Winther v. Industrial Accident Commission

60 P.2d 342, 16 Cal. App. 2d 131, 1936 Cal. App. LEXIS 250
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 19, 1936
DocketCiv. 1816
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 60 P.2d 342 (Winther v. Industrial Accident Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Winther v. Industrial Accident Commission, 60 P.2d 342, 16 Cal. App. 2d 131, 1936 Cal. App. LEXIS 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

JENNINGS, J.

This proceeding in certiorari was instituted by petitioners who seek thereby to annul an award made by respondent Industrial Accident Commission in favor of respondent Mike Robles.

The transcript of the testimony which was given before the referee of the respondent commission discloses that the following facts form the evidentiary basis for the award which is here sought to be annulled: Petitioner Winther owns a 34-acre ranch neat Lindsay, California, on which he grows olives. At some time prior to October 31, 1935, Winther entered into an oral contract with one Rueda, whereby the latter agreed to pick the entire crop of olives from the trees on the former’s ranch and to transport the olives when picked to a packing house. For the work of picking and hauling the olives Winther agreed to pay Rueda at the rate of $16 per ton. Contracts of this same character had been made between these parties for several years prior to the year 1935. Rueda hired a number of men to assist him in the work of picking the olives. He agreed to pay these men for the work which they did at the rate of 26 or 27 cents per box. Among the men who were thus hired by Rueda was the respondent Mike Robles. On October 31, 1935, Robles rode in his own automobile from his home in Porterville to the Winther ranch and began to pick olives. He had not theretofore met Winther, but became acquainted with him after he arrived at the ranch. Rueda was not himself present at the ranch during the morning of the above-mentioned date, although four of his sons were present and were engaged in picking the olives. At various times during the morning *134 Winther walked through the olive orchard and told several of the workmen, including R-obles, to pick the olives clean and to take the leaves from the boxes in which the olives were deposited as they were removed from the trees. Rueda testified that Winther told him “to do the work right”. Winther testified that Rueda hired the olive pickers, that Rueda alone had the power to discharge them, and that he had no control over them although he stated that “the understanding was if I didn’t want the men he would not bring them back”. Rueda testified that Winther had the right to discharge Robles if he did not like his work. This witness also testified that “Winther had told him which men to fire but he just hired them. ’ ’ He also testified that when he was present he “was the boss” and that in his absence his boy occupied this position. Robles testified that no boss was present during the morning of October 31, 1935, and that he took his orders from Winther. These orders consisted of the direction that he should take the leaves from the boxes, pick the olives clean, and watch the boxes. He stated that Winther was present and gave him this direction before anyone commenced to pick the olives and that Winther appeared again about half an hour after the men had begun to pick olives and told some of the other men to pick clean. At about 9 :30 in the morning of October 31, 1935, while Robles was engaged in the work of picking olives he fell and sustained the injuries for which the award here sought to be annulled was made.

It is the contention of petitioners that the above-mentioned facts indicate a lack of evidentiary sufficiency to support the award. In giving consideration to this contention it may be observed that the problem which was presented for solution by the respondent Accident Commission was the relationship which existed between the injured man, Robles, and the petitioner Winther. The referee found and by approving his findings the commission found that at the time the injuries were sustained Robles was an employee of Winther. It is apparent from the record that the factor which is of primary importance is the relationship which Rueda bore to Winther. If it may fairly be declared that there was evidence which tended to show that this relationship was one of employment the award is sustainable. If, however, an analysis of the evidence impels the conclusion *135 that Rueda was an independent contractor the award was improper and must be annulled. (Western Ind. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 172 Cal. 766 [158 Pac. 1033].) This must be true because the evidence showed without conflict—• and there is no contention to the contrary—that Robles was primarily an employee of Rueda. Rueda hired him. Rueda agreed to pay him and did pay him for. his services in picking the olives a specified sum per box. Rueda had the power to discharge him. Whatever relationship existed between Robles and Winther came to pass through the interposition of Rueda.

The term “Independent contractor” has been defined as “one who renders service in the course of an independent employment or occupation, following his employer’s desires only in the results of the work, and not the means whereby it is to be accomplished”. (Moody v. Industrial Acc. Com., 204 Cal. 668, 670 [269 Pac. 542, 60 A. L. R. 299].) In arriving at a determination of whether one person is an employee of another or whether the status of the former is that of an independent contractor, one of the best tests to be applied to the factual situation which is presented is the right of control. (Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 577 [250 Pac. 570].) When the essential object of the employment is the performance of certain work the relation of master and servant does not exist unless the employer reserves the right to direct the mode and manner in which the work shall be done. (Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 807 [159 Pac. 721].)

It is our conclusion that the relationship which existed between Winther and Rueda was not that of employer and employee but that the latter was an independent contractor. So far as appears, the contract between these parties which formed the basis for whatever relationship existed between them was one whereby Rueda agreed to pick and haul the entire crop of olives which was growing on Winther’s land and the latter agreed that he would pay for this service at the rate of $16 per ton. This was a simple oral contract and there is nothing in it to indicate that Winther was interested in the slightest degree in the means by which the work should be done or in the details of its accomplishment. So far as appears, he was interested solely in the final result *136 to be attained which was the picking and hauling of the entire crop of olives on his ranch.

In support of their contention that the commission’s award has sufficient evidentiary support to sustain it, respondents rely on certain circumstances disclosed by the record. One of these circumstances is the fact that during the morning of October 31, 1935, and prior to the occurrence of the accident, Winther walked through the olive orchard and on two different occasions directed the olive pickers to pick the fruit clean and to remove all leaves from' the boxes in which the olives were being deposited. A second circumstance is presented by certain evidence which tended to show that Winther reserved the right to discharge any olive picker whose work was not satisfactory to him.

With respect to the first of the above mentioned circumstances it should be observed that it was long ago decided that the meaning of the word control, as it is used in the phrase “right of control”, is complete control.

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Bluebook (online)
60 P.2d 342, 16 Cal. App. 2d 131, 1936 Cal. App. LEXIS 250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winther-v-industrial-accident-commission-calctapp-1936.