Withycombe v. Pierce

608 F. Supp. 1177
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedMay 14, 1985
DocketCiv. No. N-84-446 (PCD)
StatusPublished

This text of 608 F. Supp. 1177 (Withycombe v. Pierce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Withycombe v. Pierce, 608 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1985).

Opinion

RULING ON DEFENDANT PIERCE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DORSEY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are a,putative class of elderly tenants1 at the Bella Vista I and II apartments in New Haven, Connecticut, whose federally-subsidized housing rents were converted in late 1982 and early 1983 from the Rent Supplement Program2 to the Section 8 Program.3 Alleging that their monthly rents were increased beyond the 10% limit (cap) mandated by the Housing & Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (1983 [1179]*1179Act),4 plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief and return of overpaid rents. At issue is the validity of a regulation issued on May 10, 1984,5 by defendant Samuel Pierce (Pierce), Secretary of the United States Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD), interpreting the formula provided in § 206(d)(4)(B) of the 1983 Act for computing and applying the 10% cap to elderly tenants who had been converted prior to its enactment on November 30, 1983.

Plaintiffs allege (1) the regulation misconstrues the statute by applying the 10% cap to the pre-conversion rather than to the post-conversion rent (base figure claim); (2) by delaying implementation of the cap to the first “recertification”6 on or after October 1, 1984, the regulation has deferred the cap’s benefit for many tenants for at least one year (timing claim); and (3) contrary to Congress’ intention, rent increases resulting from increases in income have been excluded from the cap (income increase claim). Plaintiffs claim under the 1983 Act and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.

In moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, alternatively, for summary judgment, Pierce also argues that plaintiffs lack a private cause of action under either the 1983 Act or the Housing Act of 1937 (which contains Section 8) and have incorrectly asserted the appropriate standard of review under the APA. With the introduction of facts outside the pleadings,7 Pierce’s motion must be considered as one for summary judgment, Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Modern Woodcrafts, Inc. v. Hawley, 534 F.Supp. 1000, 1002 n. 1 (D.Conn. 1982); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1366, at 679 (1969 Ed.), and for the reasons below, it is granted.

Facts

Plaintiffs’ rents at the Bella Vista I and II projects, owned and operated by defendant Carabetta Management, Inc. (Carabetta), were first subsidized in the 1970’s through the Rent Supplement Program. Under that program, a tenant’s rent was the greater of 30% of the approved rent for the project (as defined by the Act) or 25% of the tenant’s income.8 The program did not require regular recertification of tenants’ incomes. Initially, plaintiffs’ rents were computed at 25% of their incomes, but, as approved rents rose, their rents came to be 30% of approved rents. As a result, plaintiffs’ rents increased with increases in approved rents. Prior to their conversion to* the Section 8 Program,9 rent at Bella Vista I for plaintiffs Romano, Della Valle and Faulkner was $90 per month and at Bella Vista II for plaintiffs Withycombe, Solomon and Archangelo was $93.10

Under Section 8, rent is solely a percentage of income11 which is recertified annual[1180]*1180ly. Since HUD authorized Carabetta to delay recertification of tenants’ incomes until one year after conversion, which authorization is not challenged here, plaintiffs’ rents for the first year after conversion were computed at 25% of their by-then outdated income levels.12 Plaintiffs’ first year, post-conversion rents were substantially lower than for the preceding year.

On October 1, 1983, and May 1, 1984, plaintiffs’ incomes were recertified at higher levels. As a result thereof and of the use of a 28% rate (mandated for recertifications accomplished at these times 13), plaintiffs’ rents were increased over their preconversion rents and substantially over their first year's Section 8 rents. The incomes of Romano, Della Valle and Faulkner were recertified, prior to October 1, 1984, in their third year of conversion.

Plaintiffs’ rent history is in Exhibit A. Discussion

A. Cause of Action Claims

1. Right of Action under 1983 Act or United States Housing Act

“[W]hether a statute ... [authorizes] a cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is ... a matter of statutory construction.” Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). It is agreed that no explicit private action exists under either the 1983 Act or the United States Housing Act. Plaintiffs assert an implicit right.

The test for an implied right is said to be: First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’____ Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). Satisfaction of the first test obviates satisfaction of the second. Id. at 82, 95 S.Ct. at 2089. Plaintiffs argue that as “especial” beneficiaries under the 1983 Act (which is not disputed), they need not satisfy the second test of Cort. In any case, legislative silence is construable as implying a private remedy. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1956, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

However, since Cort, whether such a right was intended has been held to be dispositive. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Udall v. Tallman
380 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1965)
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner
387 U.S. 136 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
401 U.S. 402 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Cort v. Ash
422 U.S. 66 (Supreme Court, 1975)
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel
439 U.S. 551 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Cannon v. University of Chicago
441 U.S. 677 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Davis v. Passman
442 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Southeastern Community College v. Davis
442 U.S. 397 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
442 U.S. 560 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis
444 U.S. 11 (Supreme Court, 1979)
California v. Sierra Club
451 U.S. 287 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Barbara Falzarano v. United States of America
607 F.2d 506 (First Circuit, 1979)
Joseph Wilkinson v. Maurice Abrams
627 F.2d 650 (Third Circuit, 1980)
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
325 U.S. 410 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Modern Woodcrafts, Inc. v. Hawley
534 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Connecticut, 1982)
McGhee v. Housing Authority of City of Lanett
543 F. Supp. 607 (M.D. Alabama, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
608 F. Supp. 1177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/withycombe-v-pierce-ctd-1985.