NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ARLENE BRYZYSKI WOJCIECHOWSKI, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant :
:
v. :
:
PETER A. WOJCIECHOWSKI : No. 38 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court Division, No(s): 8533 May Term 2000
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017 Arlene Bryzyski Wojciechowski (“Wojciechowski”) appeals from the Order of the trial court, which enforced the trial court’s equitable distribution Order of December 16, 2009, and directed Wojciechowski to pay $32,000 to the Estate of Peter A. Wojciechowski (“the Estate”). We affirm.
As part of the equitable distribution of the marital property of Wojciechowski and Peter A. Wojciechowski (“Decedent”), Wojciechowski was awarded sole title to the marital residence, subject to her payment of $32,000 to Decedent, and her assumption of the existing mortgage. Upon completion, Wojciechowski was to file a certification of payment in the office of the Clerk of Family Court. About two months after the Divorce Decree was entered, Decedent transferred title to the marital home to Wojciechowski. Wojciechowski did not pay $32,000 to Decedent or his Estate. Decedent died on March 30, 2014.
On May 25, 2016, the Estate filed a Motion to Enforce the equitable distribution Order, and to require Wojciechowski to pay the $32,000 specified by that Order. On December 2, 2016, the trial court entered an Order granting the Estate’s Motion to Enforce. Thereafter, Wojciechowski filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.1 In her Statement of Questions Involved, Wojciechowski presents the following issues for our review:
1. [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by initiating its own fact[-]finding operation, taking into consideration and basing its decision upon factors not before the Court; including, but not limited to the facts surrounding the [d]ivorce litigation and resolution in its entirety[?]
2. [Whether] the trial court acted beyond the scope of its discretion by researching and considering the underlying facts of the [d]ivorce litigation when ruling upon the application of the doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations applicable to contract law[?]
[3.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by prohibiting [Wojciechowski] from testifying as to her actions and interactions with [Decedent] after the Divorce Decree was entered[?]
[4.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by reviewing and considering the facts surrounding the [d]ivorce litigation[?]
1 In its Opinion, the trial court set forth a more detailed recitation of the procedural history of this case, and the court’s findings of fact, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at 1-4.
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[5.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by determining that the death of [Decedent]
and the passing of time did not prejudice [Wojciechowski] and asserting the defense of laches[?]
[6.] [Whether] the trial court committed an[] abuse of discretion and error of law that the pursuit of enforcement of a [d]ivorce Agreement is not bound by the statute of limitations applicable to contract law[?]
[7.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and an error of law by failing to accept and apply the doctrine of laches[?]
[8.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by considering and concluding [Decedent’s]
state of mind after d]ivorce[?]
[9.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by preparing and submitting findings of fact based upon its own investigation, none of which were introduced by either party at trial and none of which were relevant to the issue before the [c]ourt[?]
[10.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by failing to base its decision upon the applicable law and the relevant facts in relation to the applicable law; rather, the trial court erroneously considered prejudicial facts involving the distribution of the marital estate[?]
[11.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by failing to make a decision upon the applicable law and the specific limited facts which apply to the law governing the issue before the [c]ourt[?]
[12.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by considering statements contained in the Master’s Report, as well as statements contained in [Decedent’s counsel’s] pleading from 2009[,] when entering its ruling[?]
[13.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by considering the comments made by [Decedent’s counsel] regarding [Decedent’s] state of mind at the time of the [d]ivorce when making its decision[?]
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[14.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by exceeding the scope of review when determining its ruling[?]
[15.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by precluding relevant testimony regarding [Wojciechowski’s] reasonable reliance o[n] actions on the part of [Decedent]?
[16.] [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and error of law by utilizing facts concerning the [d]ivorce [a]ction[,] and reviewing testimony not relevant to the issues before the court[?]
Brief of Appellant at 4-6 (some issues renumbered, some capitalization omitted).
In the Argument section her brief, Wojciechowski reduces these issues to the following four claims:
A. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROPER LEGAL PROCEDURE[?]
B. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES[?]
C. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL[?]
D. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS[?]
Id. at 10, 12, 14, 15. We will address the four claims presented in the
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Argument section of Wojciechowski’s brief, and find any remaining claims waived.2 Wojciechowski first claims that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in its application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and “proper legal procedure.” Brief of Appellant at 10. Specifically, Wojciechowski challenges the trial court’s preparation and submission of a timeline of the case, which, Wojciechowski asserts, the court marked as an “exhibit,” and then considered in rendering its decision. Id.
“When interpreting a property settlement agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function.” delCastillo v. delCastillo, 617 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. Super. 1992). The interpretation of a settlement agreement between a husband and wife is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement itself provides otherwise.” Jackson v. Culp, 583 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1990). “Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation.”
2 We direct counsel’s attention to Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein….
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 2119 provides, in relevant part, that [t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued ….” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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Miller v. Poole, 45 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and[,] to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire record in making its decision.” Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1164 n.5 (Pa. 2004).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Wojciechowski’s first claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/17, at 6-7. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the trial court, and affirm on this basis as to Wojciechowski’s first claim, see id., with the following addendum.
First, we recognize that, upon the filing of a divorce complaint, a trial court is vested with jurisdiction over all matters relating to the equitable distribution of the marital estate. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a)(1). In this case, the court’s jurisdiction continued when the Estate, on behalf of Decedent, filed its Motion to Enforce the parties’ property settlement agreement. See Johnson v. Johnson, 864 A.2d 1224, 1228-29 (Pa. Super. 2004) (recognizing that the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over the determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses, even though the equitable distribution was final). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reviewing the record of the earlier equitable distribution proceedings.
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Wojciechowski also challenges the questioning of a witness by the trial court. Brief of Appellant at 11. Our Rules of Evidence provide that “[w]here the interest of justice so requires, the court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness.” Pa.R.E. 614(a). Our review discloses that the trial court questioned Wojciechowski regarding whether there existed, beyond her testimony, evidence of the $32,000 payment required by the equitable distribution Order. See N.T., 12/2/16, at 8-14. As this was directly related to the issue presented to the court, we discern no error or abuse of discretion.
Wojciechowski also asserts that the trial court improperly precluded her from testifying about the actions she took as a result of a discussion with Decedent. Brief for Appellant at 11-12. Wojciechowski asserts that the trial court erred in excluding her testimony under the Dead Man’s Statute. Id. at 12.
As this Court has stated,
[the a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and a trial court’s rulings on the admission of evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-01 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).
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“According to the Dead Man’s Rule or Dead Man’s Statute, surviving parties who have an interest which is adverse to decedent’s estate are disqualified from testifying as to any transaction or event which occurred before decedent’s death.” Zigmantanis v. Zigmantanis, 797 A.2d 990, 995 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, Wojciechowski sought to introduce testimony regarding the actions she took as a result of a discussion with Decedent. N.T., 12/2/16, at 17. Wojciechowski sought to introduce this testimony to establish that she had sent Decedent a check, and that Decedent refused the payment. See id. at 20 (regarding counsel’s statement that counsel had subsequently sought the trial court’s guidance following Decedent’s refusal of mailings from Wojciechowski). Such testimony is clearly barred by the Dead Man’s Statute, as Wojciechowski sought to use it as evidence of Decedent’s action of refusing the check. See Zigmantanis, 797 A.2d at 995. We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in precluding this evidence based upon the Dead Man’s Statute. See id.
In her second claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court erred in denying application of the doctrine of laches. Brief of Appellant at 12. Wojciechowski contends that Decedent failed to take any steps to assert his right to the $32,000 payment, and that his actions in refusing the payment caused prejudice to Wojciechowski. Id. at 13. According to Wojciechowski, Decedent’s “unavailability and the unavailability of other fact witnesses and
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retrieval of documents due to the passage of time clearly validates [Wojciechowski’s] assertion of prejudice.” Id.
Generally, the doctrine of laches is applied according to the following test:
The party asserting laches must show, first, a delay arising from the other party’s failure to exercise due diligence, and second, prejudice from the delay…. It is not enough to show delay arising from failure to exercise due diligence; for laches will not be imputed where no injury has resulted to the other party by reason of the delay.
Jackman v. Pelusi, 550 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court found that Wojciechowski did not suffer prejudice based on Decedent’s alleged delay, and therefore, laches did not apply. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 9. The trial court reasoned that Wojciechowski’s credibility was the key issue in the proceedings. Id. The record supports the trial court’s determination.
The central issue before the trial court was whether Wojciechowski had complied with the equitable distribution Order by paying $32,000 to Decedent. Evidence regarding Decedent’s refusal of the $32,000 check would not provide a defense to Wojciechowski’s failure to comply with the equitable distribution Order.3 Further, the record reflects that Wojciechowski suffered no prejudice, as she transferred the property into her name, and
3 There is no evidence that Wojciechowski filed a motion with the trial court to waive her obligation under the equitable distribution Order, or attempted to pay the funds into court.
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retained the $32,000. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying application of the doctrine of laches.
In her third claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court improperly failed to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Brief for Appellant at 14. Wojciechowski asserts that Decedent “articulated to [her] that he no longer wanted the funds.” Id. According to Wojciechowski, Decedent’s conduct, in refusing to accept payment by mail, supports and substantiates application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel
prevents one from doing an act differently than the manner in which another was induced by word or deed to expect. A doctrine sounding in equity, equitable estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied by one’s words, deeds or representations[,] which leads another to rely justifiably thereon to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity.
Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 492 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind, 457 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. 1983) (emphasis in original)). The party asserting estoppel must establish by unequivocal evidence
(1) that the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be asserted intentionally or negligently misrepresented a material fact, knowing or with reason to know that the other party would justifiably rely on the misrepresentation, (2) that the other party acted to his or her detriment by justifiably relying on the misrepresentation, and (3) that there was no duty of inquiry on the party seeking to assert estoppel.
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Stonehedge Square Ltd. P’ship v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 685 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added, citation omitted). Whether equitable estoppel exists in a given case is a question of law. Id. at 1023.
Here, our review discloses no evidence that Wojciechowski relied to her detriment or suffered an injury resulting from Decedent’s alleged actions. Rather, the record reflects that Wojciechowski transferred the property into her name, without paying the $32,000 required by the equitable distribution Order.4 Consequently, the trial court did not err in deeming the doctrine inapplicable. See id. at 1024 (requiring the party asserting estoppel to establish that she relied to her detriment on the actions or statements of the party against whom the doctrine is asserted).
In her fourth claim, Wojciechowski argues that the trial court erred in failing to apply the defense of the statute of limitations. Brief of Appellant at 15. According to Wojciechowski, the four-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts barred the Estate’s action. Id. Wojciechowski argues that the Estate was required to bring this action by December 16, 2013, and failed to do so. Id.
Pennsylvania’s Divorce Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(e) Powers of the court. If at any time, a party has failed to comply with an order of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter, … after hearing, the court may, in addition to any
4 Additionally, Wojciechowski did not seek a written waiver from Decedent, or a determination from the trial court that her obligation to comply with the equitable distribution Order was absolved.
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other remedy available under this part, in order to effect compliance with its order:
(1) enter judgment;
… (9) find the party in contempt.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e) (emphasis added).
Despite Wojciechowski’s characterization of the Estate’s action as one for breach of contract, the action is simply one to enforce the equitable distribution Order. Based upon section 3502(e), the trial court had, “at any time,” broad authority to enforce its Order. See id. Accordingly, Wojciechowski’s claim lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2017
Circulated 06/28/2017 11:17 AM