Winters National Bank & Trust Co. v. Coots (In Re Coots)

4 B.R. 281
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMay 15, 1980
DocketBankruptcy 3-79-01709; 3-79-01710
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 4 B.R. 281 (Winters National Bank & Trust Co. v. Coots (In Re Coots)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Winters National Bank & Trust Co. v. Coots (In Re Coots), 4 B.R. 281 (Ohio 1980).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

CHARLES A. ANDERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court for review of the Winters National Bank and Trust Company, a secured creditor herein, motion requesting the Court to approve a reaffirmation agreement between itself and the above debtors in the amount of One Thousand Seven Hundred Six and 35/100 Dollars ($1,706.35). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds this motion not well taken.

The debtors filed their voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code with this Court on October 5, 1979. Their schedules show an estate with property valued at approximately $18,442.37 and debts totalling approximately $53,829.00. Among the debts listed in Schedule A-2 — Creditors Holding Security is a loan from the Winters National Bank secured by the debtors’ home. The Court granted the debtors their discharge in bankruptcy on January 17, 1980. The Winters National Bank and Trust filed its motion for leave to reaffirm the subject debt on January 21,1980, subsequent to the granting of the discharge.

A careful and precise reading of § 524(c) of the new Title 11 of the United States Code reveals that reaffirmation agreements regarding debts that are secured by real property of the debtor must comply with all requirements of that section except subsection (c)(4). Section 524(c) provides as follows:

(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only to any; extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if—
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title;
(2) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement within 30 days after such agreement becomes enforceable;
(3) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and
(4) in a case concerning an individual, to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor, the court approves such agreement .

Because a debt based on real estate is a dischargeable debt, the use of such a debt as consideration for a reaffirmation agreement makes that agreement subject to the provisions of § 524(c). (The Court would explain that the dischargeable portion of a debt secured by real estate is the debtor’s personal liability for the debt; we acknowledge that the property itself remains subject to the debt under any mortgage agreement).

The first requirement for an enforceable agreement under § 524(c) is the agreement must be made before the discharge has been granted. The second requirement is the debtor must not have rescinded the agreement within 30 days after the agreement became enforceable. The next requirement is the court must have complied with the provisions of subsection (d) of § 524. The final requirement of § 524(c) is, in a case concerning an individual and a reaffirmation agreement for a debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor, the court must approve the agreement according to the criteria set forth in the subsection. We believe subsection (4) of § 524(c) is the most telling of the four subsections. First, it is the only subsection which makes specific reference to and distinction of debts that are not secured by real property. This leads the court to believe that Congress intended the other subsections of § 524(c) to apply to both debts secured by real property and those not se *283 cured by real property. The other very important point about subsection (4) in relation to the case at bar is it is the only subsection to mention the necessity for court approval of reaffirmations. The subjection specifically states the court must approve reaffirmations of consumer debts not secured by real property; there is no requirement that the court approve reaffirmations of consumer debts that are secured by real property of the debtor. Thus, this Court holds that only reaffirmation agreements concerning individuals and their consumer debts not secured by real property need be approved by the Court.

For a complete understanding of § 524(c), we must also examine § 524(d). The latter section provides, in pertinent part:

(d) In a case concerning an individual . the court shall hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person. At such hearing . [i]f a discharge has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section, then at such hearing the court shall—
(2)determine whether the agreement that the debtor desires to make complies with the requirements of subsection (c)(4) of this subsection, if the consideration for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor.

Once again, the statute refers to court approval of a reaffirmation agreement, and, once again the reference is only with regard to agreements based on consumer debts that are not secured by real property. The Court views § 524(d) as further support for the position that courts need not approve all reaffirmation agreements entered into between debtors and creditors. Instead, court need only approve agreements based on consumer debts not secured by real property.

However, the Court must point out that the issue of court approval is the only issue on which § 524(c) and (d) distinguish between consumer debts secured by real property and those not secured by real property. The specific distinction between these two types of debts set forth only in § 524(c)(4) and § 524(d)(2) leads this Court to hold that the remainder of those sections applies equally to real property debts as well as to non-real property debts as long as the debt is a dischargeable debt as required in § 524(c).

Consequently, this Court holds that a reaffirmation agreement based upon a debt that is secured by real property of the debtor must comply with § 524(c)(1) and, therefore, must be made before the granting of the discharge. In the case at bar, the creditor has not offered any evidence indicating the subject agreement was entered into prior to January 17, 1980, the date of discharge. On the contrary, the creditor’s motion filed January 21, 1980 asks the Court to allow the debtors to reaffirm. The Court infers from this that no agreement had previously been made. Thus, the proposed reaffirmation agreement was not made in time to comply with § 524(c)(1) and, therefore, is unenforceable against the debtors. The Court would reiterate that only personal liability of the debtors is precluded by this decision; the mortgaged property will remain subject to the creditor’s claim.

Disposition of the issues raised instan ter does not resolve practical problems being experienced by real estate mortgagees, creating very severe questions of the title in the event subsequent circumstances, including defaults, require a mortgagee to institute foreclosure actions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 B.R. 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winters-national-bank-trust-co-v-coots-in-re-coots-ohsb-1980.