired. In one year 250,000 targets were used on 104 days of shooting. The effect of from 10 to 25 persons shooting together, though not simultaneously, was [281]*281described as a fusillade of explosive noises, as a bombardment, and the like.

Has the highway been rendered unsafe because noises from the firing of the guns will frighten or injuriously affect the horses and other animals being used by travelers on it? There was evidence that certain horses passing along' the highway while trapshooting was in progress at the traps as originally arranged were in fact frightened, and at least one became uncontrollable and ran away.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
101 A. 868, 11 Del. Ch. 277, 1917 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolcott-v-doremus-delch-1917.