Wirth v. United States

23 C.C.P.A. 283, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 7
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 27, 1936
DocketNo. 3920; No. 3922
StatusPublished

This text of 23 C.C.P.A. 283 (Wirth v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wirth v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 283, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 7 (ccpa 1936).

Opinion

Graham, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The present case involves an appeal and cross-appeal in a reappraisement proceeding coming to us from the United States Customs Court, First Division, and involves 144 entries of goods, chiefly at the port of New York, but with two entries at the port of Boston, Mass., and four at the port of San Francisco, Calif. These reappraisements have been consolidated for the purposes of trial, by agreement of the parties.

The imported goods are filters and filter parts. The case was-before us in 1932, and the opinion of this court appears in United States v. Philipp Wirth et al., 20 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 94, T. D. 45705. When the goods were imported, the local appraiser appraised the same for duty upon the basis of their foreign value. Appeal was-taken to reappraisement by the importers, and the matter was first-tried in the Customs Court in 1930, before Chief Justice Fischer, who found the same to be dutiable on the basis of foreign value. On-appeal, the First Appellate Division of the Customs Court affirmed the finding of the trial court, and the United States appealed to this court, claiming that the value so found did not represent the foreign value. On appeal, this court held that there was no foreign value-shown to exist, and that the prices at which the merchandise was sold abroad were not uniform; that there was no evidence as to the usual quantities so sold, and that the market was a controlled one. It was conceded by counsel for the parties that the merchandise had no export value. We, therefore, held that the goods were dutiable at the United States value thereof, if there was any such value; if not, then at the cost of production under section 402 of the Tariff Act of 1922. Because of the fact that the parties and the trial court-[285]*285liad proceeded upon the erroneous theory that there was a foreign value, this court was of opinion that the cause should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial in order — '

that the parties may have an opportunity to present evidence of such value (United States) or cost of production as the facts may warrant. (Parenthetical matter not quoted.)

Accordingly, upon receipt of the mandate of this court, the First Division remanded the case to the single judge for a new trial. Trial was had before Judge Dallinger, and much testimony was offered, including several affidavits and reports of customs and Treasury representatives, bearing upon the question of United States value and cost of production of the imported goods.

As a result of the testimony heard, Judge Dallinger made a finding that there was no United States value shown as to the imported goods, but that there was a proved cost of production, which was found as to each unit involved.

From this judgment, appeal was taken to the First Division. The appellate division reversed the finding and judgment of the single judge, and entered judgment remanding the matter to the single judge, with directions to dismiss the appeals to reappraisement. From that judgment, both the importers and the Government have appealed.

The appellate division, in its decision, finds that the single judge properly held that there was no United States value shown for the imported goods. This holding was based largely upon the finding by the court that the- market in the United States was a controlled market, and that there was no fixed price for the goods, but that special prices were made by an exclusive agent for each article that was sold in the United States. As to the matter of cost of production, the appellate division differed with the single judge, and held that no ■cost of production was shown. This holding was made upon the appellate division’s theory of the law applicable to the matter, found ¿n section 402 (e) of said Tariff Act of 1922, which is as follows:

Seo. 402. (e) For the purpose of this title the cost of production, of imported merchandise shall be the sum of — •
(1) The cost of materials of, and of fabrication, manipulation, or other process employed in manufacturing or producing such or similar merchandise, at a time preceding the date of exportation of the particular merchandise under consideration which would ordinarily permit the manufacture or production of the particular merchandise under consideration in the usual course of business;
(2) The usual general expenses (not less than 10 per centum of such cost) in the case of such or similar merchandise;
(3) The cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the particular merchandise under consideration In condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States; and
(4) An addition for profit (not less than 8 per centum of the sum of the amounts found under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision) equal to the profit which [286]*286ordinarily is added, in the ease of merchandise of the same general character as: the particular merchandise under consideration, by manufacturers or producers-in the country of manufacture or production who are engaged in the production: or manufacture of merchandise of the same class or kind.

It will be observed tbat this section requires, in order to establish.. cost of production, the proof of four principal items which are numbered (1) to (4), inclusive. The appellate division was of opinion,, and so held, that in order to establish the elements of cost of production found in said subsection (1), the cost of materials, fabrication,, and manipulation must be broken down and itemized so that it might-be ascertained, separately, how much the materials cost, how much was expended for labor, and any other items which might enter into-the production costs mentioned in said subsection (1).

The Government contended, in its argument to the court, that the-“lumping” of the cost of materials, fabrication, labor, manipulation,, or other processes, was not in compliance with the terms of section 402 (e), supra, and that in the absence of such detail there was no way of determining whether an adequate amount had been included for any one of the elements constituting the aggregate cost, and based this argument upon The Gevaert Co. of America v. United States, Reap. Dec. 2988, affirmed in Gevaert Co. of America, Inc. v. United States, Reap. Dec. 3128.

The appellate division agreed with the Government in this contention, and held that because of the absence of such breaking down or itemization of labor and materials, there was no cost of production shown within the meaning of the said statute, and, therefore, the judgment was that the matter be remanded to the single judge to dismiss the appeals. No finding was made as to the presence or absence of proof of the three remaining items in section 402 (e), namely, the usual general expenses, the cost of all containers and coverings, and an addition for profit. Manifestly the appellate division did not think it necessary to pass upon the presence or absence of such proof, inasmuch as it had found that the element of cost provided by subsection (1) had not been established, and, according to the division’s finding, that, therefore, no cost of production had been established, and the necessity for further findings was obviated.

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23 C.C.P.A. 283, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wirth-v-united-states-ccpa-1936.