Wittnebel v. Loughman

80 F.2d 222, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3244
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedDecember 9, 1935
Docket82
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 80 F.2d 222 (Wittnebel v. Loughman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wittnebel v. Loughman, 80 F.2d 222, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3244 (2d Cir. 1935).

Opinion

AUGUSTUS N. HAND,

Circuit Judge.

This suit is by the owner of 935 of the 25,000 shares of capital stock of the National City Bank of the City of New Rochelle to obtain a declaratory judgment that the complainant has a right to examine the books and records of the bank at a time and place that will not interfere with the conduct of its affairs by the defendant.

The bank closed on March 4, 1933, and has not opened for business since that time. On March 21 a conservator was appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency, and on August 3 the defendant Loughman was by him appointed receiver.

• The amended complaint alleges that the complainant was induced to retain his stock through false representations by the bank and its officers regarding its financial condition. It also alleges on information and belief mismanagement and fraudulent conduct on the part of the bank and its officers whereby funds of the corporation were unlawfully diverted in various specified ways, and whereby the bank suffered serious losses and the directors and corporatioñs in which they were interested were benefited. While it is not alleged that the complainant has brought any action in his own right, or has filed a stockholder’s bill to recover the losses sustained by the bank, it is stated that the statute of limitations is running and that the complainant, by being deprived of the right to inspect the corporate books and records, is unable to ascertain facts on which he may found such actions. It is further alleged that inspection has been demanded and was refused on the ground that the comptroller possessed the *223 right to administer the affairs of the bank and his receiver had, under his direction, the exclusive right to bring suits for injuries suffered by it.

Judge Patterson denied a motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint on the ground that the receiver had no better authority to prevent an examination of the books than did the corporate officers prior to the receivership. He said that the receiver differed from a chancery receiver in that he was not an officer of the court but of the executive branch of the government, and added that while the affairs of the company were in charge of the receiver, his appointment did not terminate the corporate existence of the bank. He further added that in liquidating the business of a closed bank the comptroller and receiver were administering a trust and there was nothing in the statute or the decisions interpretative of it destructive of the stockholder’s right to examine the books. (D.C.) 9 F.Supp. 465. He likewise, upon a separate motion, struck out the answer and ordered a decree pro confesso because it did not deny the serious charges alleged in the amended complaint ([D.C.] 11 F.Supp. 571), and finally denied a motion to file an amended and supplemental answer setting up the fact that since the filing of the amended answer the plaintiff, on the 28th of March, commenced an action in the Supreme Court against seven directors and one former officer of the bank for the purpose of charging them with the losses occasioned by their derelictions, and on April 10, 1935, the receiver, pursuant to instructions from the comptroller, commenced an action against fourteen former directors of the bank for violations of their official duties.

The complainant made repeated requests to be allowed access to the books and records of the bank so that he might examine them, and his requests had been uniformly declined by the comptroller and the receiver. The comptroller denied the request in a letter dated November 21, 1933. Finally, after the bank had been closed about twenty months, the receiver, on October 29, 1934, wrote to complainant’s attorneys in part as follows:

“I am the Receiver of a bank which is now in liquidation. As I understand it, the Comptroller of the Currency has the sole and exclusive right to administer its affairs, and in so doing, I am acting as his agent. Conforming to a long course of action, extending over half a century, and based upon the experience which that length of time has demonstrated to be right, it is the position of the Comptroller that we cannot accede to demands by stockholders of a closed bank to examine the affairs of the bank on their own behalf. The cases in support of that position have already been called to your attention.
“I am quite cognizant of the feeling you have, and which you have expressed to my attorneys, that officers of the old bank are being protected by my attitude. In this you are entirely mistaken, and I think your assumptions and speculations in the matter are entirely gratuitous. It might interest you to know that among my other duties some months ago I made a full report to the Comptroller of the Currency of the conditions which I found as Receiver. Undoubtedly the proper agencies of the government will take such action with regard to that report as the facts warrant.”

The receiver frankly takes the ground that he has possession of property of the bank, that he is charged with the duty of liquidating its assets, and that under no circumstances can an examination be required by a stockholder, at least unless fraud or collusion in the administration of the trust is shown. This goes too far and leaves no check upon conduct that may become arbitrary and have too little regard for the rights of persons vitally interested in the administration of insolvent banks.

It is manifest that a stockholder of an insolvent national bank is vitally interested in the efficient liquidation of its assets, not only because of his possible right to share in a surplus after payment of the debts, but also because the amount of the assessment on his stock which the comptroller may levy will be directly affected by the success of the receiver in collecting outstanding claims. It is true that a liberal construction has always been placed upon the National Banking Act, so that the liquidation of insolvent banks can proceed without undue interruptions and to as prompt a conclusion as possible. But a recognition of the right of a stockholder to obtain an order for an examination of the books of a bank, in a case where a fair reason for the examination is shown and *224 where the examination is so conducted as not to inconvenience the receiver in his administration, preserves rights of stockholders that existed prior to the time when the comptroller took over the administration, is not in derogation of any statute, and affords a safeguard against careless administration and arbitrary conduct. It should only be granted where there is a showing of some justifiable reason; otherwise the comptroller might be unduly harassed in his administration.

We think there was enough proof here to sustain the order of the District Court providing for the examination of the books and records of the bank. In the first place, the receiver had notice of the complainant’s statement that appeared in his sworn complaint that the officers of the bank had defrauded him personally and had made way with the assets of the bank. An examination of books and records which might substantiate the claim that the bank was insolvent at the very time when its officers were representing that it was in good condition bore directly on complainant’s personal cause of action for deceit.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
80 F.2d 222, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wittnebel-v-loughman-ca2-1935.