Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Company

293 F. Supp. 1034, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8697, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9875
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 18, 1968
DocketCiv. 6221
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 293 F. Supp. 1034 (Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Company, 293 F. Supp. 1034, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8697, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9875 (E.D. Okla. 1968).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Secretary of Labor, brings this action against the Defendant, *1036 Muskogee Jones Store Company, claiming violations by the Defendant of the “equal pay” provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Jurisdiction is present pursuant to Section 17 of the Act. Plaintiff claims that the Defendant has violated Section 6(d) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (1), (added by amendment in 1963) which provides:

§ 6(d) (1) “No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.”

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendant from violating this Section and to restrain Defendant from withholding compensation due four of its female employees.

Defendant operated a retail department store in Muskogee, Oklahoma, (it has now gone out of business), with ten retail departments. Plaintiff makes no complaint with reference to three of these department managers (millinery, cosmetics and drapery) who were females, 1 but claims that four other department managers who were females were discriminated against on the basis of sex by not being paid as much as three other department managers who were males. These seven department managers involved in this case, their sex and their departments are as follows:

NAME SEX DEPARTMENT(S)

Habeck Male Men’s Clothing.

Lockler Male Domestics, Linens and Boy’s Department.

Waid Male Furniture, Home Furnishings, Warehouse and Delivery.

Hill Female Women’s Clothing.

Casey Female Lingerie and Foundations.

Epps Female Infant’s Wear and Girl’s Clothing.

Barksdale Female Ladies Accessories.

Plaintiff originally contended that all females should have been paid as much as the lowest paid male. This contention was later changed to request that Hill be paid as much as Habeck and that the other three female departments be paid as much as the lowest paid male.

It is agreed that the Defendant was not an enterprise, was engaged in interstate commerce, working conditions in *1037 the store were similar for all department heads, the Defendant had no seniority system or merit system and the department heads did not function under a system which measured earnings by quantity or quality of production.

As the issues were thus finally joined herein, the Plaintiff contends that Ha-beck and Hill on the one hand and the other five department heads on the other hand were doing equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort and responsibility with the female department heads receiving wages at a rate less than the male department heads, whereas, the Defendant contends that the department heads were not doing equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort and responsibility, that the disparity in wages was based on factors other than sex and that certain of the department heads were exempt from the provisions of the Act pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1).

The burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to establish that the department heads were doing equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility with the female department heads being discriminated against (wage disparity) on the basis of sex and is upon the Defendant to establish any of the exceptions listed in the Section. Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., (D.C.N.J.1968) 284 F.Supp. 23.

The term “equal” as used in the Act means “substantially identical” rather than “similar,” “comparable” or “identical.” Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., supra.

The evidence reveals that all seven of the employees involved had the job title of department head and each was the head of a retail department in the store which was separate and different as to merchandise handled from all the other departments. The Court does not believe that because all had the same job title or classification that the Plaintiff thereby makes out a case. 29 C.F.R. 800.121. Nor does the Plaintiff so contend. It is actual job requirements and performance that should be considered. However, the Plaintiff does urge that he is entitled to the relief sought notwithstanding the fact that none of the department heads could do the exact job of the other department heads. The evidence did disclose this inability. For example, the manager of the lingerie and foundations department could not manage the men’s clothing department and vice versa.

The evidence further revealed that in addition to being a department head of the furniture and home furnishings department, the male employee Waid was also in charge of the warehouse and home delivery service for the entire store. None of the other employees involved herein had any responsibility with reference to the warehouse and home delivery service. Thus, Waid clearly had an additional responsibility not possessed by the other department heads. The Court cannot agree with the Plaintiff’s position regarding this employee and his responsibilities to the effect that his additional duties were insignificant. The Court finds that the same were significant and substantial and, therefore, finds and concludes that Waid must be eliminated from consideration herein by reason of these additional and different responsibilities. Kilpatrick v. Sweet, (M.D.Fla.1966) 262 F.Supp. 561, Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., (D.C.Mass.1967) 265 F.Supp. 787.

As to the other employees involved herein, the evidence generally reveals that each head of a department buys for the same, establishes prices, keeps inventory records, determines when special sales will be conducted and accomplishes mark-downs on merchandise, prepares ads, makes required reports, supervises and trains other employees in the department, recommends the hiring and *1038

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Bluebook (online)
293 F. Supp. 1034, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8697, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wirtz-v-muskogee-jones-store-company-oked-1968.