W.K.G. v. A.P.W.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0963
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: MAY 1, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0963-ME

W.K.G. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MICA WOOD PENCE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-AD-00038

A.P.W.; E.S.G., A MINOR CHILD; AND L.S.W. APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0965-ME

APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MICA WOOD PENCE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-AD-00039

A.P.W.; K.E.G., A MINOR CHILD; AND L.S.W. APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: L. JONES, MCNEILL, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.

JONES, L., JUDGE: This appeal arises from the Barren Circuit Court’s May 6,

2026 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgments which terminated

the parental rights of Appellant W.K.G. (Father) to his two children, Appellees

E.S.G. and K.E.G. (Children), and the June 5, 2025 Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Judgments of Adoption which allowed Appellee A.P.W.

(Step-Father) to adopt the Children. Having considered the briefs filed, the

relevant law, and record on appeal, we affirm.

BACKGOUND

Father and Appellee L.S.W. (Mother) married in 2013, and the

Children were born in 2013 and 2018. In October 2019, Father was arrested and

charged with multiple counts of unlawful transaction with a minor after it was

discovered that he had been engaging in unlawful sexual contact with a student at

the school where Father was employed as a teacher. Mother filed for divorce in

February 2020. In April 2020, Father was released on bond; however, that bond

was revoked in July 2020 after Father was found again to be engaging in unlawful

sexual contact with the same minor student.

-2- During the three months that Father was released on bond, he

continued to communicate with Mother, had a handful of contacts with the

Children, and contributed around $600 to Mother for child related expenses.

While Mother initially believed there was a possibility of salvaging the marriage,

she eventually changed her mind and pursued the divorce. She claimed that Father

began sending her letters of an intimidating nature in which he threatened suicide if

Mother went through with the divorce proceedings. Their communications came

to a head in June 2022 during a pool party at the home of one of Father’s family

members, where Father discovered that Mother had been pursuing other

relationships. Father engaged in some verbal altercations with Mother and

Father’s brother at the party. Shortly thereafter, Mother received videos Father

made for both Mother and the Children in which he expressed some remorse for

his actions and told the Children goodbye. Mother did not show the Children the

videos but showed them to Father’s family due to their concerning nature. Father’s

sister contacted authorities, and Father was admitted to a mental health facility for

a short time. While Father never explicitly stated he was planning to take his own

life in the videos, he admitted that he had been contemplating it at the time and

made the videos after he decided that he would no longer be in Mother’s or the

Children’s lives.

-3- In November 2020, the decree of dissolution of marriage was entered,

with Mother being granted sole custody of the Children. In September 2022,

Father pleaded guilty to the criminal charges against him and ultimately received a

seventeen-(17) year sentence in February 2023.

Mother and Step-Father married in October 2022, and Step-Father

filed a petition for adoption in June 2023. The matter eventually came before the

circuit court for a hearing in early 2025. On May 6, 2025, the circuit court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgments terminating Father’s

parental rights and noting that more testimony was necessary concerning Step-

Father’s fitness and character before entering a judgment for adoption. It

specifically utilized the involuntary termination of parental rights statutes, finding

that the Children were abused and neglected by virtue of Father’s conviction of

criminal charges related to the sexual abuse of a minor child. KRS1 625.090; KRS

600.020. It also found that Father had abandoned the Children for a period of not

less than ninety (90) days, the existence of several other parental unfitness factors

under KRS 625.090(2), and that the termination of Father’s parental rights would

be in the Children’s best interests.

The circuit court conducted an additional hearing on May 19, 2025,

and subsequently issued a second set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-4- and Judgments of Adoption on June 5, 2025. Father filed motions to reconsider,

alter, amend, or vacate both sets of findings and judgments, which were denied.

This appeal followed. On appeal, Father argues that the circuit court abused its

discretion in its utilization of KRS Chapter 625 concerning his termination of

parental rights, rather than KRS Chapter 199, and challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence regarding the circuit court’s findings concerning his unfitness as a parent.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An adoption which occurs without the consent of a child’s biological

parent by its effect terminates the parental rights of the biological parent. See

Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 351 (Ky. 2003). A judgment which terminates

parental rights to a child shall only be reversed by this Court if it is clearly

erroneous; in other words, there is no substantial, clear, and convincing evidence to

support the lower court’s decision. See B.L. v. J.S., 434 S.W.3d 61, 65 (Ky. App.

2014); see also CR2 52.01. Clear and convincing evidence exists when it is of a

“probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to

convince ordinarily prudent-minded people.” M.L.C. v. Cabinet for Health and

Family Services, 411 S.W. 3d 761, 765 (Ky. App. 2013) (citing Rowland v. Holt,

70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934)). “[U]nder [the clearly erroneous] standard, we are

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-5- ‘obligated to give a great deal of deference to the family court’s findings and

should not interfere with those findings unless the record is devoid of substantial

evidence to support them.’” M.S.S. v. J.E.B., 638 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Ky. 2022)

(citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

To begin, we are compelled to elaborate on the differences between

adoption proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings. Each

proceeding is governed by separate sets of statutes; KRS Chapter 625 governs

terminations of parental rights and KRS Chapter 199 governs adoptions. While

some of the statutes are nearly identical,3 there are some key differences. For

example, any adult who has resided in Kentucky over a year may file a petition for

adoption, while only the Cabinet, a properly licensed child-placing agency, a

County or Commonwealth’s attorney, or a parent may file a petition for

termination of parental rights. Compare KRS 199.470(1) with KRS 625.050(3).

Additionally, there is no requirement that the circuit court find a child to be

adjudged as neglected or abused in adoption proceedings. A.K.H. v. J.D.C., 619

S.W.3d 425, 431 (Ky. App. 2021) (discussing KRS 625.050(1)). In instances, such

as contested adoptions, where both KRS Chapter 625 and KRS Chapter 199 may

3 Namely, the parental unfitness factors contained in KRS 199.502(1)(a)-(h) and KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(h), which we shall address further below.

-6- appear to be applicable, “the adoption supersedes the termination because KRS

Chapter 199 encompasses Chapter 625 [and so] KRS 199 governs the entirety of

the . . . petition.” M.S.S., 638 S.W.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Thus, the only four distinct considerations which must be

contemplated by a circuit court in contested adoption proceedings are:

(1) [D]id the petitioner comply with the jurisdictional requirements for adoption; (2) have any of the conditions outlined in KRS 199.502(1) been established; (3) is the petitioner of good moral character, of reputable standing in the community and of ability to properly maintain and educate the child as required by the first portion of KRS 199.520(1); and (4) finally, will the best interest of the child be promoted by the adoption, and is the child suitable for adoption as required by the final portion of KRS 199.520(1).

A.K.H., 619 S.W.3d at 431 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, Father argues the circuit court abused its discretion in its

utilization of KRS Chapter 625 concerning his termination of parental rights rather

than KRS Chapter 199. He takes specific issue with the circuit court’s findings

regarding the Children being abused and neglected under KRS 625.050(1) and the

circuit court’s failure to cite KRS 199.502(2) when making its findings regarding

parental unfitness factors.

Firstly, as mentioned above, any finding concerning abuse or neglect

is not necessary for the granting of a contested adoption. If anything, the circuit

court’s belief that the extra finding was necessary may have actually prejudiced

-7- Step-Father rather than Father. See A.K.H., 619 S.W.3d at 431 (reversing and

remanding after the circuit court denied a step-father’s petition for adoption after it

found the subject child was not adjudicated to be neglected or abused). Therefore,

any findings under KRS 625.050(1) are ultimately superfluous and irrelevant to

our review.

Secondly, while the circuit court incorrectly cited to the parental

unfitness factors of KRS 625.090(2) rather than KRS 199.502(1), any error is

harmless because the relevant factors contained within both statutes are essentially

identical,4 and the determinations to be made under both provisions are similar.

R.M. v. R.B., 281 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Ky. App. 2009). Sub judice, the circuit court

addressed all four of the necessary considerations for the granting of an adoption

found within KRS Chapter 199.5 While we agree it would have been ideal for the

circuit court not to utilize KRS Chapter 625, there is no abuse of discretion for it

4 We note one difference between KRS 625.090(2)(d) and KRS 199.502(1)(d). KRS 625.090(2)(d) states a termination may be granted upon a showing that “a parent has been convicted of a felony that involved the infliction of serious physical injury to any child[,]” while KRS 199.502(1)(d) limits the conviction to a felony involving serious physical injury to “a child named in the present adoption proceeding[.]” To the extent relevant in the case at hand, the evidence is clear that Father was not convicted of a felony involving the infliction of serious physical injury to either of the Children. However, as we detail further below, this finding was ultimately unnecessary, and does not result in any reversible error. 5 The bulk of these findings were made at the May 19, 2025, hearing. Notably, while the bifurcation of adoption proceedings in this way is unnecessary and unusual, it is not prohibited. A.K.H., 619 S.W.3d at 431 (citing A.F. v. L.B., 572 S.W.3d 64, 72 (Ky. App. 2019)).

-8- having done so in this instance. We next move to Father’s arguments concerning

the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the parental unfitness factors.

The circuit court specifically found that Father had satisfied the

conditions of KRS 625.090(2)(a), (d), (e), and (g), which substantially mirror KRS

199.502(1)(a), (d), (e), and (g).6 Though it found four factors, it only needed to

6 In relevant part, KRS 199.502(1) provides:

[A]n adoption may be granted without the consent of the biological living parents of a child if it is pleaded and proved as part of the adoption proceeding that any of the following conditions exist with respect to the child:

(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days;

...

(d) That the parent has been convicted of a felony that involved the infliction of serious physical injury to a child named in the present adoption proceeding;

(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child, and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child[.]

(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the

-9- have found the existence of one. See C.J. v. M.S., 572 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Ky. App.

2019). For our purposes, the Court shall specifically examine the findings

regarding abandonment under KRS 199.502(1)(a).

“[A]bandonment is demonstrated by facts or circumstances that

evince a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental

claims to the child.” O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. App. 1983).

Furthermore, “[s]eparation to constitute abandonment and neglect must be [willful]

and harsh.” Kantorowicz v. Reams, 332 S.W.2d 269, 271–72 (Ky. 1959).

Incarceration alone is not sufficient to warrant a finding of abandonment. J.H. v.

Cabinet for Hum. Res., 704 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Ky. App. 1985).

Father argues that he did not abandon the Children, and that the only

reason he has not had contact with the Children since July 2020 is because Mother

has chosen not to allow it. In his favor, Father has written letters to the Children

from prison, though the Children never received these letters as Father sent them to

his grandparents for concern Mother might not give them to the Children. In

addition to the child support Father paid during the time he was released on bond,

he also began sending money he intended to be child support payments to his

immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child[.]

-10- grandparents in 2024 after the filing of the adoption petition, though the Children

do not appear to have received this money either.

Regardless, the “[p]ayment of support, though significant, is but one

factor to consider among the totality of circumstances when determining parental

abandonment.” S.B.B. v. J.W.B., 304 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Ky. App. 2010). In the

case at hand, the results of Father’s criminal actions cannot be overlooked. Father

willfully engaged in unlawful sexual contact, several times, with a minor child who

was a student at the school where he taught, which resulted in a sentence of

incarceration for seventeen years. Even if Father were to obtain parole as soon as

he was eligible for it in 2034, one of the Children will already be the age of

majority.

Father also squandered the opportunity afforded by the terms of his

bond. Rather than seek to continue to provide for the Children and work towards

having healthy parental contact with them while not incarcerated, Father chose to

again engage in unlawful sexual contact with the same minor he previously

victimized. While Father’s incarceration may still have been inevitable had he not

violated his bond, he could have potentially remained out of incarceration until his

ultimate conviction in 2023. See Kentucky Criminal Rules of Procedure (RCr)

4.40; RCr 4.42(1); RCr 4.54(1). His choice to continue to engage in criminal

actions clearly demonstrates his desire to forfeit his parental responsibilities. See,

-11- e.g., J.R.E. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 667 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Ky. App.

2023).

Additionally, Father’s noncriminal actions demonstrate abandonment.

Father jeopardized a coparenting relationship with his threatening and irrational

communications directed towards Mother in the months following his initial arrest.

While the Court is sympathetic toward the suicidal ideations Father was

experiencing at the time, it is clear that Father intended to abdicate his role as a

parent when he sent the videos to Mother in which he said goodbye to the

Children. Father also never sought court intervention for establishing or

maintaining contact with the Children, his only reason being that he did not know

that he could.

From our review of the record, we agree with the circuit court that

clear and convincing evidence exists which supports the finding that Father

abandoned the Children for a period of not less than ninety (90) days. While

Father has demonstrated a desire to better his life while incarcerated and seeks to

be a father to the extent he is able to be while incarcerated, that evidence simply

does not overcome the weight of the evidence proffered by Mother, Step-Father,

and Father by his own admissions. R.P., Jr. v. T.A.C., 469 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Ky.

App. 2015) (“[I]t is within the exclusive province of the trial court to weigh the

-12- evidence. Its finding was supported by sufficient evidence, and we may not disturb

it.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we find no reversible error and affirm the Barren Circuit

Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgments entered on both

May 6, 2025, and June 5, 2025, which terminated Father’s parental rights and

allowed Step-Father to adopt the Children.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE A.P.W.:

Ronald L. Hampton Pamela C. Bratcher Glasgow, Kentucky Bowling Green, Kentucky

-13-