Wireless Advanced Vehicle Electrification, LLC v. WiTricity Corporation

District Court, D. Utah·Decided October 7, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-00577·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

WIRELESS ADVANCED VEHICLE ELECTRIFICATION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR BOND WITRICITY CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; JOE BENZ, an individual; 2:24-cv-00577-RJS-CMR JUSTIN SCALZI, an individual; STEVEN BALL, an individual; ROBERT EISERT, an Chief District Judge Robert J. Shelby individual; PRADEEP GADDAM, an individual; GARRETT HARMSEN, an Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero individual; JORY PEPPELAAR, an individual; WYLEE STAPLES, an individual; GAYLA STEWART, an individual; ADEEL ZAHEER, an individual; RUBEN GOMEZ, an individual; GLEN AGUILAR, an individual; JEFFREY HARDING, an individual; JUSTIN NORDLUND, an individual; and MELANIE ESPINOSA, an individual,

Defendants.

Now before the court are two related motions. The first is Defendants’ Expedited Motion to Reconsider Bond Amount, and Motion for Adequate Bond of $1,617,779.59 (Motion for Bond).1 The second is Plaintiff Wireless Advances Vehicle Electrification, LLC’s (WAVE) Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply Re Motion to Reconsider Bond Amount, and Motion for

1 Dkt. 66, Defendants’ Expedited Motion to Reconsider Bond Amount, and Motion for Adequate Bond of $1,617,779.59 (Motion for Bond). Adequate Bond of $1,617,779.59 (Motion to Strike).2 The court DENIES both Motions for the reasons explained below.

BACKGROUND On August 15, 2024, WAVE filed its Amended Complaint against WiTricity Corp, two WiTricity officials, and 13 ex-WAVE employees.3 WiTricity is WAVE’s competitor in the heavy-duty electric vehicle inductive charging industry.4 WAVE alleged WiTricity, two of its officers, and six ex-WAVE employees violated federal and Utah trade secret law.5 Among several other grievances, WAVE also alleged five additional ex-WAVE employees conspired to violate the same.6 Relevant to WiTricity’s Motion, WAVE alleged 10 ex-WAVE employees breached one-year non-competition agreements by accepting employment at WiTricity.7 On August 26, 2024, the court heard

argument on WAVE’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. At the TRO Hearing, the court granted in part WAVE’s TRO and enjoined 10 ex-WAVE employees from working for WiTricity for one year pending the outcome of this case.8 The court required WAVE to post $10,000 as security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) but invited Defendants to submit additional evidence regarding potential damages stemming from the TRO if Defendants

2 Dkt. 80, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply Re Motion to Reconsider Bond Amount, and Motion for Adequate Bond of $1,617,779.59 (Motion to Strike). 3 Dkt. 3, Amended Complaint. 4 Id. ¶ 50. 5 Id. ¶¶ 197–217. 6 Id. ¶¶ 197–217. 7 Id. ¶¶ 244–250. 8 Dkt. 64, Minute Entry. chose to pursue a higher bond.9 The court renewed the TRO most recently on October 3, 2024, and the order is set to renew every subsequent 14 days absent objection or until a preliminary injunction hearing.10 Defendants now move to increase the bond to $1,617,779.11 WAVE moved to strike

Defendants’ Reply in Support of its Motion for Bond, alleging Defendants raised new arguments in their Reply.12 LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) allows courts to “issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Generally, this bond “limits the liability of the applicant and informs the applicant of the price it can expect to pay if the injunction was wrongfully issued.”13 However, “the trial judge has wide discretion in the matter of requiring security” because Rule 65(c) requires a bond only in an amount ‘the court considers proper. . . .’14 Even where a

court determines a defendant was wrongfully enjoined, courts are “not bound to award damages on the bond without considering the equities of the case” because Rule 65(c) “was not intended to negate the court’s [equitable] duty.”15

9 Id. 10 Dkt. 88, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). 11 Motion for Bond. 12 Motion to Strike. 13 Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. CAT Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 335 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 14 Cont’l Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964). 15 State of Kan. ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1269–70. ANALYSIS Defendants move to require WAVE to post $1,617,779.59 as security for the TRO

enjoining 10 ex-WAVE employees (Enjoined Employees) from accepting employment at WiTricity for one year.16 Because the court invited briefing on potential harm to the Enjoined Employees,17 the court construes this motion under Rule 65(c)’s framework as opposed to a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59. Furthermore, although Defendants switched their primary legal basis underlying their Motion for Bond in their Reply, the court denies WAVE’s Motion to Strike because WAVE was sufficiently on notice of Defendants’ alternate theory. Nevertheless, the court finds WAVE’s $10,000 bond initially set at the TRO Hearing is appropriate under the circumstances. Defendants fail to proffer sufficient evidence showing $1,617,779.59 is the damage Enjoined Employees will sustain if they are wrongfully enjoined. Moreover, other equitable considerations weigh in favor of keeping the

bond set at $10,000. Accordingly, the court denies Defendants’ Motion for Bond. I. Rule 59 Is an Inapposite Basis to Decide Defendants’ Motion.

WAVE argues Defendants’ motion seeks to alter or amend this court’s judgment at the TRO Hearing wherein WAVE was required to post bond in the amount of $10,000 as security for this court granting its TRO against the Enjoined Employees. Accordingly, WAVE contends the extraordinary standards set forth in Rule 59(e) govern Defendants’ motion.18

16 Dkt. 66, Motion for Bond. 17 Dkt. 64, Minute Entry. 18 Dkt. 80, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider Bond Amount and Motion for Adequate Bond of $1,617,779.59 (Opposition to Bond) at 2–3; see Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”)). The court disagrees. At the TRO Hearing, the court invited further briefing on the bond issue because it was absent from Defendants’ TRO briefing.19 Requiring WAVE to post bond in the amount of $10,000 was subject to change if Defendants adequately showed the Enjoined Employees would suffer additional injury if the TRO was wrongfully issued consistent with Rule 65(c).20

II. Defendants’ Motion for Bond Adequately Put WAVE on Notice About Defendants’ Theory of the Case.

In their Motion for Bond, Defendants request bond in the amount of $1,617,779.59 because it represents the amount WiTricity would need to replace the Enjoined Employees,21 an argument they entirely abandon in subsequent briefing.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Wireless Advanced Vehicle Electrification, LLC v. WiTricity Corporation, (D. Utah 2024).

Wireless Advanced Vehicle Electrification, LLC v. WiTricity Corporation (Wireless Advanced Vehicle Electrification, LLC v. WiTricity Corporation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Servants of the Paraclete v. Does
204 F.3d 1005 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Marcam Corp. v. Orchard
885 F. Supp. 294 (D. Massachusetts, 1995)
Aspect Software, Inc. v. Barnett
787 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Massachusetts, 2011)
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Isham
782 F. Supp. 524 (D. Colorado, 1992)
Wilson v. Circle K Stores, Inc.
872 F.3d 1094 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams
705 F.2d 1267 (Tenth Circuit, 1983)
Temple University v. White
941 F.2d 201 (Third Circuit, 1991)