Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co.

249 U.S. 63, 39 S. Ct. 200, 63 L. Ed. 479, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2226
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 3, 1919
Docket142
StatusPublished
Cited by63 cases

This text of 249 U.S. 63 (Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U.S. 63, 39 S. Ct. 200, 63 L. Ed. 479, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2226 (1919).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Day

delivered the opinion of the court.

The construction company brought suit to enforce the lien of twelve tax-bills issued on account of the cost of paving a portion of Broadway in the City of St. Louis. WithneU, plaintiff in error, is the owner of property assessed, fronting on Broadway, being five lots in City Block No. 2069, five lots in City Block No. 2608, and unplatted property in City Blocks Nos. 2620 and 2621.

. The .validity of the tax-bills was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 269 Missouri, 546. The case is here because of alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution in assessing the lien of these tax-bills upon plaintiff in error’s property. The assessment was levied in accordance with the charter of the City of St. Louis. An assessment for improving other portions of the street than are here involved, made under the terms of the St. Louis charter, was before this court in Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55. In that case the assessment was held invalid in part. After being remanded to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and a second judgment, the case was again before this court. 245 U. S. 288.

The method of making assessments under the charter of the City of St. Louis, as stated in Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., supra, is as follows: One-fourth of the total cost is levied upon all the property fronting upon or adjoining the improvement according to frontage and three-fourths according to area ascertained, as follows: “A line shall be drawn midway between the street to be improved and the next parallel or converging street on each side of the street to be improved, which line shall be the boundary of the district, except as hereinafter pro *68 vided, namely: If'the property adjoining the street to be improved is divided into lots, the district line shall be so drawn as to include the entire depth of all lots fronting on the street to be improved. ... If there is no parallel or. converging street on either side of the street improved, the district lines shall be drawn three hundred feet from that parallel to the street to be improved; but if there be a parallel or converging street on one side of the street to be improved to fix and locate the district line, then the district line on the other side shall be drawn parallel to the street to be improved and at the average distance of the opposite district line so fixed and located.”

In the Gast Realty Co. Case the area assessment was held invalid because it assessed a large and disproportionate part of the plaintiff in error’s property. The memorandum appended to the opinion shows that the foot-front assessment was not disturbed. And see the subsequent consideration of the matter in Schneider Granite Co. v. Gast Realty Co., 245 U. S. 288.

In support of the constitutional objection it is contended that the plaintiff in error was not allowed to-be heard as to the validity, and apportionment of the assessment, and was therefore denied due process of law. The charter provision for notice and hearing is inserted in the margin. 1 But whether a property-owner is entitled to be *69 heard in advance upon the questions of benefit and apportionment depends upon the authority under which the assessment is made. When the assessment is made in accordance with a fixed rule adopted by a legislative act, a property-owner is not entitled to be heard in advance on the question of the amount and extent of the assessment and the benefits conferred. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324; Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 240 U. S. 242; Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207, 217, 218, and cases cited. We are of opinion that the assessment made , in accordance with the rule of the St. Louis charter was legislative in character and required no previous notice or preliminary hearing as to the nature and extent of benefits in order to. maintain its constitutional validity. The charter of the City ¿f St. Louis was adopted by a vote of the people under state constitutional authority. It was under consideration in St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 U. S. 465. This court said:

"As the legislative power of a State is vested in the legislature, generally that body has the supreme control, *70 and it delegates tj> municipal corporations such measure thereof as it deems best. The city of St. Louis occupies a unique position. It does not, like most cities, derive its powers by grant from the legislature, but it framed its own charter under express authority from the people of the State, given in the constitution. Sections 20 and 21 of Article 9 of the Constitution of 1875 of the State of Missouri authorized the election of thirteen freeholders to prepare a charter to be submitted to the qualified voters of the city, which, when ratified by them, was to ‘become the organic law of the city.’ ... In pursuance of these provisions of the constitution a charter was prepared and adopted, and is, therefore, the ‘organic law’ of the city of St. Louis, and the powers granted by it, so far as they are in harmony with the constitution and laws of the State, and have not been set aside by any act of the general assembly, are the powers vested in the city. And this charter is an organic act so defined in the constitution, and is to be construed as organic acts are construed. The city is in a very just sense an ‘imperium in imperio.’ Its powers are self-appointed, and the reserved control existing in the general assembly does not take away this peculiar feature of the' charter.”

The same view has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Missouri, 391, 409, that court declared, citing its previous decisions, that the charter of St. Louis, adopted under the constitution, had as respects local assessments all the force of legislative acts.

We reach the conclusion that the attack upon the validity of the assessment for want of advance notice of hearing as to benefits must fail.

Regarding the front-foot method of assessment as being unassailable under the previous decisions of this court (240 U. S., 245 U. S., supra), we come to consider .the area assessment.

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Bluebook (online)
249 U.S. 63, 39 S. Ct. 200, 63 L. Ed. 479, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/withnell-v-ruecking-construction-co-scotus-1919.