Wire Wheel Corp. of America v. C. T. Silver, Inc.

266 F. 221, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 654
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 13, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 266 F. 221 (Wire Wheel Corp. of America v. C. T. Silver, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wire Wheel Corp. of America v. C. T. Silver, Inc., 266 F. 221, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).

Opinion

LEARNED HAND, District Judge.

[1] As the issue of validity must in my judgment necessarily go against the patent, I shall coniine myself to a discussion of that alone. The tension wheel was concededly old; indeed, the world owes it to the imagination of that varied and amazing genius, Leonardo da Vinci. It depended upon the fact that the hub of a wheel might be made to hang from its upper spokes as well as rest on its lower. However, it was at once obvious that the spokes themselves, having no inherent rigidity, hut only tensile strength, could not suffer the torsional strains involved in a traction torque at the hub, if they ran radially from hub to felloe. The line of strain, being tangential to the hub, cuts directly across a radial spoke. Hence it became known long before Pugh’s time that, to be effective, traction wheels should have the spokes set tangentially to the hub, from which it also followed that the tangents must run in both directions, else the hub would tend to twist under its own load. I may therefore assume the knowledge of the art of a tension wheel with spokes set tangentially.-

Pugh had before him two requirements; i. e., to brace such a wheel against shock coming, from without for the most part, and to accommodate his wire tension wheel to the conventional established gauge of [226]*226the motor car. The shocks he provided against, where the wheel remained symmetrical, by running spokes from the ends of the hub to the opposite side of the felloe. This is shown in Figures Í, 2, and 3 of his patent. This was all that was necessary in cases where he need not concern himself with tire gauge of the vehicle. However, it so chances that this much of his patent had been exactly disclosed in every detail, 'so far as I can see, by Hammon, 574,538, over 20 years before, in 1897. Hammon’s Figure 2 shows a tension wheel of which the spokes are both tangential and radial, and laced precisely as Figure 1 of Pugh and substantially as shown in his Figure 2, though the cross-lacing does not run to the extreme rim of the felloe. Figure 5 of Hammon shows a tension wheel all of whose spokes are tangential, but laced slightly differently from the Pugh patent (Figures 1 and 2). The lacing of Figure 5 of Hammon differed from that of Figure 1 for no essential reason that I can perceive. It is clear at a glance that at pleasure either the spokes, 4-, of Figure 1 might be tangential or that the spokes, 7, of Figure 5 might be laced as shown in Figure 2.

Again, in Sharp’s British patent of 1908, 2,618, exactly similar lacing is shown of a wheel all of whose spokea are tangential. Grauert and Humphris show the same lacing in wheels with, radial spokes. This art taken as a whole anticipates Pugh, so far as Figures 1, 2, and 3 go, and must have made well known the system of cross-lacing which the defendant has adopted.

It is quite true, however, that Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the patent in suit do not show the central plane of the wheel offset from the center of the hub, and it is upon this element alone that the patent may rely. Pugh’s earlier British patent (sub nom. Rudge-Whitworth, 1905, 14,-892) shows an offset or “dished” wheel for a motor car, made up of two sets of tangentially disposed tension spokes or wires, each set running from one side of the hub to the nearer side of the felloe. That wheel is precisely the same as Figures 6 and 7 of the patent in suit, except for the fact that, instead of running all the spokes from the inner side of the hub to the inner side of the felloe, half are run to the inner side and half are crossed to the outer side. In short, Figures 6 and 7 show no greater bracing power from outside shocks than the earlier patent, but they do show a bracing against shocks from within.

The sole question upon which validity depends is therefore this: In view of Hammon, Sharp, and the other patents noted, was it invention to change Pugh’s first patent by running half the spokes from one side of the hub alternately to opposite sides of the felloe? The defendant has copied Hammon’s and Sharp’s spoke arrangement exactly; all he has done is to make it into a “dished” wheel, a.thing disclosed, not only in Pugh’s earlier patent, but in Eisenhuth and Harrington as well. In considering the invention involved in this change it must be remembered that it added nothing of value to the wheel taken alone, but only made the cross-lacing available for a standard motor car. The necessities of a “dished” wheel were forced upon Pugh only by the conventional tracking gauge or tread already established for motor cars. No one has suggested that wheels made like Hammon’s or Sharp’s [227]*227would not have answered quite as well as Pugh’s, except that they would not have been put upon standard motor cars without increasing their tread, or changing the width of the chassis.

I cannot bring myself to see that, having once solved the “problem,” assuming it was any problem at all, of “dishing” the ordinary wire wheel, it took any inventive power to make Hammon’s and Sharp’s wheel into a “dished” wheel, precisely as the defendant has done. Once the conditions of the industry presented that necessity, all the means were at hand to meet it. Doubtless it is always a difficult question to say, when any step is taken in art, what degree of imagination it required. Possibly judges are not well qualified to restate to themselves the stage in the technique of the art reached when the step was taken, or try to put themselves in the position of those who took it, yet the settled law requires them to do so, and, if not, novelty and invention would be synonymous.

I know of no objective test which will serve to answer that question, which arises in nearly every case; it must be solved by an attempt to reconstruct the scope and limits of imagination of the ordinary skilled man. Had such a one, having seen Pugh’s first wheel, wished to use Hammon’s or Sharp’s lacing upon wheels that must not increase their tread, the solution would, I think, have come automatically. He would have only to shorten the spokes on one side and lengthen them on the other. Had he needed help for that, Pugh’s patent was at hand. Perhaps there is nothing more to be said on the matter; I own I cannot think of any process of reasoning by which it can be further elucidated. The required standard-of conduct in such cases, as in some other branches of the law, e. g., negligence, notice, and the like, is not susceptible of deductive application; it must be constructed in each case for that case.

[2] As iti all successful patents, the patentee, properly enough, relies upon the supposed proof of invention arising from commercial exploitation. It is a most hazardous test. Commercial success, as the courts have repeatedly observed, may arise from many other reasons than a new inventive idea. Without trying to lay down any exhaustive definition of the conditions where it may be helpful, I can very generally say that its main value is in cases where the existing means have for some time been unsatisfactory, and where the new step has at once answered the need and displaced what went before. When to this is added the fact that others have earlier tried to reach the same result, the proof becomes telling, and we hesitate to' substitute our own judgment for the objective evidence that the new thing was not so easy to make as it looked.

The commercial conditions in Britain, where the patent arose, are nearly absent from this record.

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Bluebook (online)
266 F. 221, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 654, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wire-wheel-corp-of-america-v-c-t-silver-inc-nysd-1919.