Wise v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

• Court: District Court, W.D. Arkansas
• Decided: June 17, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-04097
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS TEXARKANA DIVISION

SHERRY WISE PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04097

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending now before the Court is the Stipulated Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 18. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey referred this Motion to the Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation. In accordance with that referral, this Court enters the following report and recommendation. 1. Background: On September 18, 2024, Sherry Wise (“Plaintiff”) appealed to the Court from the Secretary of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her request for disability benefits. ECF No. 1. On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff’s case was reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 17. On June 9, 2025, the parties filed this Motion. ECF No. 18. With this Motion, Plaintiff states the parties have stipulated to a total award of $7,191.50 in attorney’s fees and costs for work performed representing $6,786.50 in attorney fees and $405.00 costs. Id. 2. Applicable Law: Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary’s position in denying benefits was substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary

bears the burden of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below was substantially justified”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final judgment in an action, See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day time for appeal has expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993). An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). The United States

Supreme Court stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) as follows: Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)], but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the [amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.”

Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir. 1984). The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified there has been an increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the attorney’s rate per

hour, based upon the United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). See also General Order 39 (“Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act”). 3. Discussion: In the present action, Plaintiff’s case was remanded to the SSA. ECF No. 17. Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s claim that she is the prevailing party and does not oppose her application for fees under EAJA. ECF No. 18. The Court construes the lack of opposition to this application as an admission that the government’s decision to deny benefits was not “substantially justified” and that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

The Parties have stipulated to a total award of $7,191.50. ECF No. 18. This includes $6,786.50 in attorney fees and $405.00 in costs. Id. Based on this stipulation, the Court recommends this amount in fees and costs be awarded. As a final point, attorney’s fees must be awarded to the “prevailing party” or the litigant. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). Thus, these fees must be awarded to Plaintiff, not to Plaintiff’s attorney. However, if Plaintiff has executed a valid assignment to Plaintiff’s attorney of all rights in an attorney’s fee award and Plaintiff owes no outstanding debt to the federal government, the attorney’s fee may be awarded directly to Plaintiff’s attorney. 4. Conclusion: Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends the Stipulated Motion for Attorney’s

Fees (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff be awarded $7,191.50. This amount represents $6,786.50 in attorney fees and costs of $405.00. in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990). ENTERED this 17th day of June 2025. Barry A. Bryant /s/ HON. BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE