Winters v. Sanchez

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 PAUL L. WINTERS, Case No. 23-cv-06093-AMO (PR)

9 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 11 JEFFREY MACOMBER, Secretary of California Department of Corrections and 12 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Respondent. 13

14 15 I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner Paul L. Winters, a state parolee who is currently being held at Santa Rita Jail, 16 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, representing himself. He 17 claims that his parole supervision period has been unlawfully extended. The Court ordered 18 Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed a motion 19 to dismiss the petition as unexhausted.1 Winters has filed an opposition in which he argues that 20 Respondent’s filing of the motion to dismiss was improper, and Respondent has filed a reply. 21 Dkts. 9, 10, 11. Winters has also filed an unsolicited sur-reply. Dkt. 12. 22 For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 23 // 24 // 25 26 1 In the alternative, Respondent argues that to the extent that Winters alleges errors of state law, 27 such claims should be dismissed because “[f]ederal habeas corpus relief is not available for II. DISCUSSION 1 A. Winters’s Argument That Filing of Motion to Dismiss Was Improper 2 Before turning to the merits of Respondent’s motion, the Court first addresses Winters’s 3 argument that the filing of the motion to dismiss was improper because Respondent “fail[ed] to 4 address the core issues raised in the petition.” Dkt. 10 at 3. Respondent’s filing of the motion to 5 dismiss was permissible. See White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 600, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989). “While 6 there may be circumstances where concerns about delay and efficiency militate in favor of 7 ordering a full scale answer,” the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases in the U.S. District 8 Courts and the advisory committee’s notes thereto do not impose a “ blanket bar against motions 9 to dismiss without regard to their merit.” Id. at 603. The Court is receptive to a respondent 10 raising threshold problems (such as lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust, improper venue, lack of 11 custody, mootness, and untimeliness) by motion rather than in the answer because it often is a 12 more efficient process for the litigants and the district courts. When the Court sees a procedural 13 problem in its initial review of a habeas petition, it often invites a motion to dismiss rather than an 14 answer. However, as here, there often is not enough information in the petition to alert the Court 15 to the existence of a potential procedural problem and thus the Court issues an order to show cause 16 why the writ should not be granted. By doing so, the Court does not intend to preclude 17 Respondent from moving to dismiss the petition for a threshold procedural problem. 18 B. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 19 As mentioned, Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that Winters failed 20 to exhaust his state court remedies. Dkt. 9 at 1. 21 Before Winters may challenge either the fact or length of his confinement in a habeas 22 petition in this Court, he must present to the California Supreme Court any claims he wishes to 23 raise in this Court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding every claim raised in 24 federal habeas petition must be exhausted). The general rule is that a federal district court must 25 dismiss a federal habeas petition containing any claim as to which state remedies have not been 26 exhausted. Id. A fully unexhausted federal habeas petition may not be stayed and must be 27 dismissed. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Once a district 1 court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire 2 further as to the petitioner’s intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for 3 failure to exhaust.”); Jones v. McDaniel, 320 Fed. Appx. 784, 786 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming the 4 dismissal of a fully unexhausted petition and denial of a stay, because a “Rhines2 stay is only 5 available for a mixed habeas petition where at least some claims have been exhausted, and none of 6 [petitioner’s] habeas claims were exhausted”). 7 In his opposition, Winters asserts that he presented his claims in the state superior court, 8 which “fully satisfies the requirement of presenting claims to ‘any state court’ when proof has 9 been submitted.” Dkt. 10 at 3; Ex. 3. Meanwhile, Respondent disagrees and asserts that “Winters 10 must demonstrate that he presented his claim that [the] CDCR unlawfully extended his parole 11 supervision period to the California Supreme Court.” Dkt. 11 at 2 (citing Larche v. Simons, 53 12 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 13 1093 (9th Cir. 2015)). The Court agrees with Respondent. In order to exhaust, the State’s highest 14 court must be given an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. See 15 O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (holding that petitioner must invoke “one 16 complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”). It thus appears that Winters 17 has presented a fully unexhausted petition. Because Winters did not present his claims to the state 18 supreme court for review, either in a petition for review or in a state petition for a writ of habeas 19 corpus, his federal petition is unexhausted and must be DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Court 20 GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as unexhausted.3 Therefore, the petition is 21 DISMISSED. This dismissal is without prejudice to Winters returning to state court to exhaust 22 his state judicial remedies and then filing a new federal habeas corpus petition, should he need to 23 do so. If he does, he is advised to file his new federal habeas corpus petition as soon as possible 24 after his state court proceedings have concluded. The Court makes no ruling at this time on the 25 issue of the timeliness of any future federal petition. 26 2 Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 27 I. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as 2 unexhausted. Dkt. 9. The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice, and may be re-filed once 3 the claims have been exhausted. 4 Because reasonable jurists would not find the result here debatable, a certificate of 5 appealability (“COA”) is DENIED. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) 6 (outlining standard for COA). 7 The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the file. 8 This Order terminates Docket No. 9. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: December 30, 2024 11 a 12 WO - ( Mnacel. Nadle □ 13 ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN United States District Judge

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