MEMORANDUM OPINION
*1 W.N. was adjudicated a delinquent minor after he brought an unloaded .22 caliber pistol to his school in Stebbins.1 W.N.’s probation was later extended after he violated the terms of his probation multiple times. W.N., who was eventually diagnosed with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder, was placed in a number of different treatment programs, including the North Star Summit program, a residential mental health treatment program in Palmer. W.N. failed to complete the North Star Summit program and was discharged after demonstrating aggressive behavior and noncompliance with his treatment requirements. The discharge summary also noted that the program was not well-suited to W.N.’s needs because of his low IQ.
After W.N.’s discharge, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) filed a third petition to revoke probation, seeking a detention order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1). Following a contested adjudication hearing, at which W.N.’s probation officer and that officer's supervisor testified, the superior court found that W.N. had violated the terms of his probation by failing to complete a treatment program. Following a contested disposition hearing where W.N.’s juvenile probation officer explained that DJJ had exhausted all other available placements and asserted that W.N.’s needs would be best served by a (b)(1) placement, the court ordered the requested placement.
W.N. now appeals, raising two claims. First, W.N. argues that it was error for the superior court to rely on the testimony of W.N.’s probation officers at the contested adjudication hearing because they did not have firsthand knowledge of the reasons why W.N. was terminated from the North Star Summit program. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, W.N. argues that the superior court erred in ordering a (b)(1) placement. Because substantial evidence supports the superior court's (b)(1) order, we find no error.
Background facts and proceedings
In December 2021, fourteen-year-old W.N. brought an unloaded .22 caliber pistol to his school in Stebbins. In August 2022, W.N. was adjudicated a delinquent minor based on this conduct.
Initially, W.N. was released to the custody of his father in Stebbins and ordered to complete 6 months of probation. As part of his probation, W.N. was required to complete an assessment at Norton Sound Behavioral Health and follow “all recommendations of the clinician.”
In October 2022, DJJ filed the first petition to revoke probation, alleging that W.N. had committed three probation violations: (1) getting suspended from school, (2) threatening another student “by stating [that] he would go get a gun and shoot [the other student],” and (3) failing to comply with the recommendations of the clinician following the assessment. While this petition to revoke probation was pending, W.N. was detained and then released to live with his mother and stepfather in Kenai.
In January 2023, DJJ filed a second, supplemental petition to revoke probation, alleging that W.N. left the placement at his mother's home without permission and went to the Kenai airport in an effort to fly to his father's home in Stebbins, failed to follow school rules, failed to follow home rules, and tested positive for marijuana on two urinary analysis tests.
*2 W.N. was subsequently placed at the Kenai Peninsula Youth Facility. Detention records indicate that, over the next five months, W.N. exhibited increasing mistrust of others, leading to boundary testing and aggression. The records indicate that W.N. often thought staff and peers were speaking negatively about him or trying to harm him, although there was no evidence this was actually happening. He infrequently interacted with his peers, which sometimes included “shadow boxing in their directions or making stabbing gestures with his pencil towards them,” and alienated them by appearing to “laugh at nothing.” He punched the walls in his room, attempted to punch a staff member, and picked fights “with peers out of the blue.” One report author noted that it could “be difficult for staff to de-escalate [W.N.] when he [got] upset and threaten[ed] others.”
In June 2023, W.N. was admitted to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) to address his persistent psychotic symptoms. While there, he was placed on anti-psychotic medication. Once deemed stable, W.N. was transferred to another probation placement. However, W.N.’s symptoms continued after his treatment at API. In August, W.N. was transferred to McLaughlin Youth Center until he could be accepted at the North Star Summit program, a residential mental health treatment facility in Palmer.
W.N. later admitted, pursuant to a plea agreement, many of the allegations in his first and second petitions to revoke probation and was ordered to “actively participate in and successfully complete a residential program.”
W.N. was at the North Star Summit program from September 2023 to April 2024, when he was discharged following “continued non-compliance and assaultive behavior.” In April, DJJ filed a third petition to revoke probation, alleging that W.N. had violated his probation by, inter alia, (1) failing to complete a residential treatment program and (2) being physically aggressive. The petition to revoke probation ended by noting, “To date, there ha[ve] been two physical incidents in the past 3 days at which point the program requested [W.N.] be removed.”
While the petition to revoke probation was pending, W.N. was placed at the Mat-Su Youth Facility. Although W.N. initially succeeded in the program, in late 2024 he stopped taking his medications and began showing “increasingly erratic behavior” and “more aggressive responses.” A report from January 2025 indicated that, even when W.N. resumed taking his medications, his symptoms persisted and he struggled to maintain proper behavior.
Prior to the adjudication hearing, the defense filed a forensic psychological evaluation prepared by psychologist Dr. Brent J. Oneal. Dr. Oneal noted that school district officials had previously evaluated W.N.’s IQ at 44; Dr. Oneal's testing suggested that W.N.’s IQ was actually closer to 71, meaning his general cognitive ability was within the borderline range of intellectual functioning. According to Dr. Oneal, “[W.N.] currently meets diagnostic criteria for Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder and the provisional/working diagnosis of Borderline Intellectual Functioning[.]” Dr. Oneal stated that based on his interview of W.N., “it is evident that [W.N.] is currently experiencing active symptoms of psychosis to include auditory and visual hallucinations and paranoid delusions.”
Prior to the adjudication hearing, the State filed a pre-disposition report prepared by Juvenile Probation Officer Darrin Topkok and a discharge summary prepared by the staff at the North Star Summit program. The pre-disposition report stated that W.N. was discharged from the North Star Summit program “[d]ue to [his] continued physical aggression and inability to follow the program rules.” The discharge summary stated:
[W.N.] was frequently showing oppositional and defiant behaviors. He was impulsive. He also tried to run away from the facility and was aggressive and having assaultive behaviors. Inappropriate sexualized comments and behaviors by touching other kids inappropriately.
*3 The discharge summary also noted that “[W.N.] has significantly low-functioning IQ that probably will not fit too much here in this RTC program” and that “[h]e will probably need a specialized residential treatment facility.” The pre-disposition report stated that it was the Department of Family and Community Services's recommendation that W.N. be given an institutional treatment order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1).
At the adjudication hearing, the State called Juvenile Probation Officer Topkok as its first witness. W.N.’s attorney objected, on confrontation grounds, to Topkok testifying about whether W.N. had complied with several of his probation conditions, including completing a residential treatment program, because Topkok did not have firsthand knowledge of W.N.’s conduct.
The superior court ruled that Topkok could testify to the first allegation in the petition to revoke probation, i.e., he could testify as to the fact that W.N. had not completed a treatment program. But the court ruled that if the prosecutor wished to bring in evidence related to the second and third allegations in the petition — which were based on allegations that W.N. assaulted a person while in the North Star Summit program — he would either have to produce as witnesses persons with direct knowledge of the alleged assaults or show good cause for not producing them. During discussion of this point, the prosecutor stated that, in order to avoid this problem, he was willing to dismiss the second and third allegations in the petition and proceed on the failure-to-complete-treatment allegation.
Topkok testified that he had frequent communication with W.N. and received weekly reports of his progress in residential treatment, some of which indicated that W.N. was not participating in the program. W.N.’s attorney again objected to this testimony, arguing that it appeared to exceed the limits of the court's ruling. The court permitted Topkok to provide additional detail “for the limited purpose of demonstrating that the program was unsuccessfully completed.” On cross-examination, Topkok acknowledged that W.N. had a low IQ and that the discharge summary indicated that W.N. was in need of a more specialized program because of his low IQ. Topkok was clear, however, that he had been informed that W.N. was discharged because of his behavior as well as his low IQ.
Juvenile Probation Officer Jana Hoggan, the supervising juvenile probation officer for the Nome region and Topkok's supervisor, also testified at the adjudication hearing. According to Hoggan, W.N. was discharged from the North Star Summit program “based on his behavior being sexually inappropriate and not following the rules.” Hoggan testified that W.N. was in violation of his probation conditions because he had failed to complete the North Star Summit program.
The court then heard closing arguments from counsel. The prosecutor argued that the State had shown that W.N. had “violated his probation.” W.N.’s counsel argued that the State had not shown that W.N. was discharged from the North Star Summit program due to his behavior rather than a reason over which he had no control, i.e., his low IQ.
The court found that W.N. had violated the probation condition requiring him to complete a treatment program. The court also found that W.N. was not discharged solely because of his low IQ. The State reported at the end of the adjudication hearing that DJJ would be seeking a (b)(1) placement order for W.N., and the court scheduled a disposition hearing.
*4 The State filed an updated pre-disposition report prepared by Juvenile Probation Officer Hoggan prior to the disposition hearing. The report detailed W.N.’s placement in and discharge from the North Star Summit program, his initial good behavior at the Mat-Su Youth Facility, and his subsequent decompensation when he stopped taking his mental health medications. The report also explained why attempts to place W.N. with his parents had failed and detailed the various attempts that DJJ had made to get W.N. into another program. The report concluded that “[W.N.] is in need of a supervised and highly structured environment” and recommended that the court impose an institutional placement under AS 47.12.120(b)(1).
The court conducted a disposition hearing in February 2025. Dr. Oneal, W.N.’s expert witness, was called first and testified that W.N.’s inappropriate behaviors were “directly related to untreated psychosis.” According to Dr. Oneal, now that W.N. was developing skills and taking his medication, “things looked ... promising with regard to how [W.N.] would beha[ve] and be able to live in the community.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Oneal stated that W.N. “does have a serious psychiatric condition that will require ongoing intervention and support.” Dr. Oneal admitted that he was not familiar with the mental health resources in Stebbins. Dr. Oneal also acknowledged that W.N.’s father had not supported W.N. taking medication, which likely contributed to W.N.’s medication nonadherence and subsequent decline in functioning. Dr. Oneal noted, however, that W.N.’s father had seemingly become supportive of W.N. taking his medication.
The State then called as its first witness Alejandra Ruggio, W.N.’s clinical therapist from the North Star Summit program. She testified that W.N.’s “engagement [in treatment] was on the low side” and that he was discharged from the program “due to several incidents, aggression incidents, and also his noncompliance with our treatment expectations.” She also testified that the North Star Summit program was unable to provide the level of care necessary for W.N. due to his low IQ and cognitive abilities. W.N's counsel did not ask Ruggio any questions about the basis for W.N.’s discharge from the program and allowed Ruggio to be released as a witness.
The State then called Juvenile Probation Officer Hoggan. She explained that DJJ had “exhausted all available alternatives within the state” and that it was now seeking a (b)(1) placement order. She testified that W.N.’s father had requested an instate placement and that DJJ had sought to place W.N. in multiple programs, but they had all declined to accept him.
Hoggan testified that an institutional placement involves “a highly structured environment that [W.N.] seems to do well in” and that he could “engage in school, multiple educational classes, group therapy, [and] individual and family therapy.” Hoggan testified that because W.N. could not be discharged from an institutional placement, the staff would work with him throughout the duration of his placement, even if he had periods of noncooperation. She testified about concerns with a placement at his father's home in Stebbins because W.N. previously had trouble following basic rules at home, refused to participate in outpatient treatment, and likely would not “get the adequate structure, supervision[,] and treatment that he would need if he was to return home.” She testified that W.N.’s father had been “compliant and helpful” with DJJ when he had custody of W.N., but he was not a reliable reporter about when W.N. was out of compliance with his probation conditions, and that W.N.’s mother did not believe she could provide the necessary level of supervision.
*5 Lastly, the State called W.N.’s father as a witness. He testified that he had initially been reluctant for W.N. to take psychotropic medications because of the side effects but had come to the realization that the medications were needed, and he would support W.N. taking medication if he returned to live at home in Stebbins.
In closing arguments, the State argued that it had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a (b)(1) order was the least restrictive alternative available given W.N.’s needs. W.N.’s attorney argued that the State had not shown that the less restrictive placement with W.N.’s father would not work.
The court concluded that the State had established that there were no less restrictive alternatives to a (b)(1) placement available, noting that prior placements with both of W.N.’s parents had failed, that W.N. had failed in his other placements, and that DJJ had tried to get W.N. into a number of other programs but all declined to accept him. The court concluded that placement with W.N.’s father in Stebbins was not a viable alternative because W.N. could not receive the level of care that he needed there. The court acknowledged that W.N.’s behavior had not risen to the level of felony conduct but concluded that a (b)(1) placement order that would remain in place until W.N.’s eighteenth birthday was nevertheless appropriate. The court stated that it would revisit the placement order prior to W.N.’s eighteenth birthday.2
Why we conclude that any error in having the probation officers testify to the reasons W.N. was discharged from North Star Summit was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
As a general matter, the Alaska Rules of Evidence do not apply to probation revocation hearings.3 In McDaniels v. State, however, we held that probationers “have a due process right to confront witnesses against them unless the State demonstrates that there is good cause to deny them that right.”4 Alaska courts follow federal courts in applying a balancing test to determine whether “good cause” exists to rely on hearsay evidence.5 The balancing test requires a court to “weigh the probationer's interest in confrontation against the government's good cause for denying it — that is, the government's reasons for not producing the witness. The probationer's interest in confronting adverse witnesses turns on both the importance and the nature of the hearsay evidence (i.e., its reliability and accuracy).”6
Relying on McDaniels, W.N. argues that his due process rights were violated because the superior court allowed his probation officers to testify to the reasons for his discharge even though they did not have firsthand knowledge of the underlying conduct. W.N. argues that the superior court failed to conduct the correct good cause analysis for this hearsay testimony.
*6 But, as the State points out, it did not proceed on all of the allegations in the petition to revoke probation. Instead, the State limited the adjudication hearing to a single allegation — whether W.N. violated his probation by failing to successfully complete a residential treatment program. The probation officers had firsthand knowledge of that fact even though they may not have had firsthand knowledge of the underlying conduct that led to the discharge. The superior court therefore did not err in relying on their testimony to find that violation, which was itself sufficient to move the case to the disposition hearing.
It is true that the probation officers also testified in general terms that it was primarily W.N.’s conduct (as opposed to his low IQ) that led to W.N.’s discharge. But this information was in the discharge summary, which was filed with the court and not objected to by W.N. Indeed, W.N.’s counsel questioned Topkok regarding the contents of the discharge summary at the adjudication hearing. Moreover, when Ruggio testified at the disposition hearing in greater detail regarding the conduct that led to the discharge, W.N. did not cross-examine her about or otherwise controvert her explanation for the discharge.
Given these circumstances, we conclude that any error in permitting the juvenile probation officers to provide limited testimony about the reasons for W.N.’s discharge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of the adjudication hearing.
Why we conclude that the superior court did not err in imposing an institutional placement
W.N. argues that the superior court erred in imposing an institutional placement under AS 47.12.120(b)(1). In particular, W.N. argues that the court erred in rejecting his proposal that he be placed in the community to live with his father in Stebbins. W.N. argues that circumstances had changed as his father had become supportive of W.N. taking his medications and there was evidence that remaining medicated changed W.N.’s potential for rehabilitation in the community. W.N. also argues that the superior court failed to take into consideration Dr. Oneal's testimony regarding the potential harm that an institutional placement could cause W.N. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with W.N.’s contentions and affirm the disposition order.
In deciding what disposition to impose in a juvenile probation revocation action, a court must consider “the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public,” and the court is required to impose “the least restrictive alternative disposition.”7 The “least restrictive alternative disposition” is statutorily defined as the “disposition that is no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the court, most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.”8 We have recognized that a court may impose an institutional placement order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) when “the State presents substantial evidence that lesser measures will likely fail to meet the twin goals of disposition” — the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public.9
We conclude that the superior court did not err in declining to find that placement in the community with W.N.’s father in Stebbins, a placement under AS 47.12.120(b)(2), was a valid less restrictive alternative. Aside from the issues with medication adherence, the court noted that previous placement with W.N.’s father had not “work[ed] out” due to W.N.’s unwillingness to follow rules. Finally, the court found that the village of Stebbins was simply unable to provide the high level of structured care that W.N. needed. The superior court's finding that placement with W.N.’s father in Stebbins would likely fail to meet the best interests of W.N. and the interests of the public was supported by substantial evidence.
*7 We also conclude that the superior court did not err in concluding that a placement under AS 47.12.120(b)(3), i.e., placement in a nondetention facility, was not a viable alternative. The superior court noted the testimony of Juvenile Probation Officer Hoggan that, after W.N. was discharged from the North Star Summit program, DJJ had tried to place W.N. in multiple different less-restrictive treatment programs, but the programs all declined to offer him a placement. Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that a nondetention treatment program was not a valid option.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.