Wisnieski v. Vine Veterinary Hospital

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedOctober 15, 1997
DocketI.C. No. 260942
StatusPublished

This text of Wisnieski v. Vine Veterinary Hospital (Wisnieski v. Vine Veterinary Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wisnieski v. Vine Veterinary Hospital, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1997).

Opinion

The undersigned have reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before former Deputy Commissioner Shuping. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award.

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EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

The Full Commission hereby DENIES plaintiff's Motion to Reopen the Record to Take Additional Testimony. At the 5 June 1996 hearing before former Deputy Commissioner Shuping in this matter, the former Deputy Commissioner indicated, without objection by either party, that he would consider the witnesses tendered for corroborative purposes.

The Full Commission hereby GRANTS plaintiff's Motion to strike all information in motions or briefs regarding any criminal trial or conviction of plaintiff that is not contained in the record of this matter.

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS

1. The Pre-Trial Agreement in which the parties agreed to a number of jurisdictional and factual stipulations is incorporated by reference as if fully set-out herein.

2. The deposition of Calvin Clayton is received into evidence.

3. The medical records and depositions of Drs. Scott Sanitate, S. Mitchell Freedman and Elliot Kopp are received into evidence.

4. The parties stipulated voluminous medical and rehabilitation records to complete the record and submitted statements of contention.

The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff is a 39 year old married female with a twenty year history of fibromyalgia, who lives with her husband on an approximate thirty-five acre working farm outside of Roxboro and continues to care for her several horses and other animals, including a couple of dogs and a goat.

Fibromyalgia is a rheumatic condition of unknown etiology or cause involving the soft tissues, muscles, ligaments, tendon and bursa which is manifested by diffuse pain, and is a condition that is subject to being flared or aggravated by stress. Plaintiff experienced fibromyalgia in her neck and shoulders which required medical treatment while living in Wisconsin and Ohio prior to moving to North Carolina.

2. Plaintiff initially completed the tenth grade, but subsequently obtained a GED or high school equivalency certificate. She also took college level courses in supervision and time management. She has prior work experience as a fabricator and a supervisor for General Electric and Diversified Fabricators, Inc., as a physical fitness instructor at the YMCA and a private health clinic, as a supervisor for a ceramic component manufacturer and at another kennel for a short period of time.

3. In 1990 plaintiff began working for defendant-employer as a veterinary assistant where her primary duty was taking care of animals, including bathing, grooming and medicating animals, cleaning and disinfecting their cages and assisting veterinarians with surgery.

4. Plaintiff sustained the admittedly compensable low back injury that was the subject of the prior Industrial Commission Award on 7 August 1992 when lifting a large struggling dog onto the operating table for surgery. She has continued to receive weekly compensation benefits under the same Award since her injury.

5. Plaintiff initially sought medical treatment for her low back injury the following morning from Dr. Jones, an associate of her family physician, Dr. Aycock. Dr. Jones placed her on strict bedrest and recommended both heat and ice treatment.

6. Plaintiff was subsequently referred to Burlington's Kernodle Clinic where she was initially seen by Dr. Kernodle, then Dr. Califf, who placed her on a continued course of conservative treatment, including multiple medications and physical therapy. He also had her undergo a diagnostic EMG and nerve conduction studies, MRI and discography, which did not demonstrate any clinical abnormalities.

7. Dr. Califf subsequently referred plaintiff to a work hardening program at Southwinds in Durham. However, plaintiff did not complete the program because it was allegedly too painful. Dr. Califf then referred plaintiff to a local work hardening program with physical therapy at Health Focus. At Health Focus, plaintiff underwent a functional capacity evaluation which demonstrated symptom magnification and the absence of objective findings that were either anatomically or physiologically consistent.

8. Dr. Califf ultimately released plaintiff to return to unrestricted work on 1 March 1993 and gave her a five percent permanent partial disability rating of the back from the involved back injury.

9. In the interim plaintiff was referred for a second opinion to Dr. Robert Price, a Durham neurosurgeon, who had her undergo additional diagnostic testing, including a myelogram and CT scan, which demonstrated no evidence of nerve root compression or a herniated disc. As a result, Dr. Price determined plaintiff was not a surgical candidate, but recommended several weeks of a work hardening program with an intense psychological component.

In Dr. Price's opinion, absent improvement after three or four weeks in such a program, plaintiff would have reached maximum medical improvement from her back injury. Dr. Price would have then rated plaintiff as retaining a five percent permanent partial disability of the back from the same injury and released her to return to unrestricted work.

10. Although plaintiff attempted to return to her regular veterinary assistant's job in early March 1993, she worked there less than a week because she claimed it was too painful.

11. That same month plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Scott S. Sanitate, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, who has continued to treat her to date and has provided a conservative course of treatment, including multiple medication and epidural injections.

12. By 28 June 1993 plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and/or the end of the healing period from and following the back injury giving rise hereto, at which time Dr. Sanitate rated plaintiff as retaining a five percent permanent partial disability of the back as a result of her 7 August 1992 back injury. Dr. Sanitate released her to return to work with the restrictions of no lifting more than thirty pounds, the ability to change positions frequently due to the increasing pain she claimed while sitting and no driving more than fifteen to twenty minutes to a job due to her alleged pain from prolonged sitting.

Dr. Sanitate placed the restrictions on plaintiff's ability to return to work based upon the veracity of her subjective complaints. If plaintiff was not truthful in those complaints, then she was able to return to unrestricted work, including her regular veterinary assistant's job, as well as any of the other multiple jobs she had previously done, which are more fully described in Finding of Fact No. 2 hereinabove. Although defendant-employer engaged the services of a vocational rehabilitation specialist in an unsuccessful attempt to return plaintiff to work within the restrictions provided by Dr. Sanitate, the focus of the vocational rehabilitation efforts were also based on the assumption that plaintiff's subjective pain complaints and the resulting restrictions Dr. Sanitate placed on her were actual reflections of plaintiff's capacity to work and earn wages.

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Bluebook (online)
Wisnieski v. Vine Veterinary Hospital, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wisnieski-v-vine-veterinary-hospital-ncworkcompcom-1997.