F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 31 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
BILLY WISEMAN,
Petitioner-Appellee, v. No. 98-7047 MICHAEL CODY, Warden, Lexington (D.C. No. 92-CV-677-S) Correctional Center; THE ATTORNEY (Eastern District of Oklahoma) GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, and McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
On October 16, 1992, Billy Wiseman, a state prisoner, brought a federal habeas
corpus action against his custodian, Michael Cody, Warden, and the Attorney General of
the State of Oklahoma, in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 26, 1992, the case was transferred
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. An evidentiary
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3 hearing was held before a United States Magistrate Judge on May 28, 1997, and on
March 9, 1998, the district court approved the findings and recommendation of the
magistrate. In so doing, the district court ordered as follows: “If the State of Oklahoma
has granted the petitioner an appeal out of time and provided him assistance of counsel
within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, the petitioner’s writ will be denied;
otherwise, it will be granted.” Cody and the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office appeal
the order and judgment thus entered. The background out of which the present
controversy arises is involved but must be summarized in some detail if the appeal is to be
fully understood.
In 1982, Wiseman, then a 19-year-old with a ninth grade education, was charged in
a state district court in Johnston County, Oklahoma, in two counts with robbery with a
dangerous weapon after two prior felony convictions, and in the second count with assault
and battery with an intent to kill after two prior felony convictions. An attorney, Burl
Peveto, was appointed by the court to represent Wiseman. Pursuant to a plea agreement
between Wiseman and his attorney, and the state district attorney, Wiseman entered a plea
of guilty to both counts of the indictment on October 26, 1983. On that date, Wiseman
filed with the court a “Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty,” which provided in paragraph 18
thereof that the district attorney would recommend to the court that Wiseman be given a
30-year sentence on each of the two counts in the indictment, to be served concurrently
-2- with sentences imposed in other cases against Wiseman.1
On December 8, 1983, Wiseman appeared in court for sentencing. At that time,
Burl Peveto did not appear with Wiseman, and, as will later be developed, Peveto could
not explain just why he did not appear, thinking he might have been “in a trial in
California or in federal court in Tulsa.” In any event, it would appear that the district
court then appointed Thomas Purcell, an attorney appearing in court for another person
who was not related to the Wiseman indictment, to represent Wiseman. After conferring
for a few minutes with Purcell, Wiseman was sentenced to life imprisonment on each
count, to run concurrently with other sentences involving Wiseman. It would appear that
at the moment of sentencing, neither Purcell nor the judge were aware of the prior plea
agreement between Wiseman and the state district attorney, and there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the district attorney at the court hearing when Wiseman entered a
plea of guilty, or later at the sentencing hearing, verbally recommended to the court a 30-
year sentence on each count.2
After the hearing, according to Wiseman, he advised Purcell that he believed he
1 The “blanks” on the printed “Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty” form were filled in by Peveto and the petition was then signed by Wiseman and Richard A. Miller, an assistant district attorney. In the petition, in response to a printed inquiry, Wiseman stated that he understood that even though he had pleaded guilty, he could still appeal the punishment imposed. A copy of this petition is a part of the record on appeal.
A copy of a transcript of the proceedings when Wiseman pled guilty and when he 2
was sentenced is not in the record on appeal. It would appear that the reporter’s notes are no longer available.
-3- was going to receive a 30-year sentence, and not a life sentence, and that Purcell, in
response, had stated that “[h]e would take care of it” and that he “needed to tell Peveto
what went on.” And, according to Wiseman, that was the last time he talked to Purcell.
Purcell, in his testimony before the magistrate in the federal habeas corpus proceeding,
stated that he recalled being present at Wiseman’s sentencing, but didn’t recall much else
about the matter. In any event, no motion to withdraw Wiseman’s plea of guilty was
filed, nor was an appeal taken.
After sentencing, Wiseman was immediately remanded, without objection, to the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections. It would appear that thereafter Wiseman wrote
several letters of inquiry about his case to the public defender’s office, asking about the
status of his appeal.3 On March 3, 1986, Wiseman filed in the district court for Johnston
County, Oklahoma, a pro se application for post-conviction relief, seeking to appeal his
conviction out of time because of the failure of his trial counsel to perfect an appeal. In
connection therewith, Wiseman stated that he believed he had been deprived of “[t]he
right to an appeal of my conviction due to my lawyer’s failure to file my appeal.” In this
same regard, Wiseman added “[d]ue to my lawyer’s gross neglect, my appeal was not
filed. He stated to me an appeal would be filed, but failed to do so. Ineffective counsel
3 At the evidentiary hearing on his federal habeas corpus claim before a magistrate judge, letters from the public defender’s office in response to Wiseman’s inquiries were introduced into evidence and they indicated that their office could not find that any appeal was ever filed.
-4- has deprived me of my appeal under due process.” Five years later, on October 18,
1991, a district judge denied Wiseman’s application for post-conviction relief. In so
doing, the district court explained the delay by stating that there had been a “change of
administrations,” and that the application was “undecided and remained unknown to the
successors in office until December of 1990.”
In denying Wiseman’s application, the state district court noted that Wiseman
made no application to withdraw his plea of guilty until his application for post-
conviction relief was filed some two and a half years after sentencing, that he had failed
to show any basis for relief, that he fully understood his rights and voluntarily pled
guilty. On January 10, 1992, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
district court’s denial of Wiseman’s application for post-conviction relief, noting that
Wiseman had failed to file a direct appeal of his conviction, and that post-conviction
relief provided by 22 O.S. 1981, § 1080 was not a substitute for direct appeal. Wiseman
then sought federal habeas corpus relief.
As above stated, Wiseman’s pro se petition for federal habeas corpus was filed on
October 16, 1992. On June 18, 1993, the district court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma denied Wiseman’s pro se petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that it
contained “unexhausted grounds for relief,” and dismissed the action. On appeal, this
court in an unpublished order and judgment affirmed the district court’s order. Wiseman
v. Cody, No. 93-7074 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994). In so doing, we noted that Wiseman in his
-5- petition raised three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in that
counsel failed to file an appeal; (2) the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals improperly
denied him a right to an out-of-time appeal; and (3) double jeopardy. On appeal, we held
that, though Wiseman had “successfully exhausted his ineffective assistance of counsel”
issues, i.e., issues l and 2, he had not exhausted his state remedies as to his claim of
double jeopardy. Accordingly, we stated that, on remand, Wiseman had a “choice” of
returning to state court for resolution of his double jeopardy claim or amending his
petition for habeas corpus to present “only the exhausted claims” of ineffective
assistance of counsel. On remand, Wiseman elected to amend his petition to include
only his exhausted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The matter was then
referred to the magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing.
As stated, an evidentiary hearing was held before a United States Magistrate
Judge on May 28, 1997. At that hearing, Wiseman, the petitioner, testified in his own
behalf. At the conclusion of his examination, and cross-examination, Wiseman’s
counsel rested his case. The respondents, Cody and the Oklahoma Attorney General,
then called as their witnesses Burl Peveto, the attorney who represented Wiseman when
he pled guilty, but then failed to appear at sentencing, and Thomas Purcell, the attorney
who was appointed to represent Wiseman at sentencing when Peveto did not appear.
The gist of their testimony appears in the summarization set forth above and need not be
repeated here.
-6- On January 16, 1998, the Honorable James H. Payne, the magistrate judge who
conducted the evidentiary hearing, filed his “Findings and Recommendation.” In his
findings, the magistrate judge noted that attorney Purcell had not sought to withdraw
Wiseman’s plea of guilty nor filed a timely appeal. The judge then generally observed
that where a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in a state court pursuant to an
independent and adequate procedural state rule, federal habeas corpus review of such
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as the result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, citing
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The magistrate judge then went on to
find that, in the instant case, Wiseman had shown “cause and prejudice,” holding that the
performance of Messrs. Peveto and Purcell fell well below the level guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. The magistrate judge then recommended that the case be held in
abeyance for no longer then 60 days during which time the State of Oklahoma may grant,
“by whatever procedure it deems appropriate, an appeal out of time and provide him
assistance of counsel,” and that if Wiseman is granted an appeal out of time, the habeas
corpus action would be dismissed. However, the magistrate judge went on to state that if
Wiseman should not be granted an out of time appeal within 60 days, “the writ should
issue releasing petitioner.” As already stated, the district court on March 6, 1998, by
order, affirmed and adopted the findings of the magistrate judge and ordered that, if
-7- Wiseman was given an out of time appeal by the State of Oklahoma within 60 days, the
petition would be denied, “otherwise it will be granted.”
The essential historical facts are not in dispute: (1) A “Petition to Enter a Plea of
Guilty,” which included, inter alia, a provision that the district attorney would
recommend to the District Court of Johnston County, Oklahoma that Wiseman be given
a 30-year sentence on each count of a two-count indictment to be served concurrently
with other sentences Wiseman was then serving, was signed by Wiseman and an
assistant district attorney and filed with the district court;4 (2) Wiseman’s plea of guilty
to both counts of the two-count indictment was accepted by the district court at a hearing
where Wiseman was represented by Burl Peveto, an attorney who had been appointed by
the district court to represent Wiseman; (3) six weeks later when Wiseman was
sentenced by the district court pursuant to his plea of guilty, Peveto was unexplainably
not present;5 (4) the district court then appointed Thomas Purcell, an attorney who was
appearing in that particular courtroom on another matter unrelated to Wiseman’s case, to
represent Wiseman; (5) after a brief conference between Wiseman and Purcell lasting
4 In paragraph 18 of the petition, Wiseman stated that “I have been told that the District Attorney will recommend 30 years to run concurrent with sentences imposed in CRF-82-60 and 83-24.” Whether the district attorney ever followed through on his promise to recommend a 30-year sentence does not appear in the record before us. Perhaps, it appears in the presentence report, but that is not in the record either. That there are “gaps” in the record is not surprising, considering the lapse of time. 5 Peveto had not conferred with Wiseman at any time after Wiseman had, pursuant to the plea agreement, pled guilty.
-8- about five to ten minutes, Wiseman was sentenced to two life sentences; (6) immediately
after sentencing, Wiseman advised Purcell that pursuant to his plea agreement he thought
he was going to be sentenced to 30 years on each count, not to a life sentence on each
count; (7) Purcell said he would look into the matter and check with Peveto, and
Wiseman never heard from Purcell again; (8) no direct appeal was ever taken by Purcell
or Peveto; (9) two and a half years later Wiseman filed a pro se motion for post-
conviction relief in the District Court for Johnston County, Oklahoma, which motion was
denied, after a five-year delay; and (10) the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
thereafter affirmed the district court’s denial of Wiseman’s application for post-
conviction relief. It was in this setting that Wiseman, some nine years after his
sentencing, filed a federal habeas corpus action.
The respondent’s basic position in this court is that because of his “default” in
Oklahoma state court, Wiseman is “barred” from federal habeas corpus relief based on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not agree.
In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 750, the Supreme Court spoke as follows:
We will now make it explicit: In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis added.)
As concerns a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in Strickland v.
-9- Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-8 (1984), the Supreme Court spoke as follows:
III A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. A As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d, at 151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, 397 U.S., at 770, 771, 90 S.Ct., at 1448, 1449, that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not “a reasonably competent attorney” and the advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S., at 344, 100 S.Ct., at 1716. When a convicted defendant complains of the infectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
By adopting the findings of the magistrate judge, the district court, in effect,
found that Wiseman, having shown cause and prejudice, was not procedurally barred
from raising his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in federal court. In this
- 10 - regard, we stated in Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 505 (10th Cir. 1992) that
“constitutionally ineffective counsel constitutes cause” for a state procedural default.6
As concerns the “prejudice” prong, the magistrate judge concluded, and the district
court agreed, that the “obvious prejudice to petitioner was that his plea agreement was
not considered at sentencing, and he received the maximum sentences for the offenses.”
We agree. The difference between a 30-year sentence and a life sentence is not, in our
view, de minimis. At least the sentencing judge, in imposing sentence, should have
been aware that the plea of guilty was conditioned on a recommendation by the district
attorney that Wiseman receive a 30-year sentence. There is nothing in the present
record to indicate that such was the case.
The key issue is, of course, whether Wiseman was afforded his Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel. The district court held that Wiseman was not afforded
that right. The record supports such determination. Counsel who negotiated the plea
agreement with the district attorney didn’t even show up at the sentencing hearing. If
6 Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed the question of whether any “state default” by Wiseman was “pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Rather, both concluded that Wiseman had shown “cause” for any default and “actual prejudice” resulting therefrom. We elect to review this question of whether there was a state default which would bar federal habeas corpus relief on the basis it was resolved by the trial court, i.e., “cause” and “prejudice.” However, in this connection, see Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1998); Brewer v. Reynolds, 5l F.3d 1519, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F. 3d 1343, 1363-64 (10th Cir. 1994).
- 11 - Peveto had been in attendance, a “reasonably effective” attorney would have exercised
his right of allocution, and after having made certain that the district attorney had, in
fact, recommended a 30-year sentence, would then have urged the district court to
follow that recommendation. But Peveto was not present and the district court then
appointed an attorney who knew nothing about the case to represent Wiseman at
sentencing, and after a brief conference lasting a few minutes, Wiseman was sentenced
to two life sentences. The fact that they were to be served concurrently, and not
consecutively, is, contrary to a suggestion by counsel, of little solace! Then newly
appointed counsel, after being advised that Wiseman thought he was going to receive a
30-year sentence under the plea agreement, did not pursue the matter, -- i.e., no motion
to withdraw the plea of guilty, and no appeal. All of which, in our view, adds up to
ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of both Peveto and Purcell. In this regard, it
would appear, as previously noted, that neither Purcell nor the sentencing judge, who
apparently was the judge who accepted Wiseman’s petition to plead guilty, was aware of
the fact that the district attorney in the plea agreement agreed to recommend a 30-year
sentence. In sum, under the authorities above cited, the record supports the court’s
determination that Wiseman was denied his constitutional right to counsel and
accordingly was entitled to
§ 2254 relief.
The respondents also argue that the remedy ordered by the federal district court is
- 12 - improper since Wiseman has never moved to withdraw his plea of guilty, and that under
Oklahoma law a defendant may not appeal a sentence imposed on a plea of guilty unless
he has previously moved to withdraw his plea. In thus arguing, the respondents cite the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 4.2(A), 22 O.S.A. Ch. 18, App. and Banks v.
Oklahoma, 953 P.2d 344 (1998). We are not persuaded.
In our view the federal district court on the record before it could have simply
issued the writ and ordered Cody and the Attorney General’s office to release Wiseman
from custody on the two life sentences with which we are here concerned. However, the
district court, in the spirit of comity no doubt, entered an order that the Oklahoma courts
be given the opportunity to grant Wiseman an out of time appeal and provide him with
the assistance of counsel. The Oklahoma courts may well order that Wiseman be
allowed to file an out of time motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, if that be necessary.
However, in this regard we do note that counsel for Wiseman at oral argument before
this court indicated that he really did not want to withdraw Wiseman’s plea of guilty.
Rather, Wiseman’s attorney stated that all he wanted was that Wiseman be resentenced
by a judge who was aware that Wiseman pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain with
the district attorney wherein the latter promised to recommend a 30-year sentence, as
contrasted to a life sentence, the maximum under the statute. In line with the judgment
of the district court in the instant case, if the Oklahoma courts grant an out of time
appeal and look into this matter, the petition should be denied, and the action dismissed
- 13 - without prejudice. If the Oklahoma courts, for one reason or another, do not grant an
appeal out of time, and do not otherwise proceed, the writ should issue and Wiseman
should be released from custody for the two life sentences here involved. In Baker v.
Kaiser, 929 F.2d at 1501, we indicated our approval of an order similar to the present
one, i.e., if Oklahoma grants, “by whatever procedure it deems appropriate,” an out of
time appeal within 90 days, the petition shall be dismissed, but if the state fails to grant
the appeal, the “writ shall issue releasing petitioner.”
As noted, there are “gaps” in the record before us, which is not surprising in view
of the fact that the case has its genesis in 1982. That there are “gaps,” of course, permits
concern, concern that there may be an innocuous scenario. Perhaps, for example, the
district court, in fact, rejected the “recommendation” of the district attorney, and
Wiseman thereafter persisted in a plea of guilty and was lawfully sentenced within the
statutory limits. However, there is nothing in the present record which suggests such.7
And, importantly, at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate, the respondents
called only two witnesses, Peveto and Purcell. Their testimony, standing alone, in our
view, amply supports the magistrate’s proposed finding that there was a plea bargain
and that thereafter Wiseman was not afforded his Sixth Amendment right to assistance
7 In like fashion, we reject respondents’ suggestion that there never was a plea bargain between Wiseman and the district attorney and that his plea of guilty was in fact a “blind” plea. The evidence on that matter is all to the contrary, and the magistrate so found.
- 14 - of counsel. The district court “affirmed and adopted” all of the magistrate’s findings.
The record supports such, and therefore we now affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Robert H. McWilliams Senior Circuit Judge
- 15 -